Book Review: The Mind-Body Problem

In The Mind-Body Problem, philosopher Johnathan Westphal explains the the mind-body problem (MBP) and various logical and empirical attempts to provide solutions. In essence, Westphal argues that the MBP is an intractable paradox that requires a different way to look at the human mind and body in the real world if progress is to be made.[1] The MBP asks (1) how it is possible for the nonphysical mind to interact with the physical body if it is true that physical and nonphysical things cannot interact, and (2) how mind and body are related. Westphal's logic, which is open to criticism as not the correct way to frame the issue, is as follows:

1. The mind is a nonphysical thing
2. The body is a physical thing
3. The mind and body interact
4. Physical and nonphysical things cannot interact

Westphal comments: “The mind-body problem is a paradox.[2] . . . . It is very hard to deny any of these four propositions. But they cannot consistently be held to be true together. At least one of them must be false, and the attempt to show the exact way in which this plays out is the work of developing a solution to the mind-body problem.” For example, if propositions 1, 2 and 3 are true, then 4 is false. One class of proposed solutions, generally believed true until the 1960’s, was generically called ‘dualist’ theories.

Of necessity, dualists argue that proposition 4 is false and gave various rationales to support that belief. If they didn't, it would be the case that mind and body were different and could not interact. But mind and body obviously do interact somehow, so therefore proposition 4 is false in the dualist mind.

The Mind-Body Problem (2016) is a fairly short book (197 pages), written in easy to understand language. The simple logic is laid out as shown above. It is another easy to read book for a general audience in the Essential Knowledge Series that MIT Press has published. Free Will, reviewed here, is another short, well written book in that series.

Maybe the most significant progress to date comes from understanding just how subtle and easily confused the problem is, despite the simplicity of the underlying logic that clearly defines the problem.

Wrapping heads around problem: The subtlety of the MBP is revealed in how Westphal describes the way the problem first came to be understood and described with some degree of coherence. On Westphal’s account, which differs somewhat from some other historical accounts, Rene Descartes’ 1641 Meditations on First Philosophy, proposed that the body is spatial or exists in space, and the soul (mind) doesn’t and therefore the two cannot act on each other. Descartes describes the problem, but is actually unaware of it. He thought that somehow the mind got close to the body, but still wasn’t in space or physical. The problem was first articulated in letters to Descartes asking how on Earth is it possible for mind and body to interact when one is in physical space and the other isn’t.

Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia wrote to Descartes in 1643: “I beg you to tell me how the human soul can determine the movement of the animal spirits [roughly, nerve impulses] in the body so as to perform voluntary acts – being as it is merely a conscious substance. . . . .” Elizbeth goes on to claim that she simply could not comprehend how it is possible for the mind, which has no location in space, can come into contact with an unconscious substance like the body, which is located in space, thereby interacting with it.

In essence, Westphal argues that Descartes was describing a solution to the mind-body problem, substance dualism (the mind is one substance, separate and different from the substance of the soul), without being aware of the MBP. What forced the problem into the open was Descartes’ insistence on the sharp distinction of a body in space interacting with a mind that’s not in space. In 1649, sensing something was rotten, Descartes’ wrote in his Passions of the Soul and claimed that the soul (mind) worked through the pineal gland in the brain. Westphal: “. . . the whole idea [pineal gland] is a nonstarter, because the pineal gland is as physical as any other part of the body.”

Well, so much for that theory. Woof!

Science chastised: An interesting criticism Westphal levels at scientists who work on the MBP is that they sometimes lose sight of the simple underlying logic and think they can use the power of neuroscience, physiology, data processing and other science to solve this problem. For example, Westphal cites a 2005 science-based hypothesis that a highly interconnected layer of neurons below the neocortex (the claustrum) is the site of consciousness. Westphal observes that the hypothesis is an “inconsistent and unstable mixture” of prior hypotheses. They are mutually exclusive on pure logic grounds.

Regarding the two scientists who proposed the claustrum hypothesis, if that’s what it is, Westphal doesn’t mince words: “It seems to me that Crick and Koch did not have the measure of the true difficulty of the problem, and the kind of problem it is: the logical part of it must be solved before the scientific and psychological elements of a solution can begin to have any traction.”

Neutral theories: Westphal’s book marches from dualist theories through other major theories that have come and gone, e.g., property dualism, behaviorism theories, materialism theories, physicalism theories, identity theory, functionalism, theories with strange names, e.g., epiphenomenalism, panpsychism and panprotopsychism, science-based theories such as the claustrum hypothesis and the 35-70 Hz hypothesis, and so on. He clearly describes why he believes that that all theories have failed. All except one class. Among the theories, is a genus called neutral theories that Westphal does not believe has failed.

Westphal acknowledges that neutral theories fell out of favor as science took hold and pushed other theories aside. Despite that, Westphal believes that the science-based approach has stalled. In view of the failure of all other theories from Descartes to the present, he argues this class of theory needs to be reassessed. His preferred neutral monism theory affords a different way to see and think about the universe and minds.

It sees the mental and physical as manifestations of a single thing, ‘neutral elements’ such as colors, pain and behavior. For intentional behavior, the hardest thing to explain, Westphal separately breaks behaviors down into mental elements and observable physical events (elements), finds them roughly the same and concludes that “mental events can ‘become’ or rather be taken to be physical elements, via their corresponding neutral elements.” In essence, this refutes proposition 1, that the mind is a nonphysical thing. In other words, proposition 1 is false because the mind is in fact a physical thing according to neutral monist theory. That’s rather appealing (personally), even though it’s somewhat hard to understand and internalize.

Not surprisingly, Westphal’s preferred theory, neutral monism, is subject to criticisms. Clearly, the MBP still isn’t solved. Or, maybe it is, but folks just don’t know it yet. Philosophy is a strange beast indeed.

For those interested, Westphal commentaries on neutral monism and Q&A with him are here at the Brains Blog. Turns out, Westphal actually responded to questions from the public, at least for a while. For an influential academic (Oxford) in any field, that’s very rare.

Footnotes:
1. Caveat: This channel is primarily focused on the biology of politics, the most important subject, and articulating a world view through a pragmatic, fact- and reason-based political ideology or lens (an ‘anti-bias’ viewpoint). Despite that, it is becoming more personally apparent that one cannot ignore at least some areas of philosophy, such as the philosophy of mind. Although the anti-bias ideology, thinking and mindset was originally grounded in cognitive and social science, it is clear that those areas alone cannot provide a sufficiently wide scope of informed vision about the human species. That raises caveats. I am academically trained and have decades of personal and professional experience in biology, mainly molecular biology and medical science, and law. Philosophy is outside my training and expertise, therefore, I do not know philosophy beyond what comes from the sources I discuss, The Mind-Body Problem in this case. The situation for cognitive and social science is better informed, being closer to my academic and professional experiences and subjects of informal study for about 14 years. In other words, there is no claim to real expertise in philosophy (or science) here. One can decide for themselves if that is a problem or not.

2. Westphal on paradox: “A paradox is a group of propositions for each of which we have apparently sound arguments, yet the propositions taken together are inconsistent. We cannot affirm all the propositions in the group, yet we have good reason to believe they are all true.” In other words, each piece of the logic framework seems to be true, but when all the pieces are put together, they just don't fit and are logically inconsistent. At least one of the propositions has to be false.

B&B orig: 11/27/17