In an interview the Hidden Brain program that NPR broadcast a couple of weeks ago, Harvard history professor David Moss discussed his analysis of civil conflicts in the US. He studied about twenty instances of significant conflict and what effects they had on the American republic and its democratic progression.
In general, Moss found that the conflicts were productive in the sense that, despite intense partisan disagreements, American democracy was improved in some way or another. The fundamental glue that held democracy together was a belief by most people in the democratic ideal. Their disputes were not about American democracy, but about social or political issues. The only exception where the glue failed to hold was in dispute over slavery where the South was willing to defend that social institution even at the expense of dissolving the union.[1]
In general, Moss is optimistic about America’s political polarization. He pointed out that on many occasions in the past, many people felt the country was falling apart and would fail as a single nation. He called those false positives, i.e., it looks bad , but it really isn't, a common occurrence in the social sciences.
But what about the false negatives, where something seems more or less OK, but it turns out much worse? Hindsight can often spot these things, but even that is usually contested to some non-trivial degree or another.
So, what is the glue that holds Americans in political dispute together? Moss argues it is the belief among people in disagreement that even if their side loses a dispute, the people on the other side will do the right thing and govern reasonably well and reasonably fairly. Moss cites Gallup poll data: In the 1970s, 15% of Americans reported they had little or no confidence that the other side would govern well or fairly. Today that number is 43%. America’s social glue is much weaker now than it was 50 years ago. And given the harsh tone of rhetoric and presumably increasing polarization and intolerance, it seems rational to think the glue will weaken more in time.
What evidence is there for weakening social glue?: Although it is only one data point, the presidential greatness survey published in January of 2108 included its first assessment of president Trump for his first year in office. His ranking was last among all US presidents. The survey included this assessment about Trump’s polarizing presence:
“In the current polarized political climate, we thought it would be interesting to ask which presidents were considered by presidency experts to be the most polarizing. To do so, we asked respondents to identify up to five individual presidents they believed were the most polarizing, and then rank order them with the first president being the most polarizing, the second as next most polarizing, and so on. We then calculated how many times a president was identified as well as their average ranking.
Donald Trump is by far the most polarizing of the ranked presidents earning a 1.6 average (1 is a “most polarizing” ranking). Lincoln is the second most polarizing president of those presidents ranked. He earned a 2.5 ranking. This is close to Polk as the second most polarizing president at 2.6. Trump was ranked “most polarizing” by 95 respondents and second most polarizing by 20 respondents. For comparison, Lincoln, the second most polarizing president on average, received 20 “most polarizing” rankings and 15 second “most polarizing” rankings.
President Trump is ranked as the most polarized by all party identifiers. On average, Republicans view President Trump one full spot less polarizing than Democrats. Independents found President Trump the most polarizing president than either Democrats or Republicans and in general Independents rank President Trump as the most polarizing president of any modern president.”
Lincoln was highly polarizing because of his opposition to allowing slavery in the new states in the West. That led to civil war. But what is it that makes Trump so polarizing? Many or most Trump supporters might simply reject the data and point to Obama and Hillary Clinton as the current source of polarization. Personal experience with citing this survey had led at least some Trump supporters to instantly reject it out of hand as pure propaganda and/or partisan lies.
Assuming Trump supporters are wrong about this, what is it that Trump advocates? There is more than a little objective evidence to support a belief that he is racist, sexist, homophobic, xenophobic, corrupt, unethical/immoral, a chronic liar/BSer, anti-democratic, a traitor, and an oligarch/despot.
But, what agenda or issue does that boil down to? In the case of president Lincoln, it was easy to spot the issue that tore America apart. In the case of Trump, the issue(s) seems amorphous. It isn't any one thing. It seems more about playing on a general sense of a combination of social, demographic and economic grievance and/or anger-fear-unease. Trump is clearly playing our emotions to tear us apart, but there just doesn't seem to be a unifying issue.
If that analysis is basically correct, it raises the question: Does there have to be a unifying issue and was the case with Lincoln and slavery? Can Trump tear America apart simply by being what he is, i.e., a highly skilled manipulator of reality, reason and emotions?
Hitler was a highly skilled manipulator of reality, reason and emotions, but at least there was deep economic pressure at work. One could see that as part of what brought Hitler to power. But that does not apply to the US at present. The economy is very good (if one ignores the debt, hidden costs, environmental danger, etc).
A second indicator of social glue strength: Professor Moss seemed to be basically optimistic that current social conflict is, maybe based on statistics alone, likely to be just more constructive conflict that won't amount to a hill of beans long the long run. Maybe that is right. False negatives are much more common than false positives, at least for this situation.
To assess the danger, Moss pointed to the level of trust in fellow citizens as an indicator of social health. But he also raised a second indicator, assessment of the frequency at which politicians and partisans ON YOUR OWN SIDE put party and/or partisanship above country. Now, that is a downright bizarre measure of social-democratic health -- it ignores human cognitive and social concerns. To see when your own side puts party above country, a person needs to adopt an anti-bias political ideology, morals, and mindset. Very few people apply that to politics. On this point, Moss is flat out naïve because most people (≥ ~95% ?) simply cannot do what Moss asks them to do.
The anti-bias view: Fortunately, this commentator does at least try to apply an anti-bias ideology, morals and mindset to politics. If one looks dispassionately at existing evidence about Trump’s mind and morals, there is objective evidence that he puts himself and to a less extent partisanship above country. One can argue that democrats are not perfect. They can put special interests with money before the public interest, with the tax code and democratic complicity in massive tax evasion, currently roughly $500 billion/year, being a prime example.
On balance, one can argue that many or most republican, populist and conservative politicians put party before country more often than democratic and liberal politicians. But whether that is true or not, what does it say about the long-term prospects for the American experiment? Moss’ second indicator of social glue just does not seem to be particularly helpful, at least under current conditions.
If that analysis is basically correct, are we in a period that will turn out to have been a false negative? At the moment, it does not feel that way and one indicator of social cohesion, trust in fellow citizens, is moving in the wrong direction. What the end result will be is likely an democratic oligarchy, tinged with Christian theocracy. Despotism-oligarchy, with or without democracy, seems to be a common fate of liberal democracies in general.[2] One question is, is the US democracy exceptional in this regard? And, is Trump a false positive? Looks like we going to find out in the next few years.
Footnotes:
1. Moss pointed out that Lincoln opposed expansion of slavery to the new states, and the South could not tolerate that, believing that a rough parity among slave and non-slave states was the only way to preserve their way of economic life. Defense of slavery as a social institution led to the civil war because no compromise was possible.
2. The New York Times on weaknesses of liberal democracies: “Maybe Brazil’s election, along with the rest of the populist trend, represents something more disruptive than a single wave with a single point of origin. Research suggests it exemplifies weaknesses and tensions inherent to liberal democracy itself — and that, in times of stress, can pull it apart.
When that happens, voters tend to reject that system in all but name and follow their most basic human instincts toward older styles of government: majoritarian, strong-fisted, us-versus-them rule.
It’s a pattern that might feel shocking or new in the West, but is all too familiar in Latin America, which has experienced several populist surges like the one that elevated Mr. Bolsonaro.
‘Most attempts at democracy end in a return to authoritarian rule,’ Jay Ulfelder, a political scientist, wrote in 2012 as elected populists in Venezuela, Ecuador and Nicaragua rolled back rights in ways that look familiar today.”
B&B orig: 11/3/18
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