President Attacks Climate Science, Again

The Wall Street Journal is reporting that a State Department intelligence analyst resigned in protest because the White House blocked his discussion of climate science in Congressional testimony. The White House refused to approve Dr. Rod Schoonover’s written testimony for entry into the permanent Congressional record because it contradicted the president's false opinions about climate science. The WSJ writes:

A policy expert familiar with his case confirmed that his resignation came as a direct result of the episode. His last day is expected to be Friday.

“Intelligence analysts, as a rule, are very committed to objective truth,” said Francesco Femia, the head of the Center for Climate and Security, a research organization in Washington. “And when something extraordinary happens to try to politicize their or suppress their analysis, as happened in this case, that flies in the face of their professional integrity. It’s a matter of someone standing up for principle.”

The State Department agency where Dr. Schoonover worked, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, has long been regarded as one of the most scrupulous and accurate in the federal government. In the prelude to the 2003 United States invasion of Iraq, the agency stood almost alone in asserting — correctly, but contrary to the positions of the White House and the Central Intelligence Agency — that Iraq was not reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.

As usual, the White House refused to comment. For context, a few days ago, the president gave a speech touting his great and wonderful record on leading the world in protecting the environment. That speech was loaded with lies, as discussed here previously.

Once again, republican attacks on science they dislike is on full display and undeniable to all except their supporters. For the GOP and its supporters, ideology talks and all contrary reality, science and logic walks.

B&B orig: 7/10/19

What Hypocrisy Looks and Sounds Like

This 6-minute video is self explanatory.



B&B orig: 7/11/19

Identity Protective Cognition

Dan Kahan at Yale University's Cultural Cognition Project studies identity protective cognition. In a working paper, Misconceptions, Misinformation, and the Logic of Identity-protective Cognition, he discusses identity protective cognition.

ABSTRACT: This paper supplies a compact synthesis of the empirical literature on misconceptions of and misinformation about decision-relevant science. The incidence and impact of misconceptions and misperceptions, the article argues, are highly conditional on identity protective cognition. Identity protective cognition refers to the tendency of culturally diverse individuals to selectively credit and dismiss evidence in patterns that reflect the beliefs that predominate in their group. On issues that provoke identity-protective cognition, the members of the public most adept at avoiding misconceptions of science are nevertheless the most culturally polarized. Individuals are also more likely to accept misinformation and resist the correction of it when that misinformation is identity-affirming rather than identity-threatening. Effectively counteracting these dynamics, the paper argues, requires more than simply supplying citizens with correct information. It demands in addition the protection of the science communication environment from toxic social meanings that fuse competing understandings of fact with diverse citizens’ cultural identities.

INTRODUCTION: This paper investigates the role that “misinformation” and “misconceptions of science” play in political controversies over decision-relevant science (DRS). The surmise that their contribution is large is eminently plausible. Ordinary members of the public, we are regularly reminded (e.g., National Science Foundation 2014, 2016), display only modest familiarity with fundamental scientific findings, and lack proficiency in the forms of critical reasoning essential to science comprehension (Marx et al. 2007; Weber 2006). As a result, they are easily misled by special interest groups, who flood public discourse with scientifically unfounded claims on global warming, genetically modified foods, and other issues (e.g., Hmielowski et al. 2013). I will call this perspective the “public irrationality thesis” (PIT).

The unifying theme of this paper is that PIT itself reflects a misconception of a particular form of science: namely, the science of science communication. One of the major tenets of this emerging body of work is that public controversy over DRS typically originates in identity-protective cognition—a tendency to selectively credit and discredit evidence in patterns that reflect people’s commitments to competing cultural groups (Sherman & Cohen 2002, 2006). Far from evincing irrationality, this pattern of reasoning promotes the interests of individual members of the public, who have a bigger personal stake in fitting in with important affinity groups than in forming correct perceptions of scientific evidence. Indeed, the members of the public who are most polarized over DRS are the ones who have the highest degree of science comprehension, a capacity that they actively employ to form and persist in identity-protective beliefs (Kahan 2015a).

