I was having a dispute with @Ted Wrigley on the Religion channel, as to whether Fine Tuning is a question that can be investigated by science. I THINK that Ted was advocating for a "no". Along the way, he rejected the Popperian boundary condition for science, and claimed that Popper was dismissed in philosophy of science today. Most such conversations end up timing out on the 7 day thread limit, and this one did as well.
This, I think, is a question of interest to other participants on this board, so I am bringing it here. :-)
My last several posts were providing examples of empirical tests of spiritual claims. There were four in this post: https://disqus.com/home/channel/religion/discussion/channel-religion/another_bad_objection_to_one_of_the_best_arguments_for_gods_existence/#comment-4271260531
They included that divine authorship should be infallible, divine creation should pass the Problem of Evil test, and special creation should demonstrate both ecosystem and biochemical optimization for each species. I also included the Problem of Numbers for reincarnation, so they weren't all optimization tests. Ted's comments reference some of these points, he zeroed in on the Problem of Numbers.
Here is Ted's final post:
The ability to make a hypothesis is by no means the same as the ability to test it empirically; that's the distinction I'm trying to get across here. It's also the distinction that Popper was trying (and failed) to get at with the notion of 'falsifiability.' As Popper saw it, we can never 'prove' that a theory was 'true' (because there was always the possibility that some test of the theory might fail in the future), so the best we can do is to keep trying to falsify theories. The more we try — and fail — to falsify a theory, the more confident we are that the theory actually works. But Popper recognized that — to use his framework — some theories simply could not be falsified, meaning that there was no way to construct empirical tests that would definitively show them to be false. That became a major focus for Popper and the people who follow him: identifying and rejecting unfalsifiable theories.
Now of course (as I keep saying), Popper's theories failed. They failed on two points:
— Behavioral pragmatics: scientists simply do not work the way Popper says they should. They make theories and try to apply them, but they rarely try to falsify the work of others, and they almost never try to falsify their own work. In fact, scientists rarely throw out any theory if it can be adjusted or amended to work again.
— Theoretical deficiencies: in order to make the concept of falsifiability work, Popperians have to make a priori assertions about which theories are and are not falsifiable. In that sense, Popper's theory itself is unfalsifiable, since it relies (effectively) on a subjective judgment call. Popper himself eventually realized this problem, though he never really found a way to address it within his framework.
But those theoretical problems aside, Popper's insight is correct: certain theoretical propositions simply do not fall within the purview of empirical science. The issue (as I tried to show with the 'problem of numbers' discussion), is that no empirical evidence can be brought to bear, because the question itself cannot be rigorously operationalized. You can certainly whip up some evidence, as you did by pointing to the fact that people put through certain kinds of hypnotic regression claim to experience multiple past lives... But the original theory of reincarnation is so poorly defined (analytically speaking), that I can simply redefine terms over and over to salvage the central principle. Now that's not bad, mind you — done well that is effectively the process of philosophical hermeneutics — but there is no way to get an empirical handle it.
In order to operationalize research, we have to make assumptions, and those must be valid assumptions. That question of validity is usually non-problematic within the material world, because the assumptions themselves can be treated as testable theories in their own right. But even if we take 'past life' regression as a genuine experience, how could we find empirical evidence that would allow us to distinguish between various different interpretations?
I mean, let's say that someone (Person X) does a regression and remembers being a Roman soldier in Britain. Moreover, X remembers that as a Roman soldier, he buried some object under a particular stone bridge; and then when we go to that particular bridge and dig, we find that particular object buried there. That's pretty astounding evidence, granted, but evidence of what exactly? One person says that X was that Roman soldier in a past life; another person says that X travelled back astrally and communed with that soldier in the past; a third person says that X connected with the universal oversoul, which gave him access to the memories of that soldier. What empirical evidence could we possibly find that would help us differentiate between those three theories? I mean, you've been working on the assumption that there must be a one-to-one correspondence (only one soul can inhabit one body at any one time), which sounds reasonable enough, but how would you validate or justify that assumption if someone questioned it?
Testing something empirically doesn't mean merely finding evidence; it means using evidence to differentiate one theory form another. Where we cannot do that, we cannot do empirical science.
B&B orig: 1/12/19
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