Chapter Review: (Im)Morality in Political Discourse

Context

(Im)Morality in Political Discourse: The Effects of Moral Psychology in Politics is the sixth chapter in the 2017 book, Moral Psychology: A Multidisciplinary Guide, edited by Benjamin Voyer and Tor Tarantola. The book is directed to an academic and research audience in an attempt to nudge disparate streams of research into moral psychology into some form of convergence of knowledge (consilience). Researchers in neuroscience, cognitive science, psychology, sociology, political science, analytic philosophy, moral philosophy, anthropology, computer science, evolutionary biology and other disciplines have developed enough knowledge in disparate areas of research that unwanted siloing and isolation of streams of research and knowledge has begun.

This book attempts to fight against that trend. The point is to fertilize disparate minds with data and logic from related areas of research, accelerate the pace of research and introduce graduate students to the depth and breadth of research as of early to mid 2017.

Chapter six was written by Nicholas Nicoletti and William Delahanty. It is the longest chapter in the book and intellectually rather complex, at least for me.

Chapter 1 (reviewed here) deals with fundamental problems in moral psychology, mostly the difficulty the human mind has in trying to understand itself. Moral psychology is not a problem the human mind evolved to solve. It is a problem the human mind may not be able to solve with a high degree of precision. Chapter 2 (reviewed here) deals with  moral psychology from an evolutionary biology point of view. Again, the human mind is a central issue, which the author makes painfully clear: “While the human mind is not usually considered an impediment to scientific progress, it may present particular barriers to accurate models of the nature of morality and moral psychology. This is not the first research question that has been hampered by the fact that science is done by humans.”

Chapter review

Nicoletti and Delahanty (N&D) conclude chapter six with these sobering comments:

“To conclude, we argue that compromise is possible under certain conditions such as those mentioned above. However, the primary obstacle to overcome is the perverse incentive that elites have to frame issues in order to mobilize maximum support. Moral framing is a very effective way to gain support and mobilize voters. Moreover, while elites moralize issues to get elected, they also have policy preferences in line with their own moral preferences. This makes political discourse exceedingly more difficult, while simultaneously increasing political participation. The juxtaposition of destructive democratic discourse with an active politically engaged public underscores the promises and pitfalls associated with moral conviction in democratic politics.”

N&D are saying that compromise has been significantly undermined by weaponizing morality in politics. Injecting morality into political discourse politically engages many people but it also tends to make them less open understanding or tolerating differences of opinion. N&D argue that political discourse infused with morality constitutes ‘destructive democratic discourse’. That is a serious allegation.

N&D discuss the moral frameworks (1) that psychologist Johnathan Haidt proposed, the Moral Foundations Theory (discussed here), and (2) that cognitive linguist George Lakoff  (discussed here) and others proposed, something that N&D call the Equal Opportunity Motivator Hypothesis. Current research indicates that, despite explicit claims to the moral high ground by conservatives, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s, both liberals and conservatives have significantly moralized their politics. N&D comment:

“both sides of the aisle show high levels of moral conviction .... This suggests that there is not a conservative advantage in the realm of moral reasoning and politics. .... We suggest that moral conviction is a double-edged blade; it has the desirable tendency to increase political action but also to limit the ability of opposing sides to deliberate, compromise and build social capital in a democratic system. .... Those respondents who felt that an issue was connected to their moral conviction preferred more social distance from someone with a dissimilar attitude. .... Ryan’s (2014) study provides more evidence that when moral conviction makes its way into political discourse, democracy may be threatened.”

N&D point out that some evidence indicates that a person’s moral foundations are partly genetic. That accords with speculation by other researchers like John Hibbing who study how biology may influence political attitudes. Hibbing estimates that our personal politics is about 35% nature (genes) and 65% nurture (family, language, identity, social norms, etc).

Making connections

Trying to connect knowledge in different disciplines is likely to be necessary if moral psychology is to progress past its current early, fragmented stage. For example, a discussion here based on a recent Scientific American article focused on how human sentience appears to include an unconscious social distancing-mapping function. Social distance between people mapped to two dimensions, relative power and affiliation, e.g., family member vs complete stranger vs your boss. It may be the case (my speculation only) that social distancing also contains a basis in morality as well as the proposed basis in power and affiliation. If so, that might make social distancing a 3-dimensional function.

Personal analysis: What’s wrong with morality & what’s right with pragmatic rationalism

N&D point to a large body of research that shows when a political issue engages people's moral values, they are (i) less inclined to compromise and trust people they disagree with, and (ii) more inclined to accept extreme means to attain a moral end, i.e., moral political ends justify draconian means. Both of those attitudes are extremely dangerous for democracy, the rule of law and civil society. From what I can tell, moral concepts[1] are both flexible and essentially contested, making disagreements unresolvable without compromise. Social context changes moral beliefs. The rise of the president led to a major moral change among Evangelical Christians. Before Trump, they were more concerned with the morals and character of a president than any other group. After Trump, they were the least concerned group.

What I glean from N&D is that the rise of morality and the rise of attitude-constraining ideology are serious threats to democracy and civil society. The four core moral values that underpin pragmatic rationalism[2] were intended to counteract the anti-democratic nature all existing sets of moral and ideological beliefs. I posited pragmatic rationalism as anti-biasing and anti-ideology. I criticized political ideology too. Morals and political ideology tend to cause, among other unwanted things, reality-distorting bias and reduced willingness to compromise.

From what I can tell, the moral and political situation that N&D describe, and worry about as rising destructive democratic discourse, is exactly what pragmatic rationalism is an attempt to counteract. As evidence continues to flow in, pragmatic rationalism makes more and more sense.


Footnote:
1. N&D define values as the basis of morals in politics like this and the implication of the rise of ideology: “Political values may be structured by values, and these values exist within greater systems and form the underlying foundation for broader ideologies. Rokeach (1973) defined a value as ‘an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or a conversemode of conduct or end-state of existence.’ .... morality and moral conviction may be an outgrowth of individual value systems, with some of them forming along ideological lines. .... Recent research has demonstrated that attitude structure along ideological lines may be strengthening. .... Defined succinctly, a political ideology is a comprehensive political orientation that allows individuals to assess political phenomena by reference to assumptions about the proper role of government in society and the economy.”

2. The four core moral values are:
(i) fidelity to trying seeing fact and truth with less bias,
(ii) fidelity to applying less biased conscious reason to the facts and truths,
(iii) service to the public interest (defined as a transparent competition of ideas among competing interests) based on the facts, truths and reason, and
(iv) willingness to reasonably compromise according to political, economic and environmental circumstances point to.