The problem, in short, is not a gullible, manipulated public; it is a polluted science communication environment. The pollution consists of antagonistic social meanings that put individuals in the position of having to choose between using their reason to discern what science knows or using it instead to express their group commitments. Safeguarding the science communication environment from such meanings, and repairing it where protective measures fail, should be the principle aim of those committed to assuring that society makes full use of the vast stock of DRS at its disposal (Kahan 2015b)

Is Kahan right to argue that the problem is a polluted science communication environment and not a gullible or manipulated public? For example, the president met yesterday with propagandists of the radical right and praised their efforts at deceiving and manipulating the public, commenting no their propaganda tactics: "The crap you think of is unbelievable. I mean it's genius — but it's bad." That evinces manipulation broader than just science-based content. Is there a difference between a polluted science communication environment and a manipulated public?

B&B orig: 7/12/19

The Will of the People: Legislators Do Not Care

“Our analyses suggest that majorities of the American public actually have little influence over the policies our government adopts,” Gilens and Page write: Americans do enjoy many features central to democratic governance, such as regular elections, freedom of speech and association, and a widespread (if still contested) franchise. But we believe that if policymaking is dominated by powerful business organizations and a small number of affluent Americans, then America’s claims to being a democratic society are seriously threatened.

That’s a big claim. In their conclusion, Gilens and Page go even further, asserting that “In the United States, our findings indicate, the majority does not rule—at least not in the causal sense of actually determining policy outcomes. When a majority of citizens disagrees with economic elites and/or with organized interests, they generally lose. Moreover … even when fairly large majorities of Americans favor policy change, they generally do not get it.” New Yorker magazine, 2014

Writing an opinion piece for the New York Times, political scientists Joshua Kalla and Ethan Porter report on a two-year study. They write:

We like to think that politicians care about what their constituents want. If voters in a legislative district have certain views about, say, the legality of abortion, we assume that their representative’s decisions will be shaped, or at least influenced, by those views. To a large extent, democracy depends on this assumption: The beliefs of voters should be reflected, however imperfectly, in the leaders they elect.

But there is reason to question this assumption. It is easy to think of issues, climate change and gun control chief among them, where the consensus of public opinion has provoked little legislative action. How much do legislators really care about the views of their constituents?

Over the past two years, we conducted a study to find out. We provided state legislators in the United States with access to highly detailed public opinion survey data — more detailed than almost all available opinion polls — about their constituents’ attitudes on gun control, infrastructure spending, abortion and many other policy issues. Afterward, we gauged the willingness of representatives to look at the data as well as how the data affected their perceptions of their constituents’ opinions.

What we found should alarm all Americans. An overwhelming majority of legislators were uninterested in learning about their constituents’ views. Perhaps more worrisome, however, was that when the legislators who did view the data were surveyed afterward, they were no better at understanding what their constituents wanted than legislators who had not looked at the data. For most politicians, voters’ views seemed almost irrelevant.

No one wants or expects politicians to march in lock step with their voters. Politicians are not supposed to mechanically replace their own views with the views of their constituents. But constituents’ perspectives should carry considerable weight. Our study suggests that for most politicians, voters’ views carry almost no weight at all.

What Kalla and Porter describe in this opinion piece accords with the Gilens and Page (Yale U. and Northwestern U., respectively) analysis from 2104.[1] Kalla and Porter's research shows a clear indifference by legislators as to what voters want, and when they do pay attention, they usually misunderstand what voters want.

Footnote:
1. The abstract from a Gilens and Page paper in Perspectives on Politics:

Each of four theoretical traditions in the study of American politics—which can be characterized as theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy, Economic-Elite Domination, and two types of interest-group pluralism, Majoritarian Pluralism and Biased Pluralism—offers different predictions about which sets of actors have how much influence over public policy: average citizens; economic elites; and organized interest groups, mass-based or business-oriented.

A great deal of empirical research speaks to the policy influence of one or another set of actors, but until recently it has not been possible to test these contrasting theoretical predictions against each other within a single statistical model. We report on an effort to do so, using a unique data set that includes measures of the key variables for 1,779 policy issues.

Multivariate analysis indicates that economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while average citizens and mass-based interest groups have little or no independent influence. The results provide substantial support for theories of Economic-Elite Domination and for theories of Biased Pluralism, but not for theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy or Majoritarian Pluralism. (emphasis added)

B&B orig: 7/12/19