Saturday, March 23, 2019
In their book, Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government, social scientists Christopher Achen and Larry Bartels (Princeton University Press, 2016) describe the major disconnect between what people believe democracy should be, what it really is and why it exists. The difference flows from human social and cognitive biology.
That's no surprise. Human biology dictates that people's beliefs, perceptions and thinking about politics are usually more personal or subjective than objective and fact-based.
In democracies, the typical voter believes that people have preferences for what government should do and they pick leaders or vote their preferences in ballot initiatives. That then leads to majority preference becoming policy, which in turn, legitimizes government because the people consented through their votes. In that vision, government is ethical and has the people's interests at heart.
That folk theory isn't how democracy works. The authors point out that the false definition leads to cynicism and unhappiness: “One consequence of our reliance on old definitions is that the modern American does not look at democracy before he defines it; he defines it first and then is confused by what he sees. We become cynical about democracy because the public does not act the way the simplistic definition of democracy says it should act, or we try to whip the public into doing things it does not want to do, is unable to do, and has too much sense to do. The crisis here is not a crisis in democracy but a crisis in theory.”
That reflects the reality that people don’t or, because of their social and cognitive biology, can't pay enough attention to politics for the folk theory to work as people believe it should work. Humans are biologically too limited to truly understand what’s going on even if they tried. The authors put it like this: “. . . . the typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the political field. He argues and analyzes in a way which he would readily recognize as infantile within the sphere of his real interests. . . . cherished ideas and judgments we bring to politics are stereotypes and simplifications with little room for adjustment as the facts change. . . . . the real environment is altogether too big, too complex, and too fleeting for direct acquaintance. We are not equipped to deal with so much subtlety, so much variety, so many permutations and combinations. Although we have to act in that environment, we have to reconstruct it on a simpler model before we can manage it.”
That describes reality based on what sentient humans can reasonably do. It's not a criticism of the human condition. Democracy and all or nearly all issues in politics are far too complex for voters to rationally deal with based on facts and unbiased reason. Instead, we have to simplify reality and apply heavily biased reason (common sense) to what we think we see. For the most part, what we believe we see is more illusion than objective reality.
The authors acknowledge the problem: “The result may not be very comfortable or comforting. Nonetheless, we believe that a democratic theory worthy of serious social influence must engage with the findings of modern social science.”
Although Democracy For Realists dissects popular democratic theory and analyzes science and historical data from the last hundred years or so, the exercise is about analyzing the role of human social and cognitive biology in democracy. Our false beliefs about democracy are shaped by human biology, not political theory. The authors research finds that the most important driver of voter belief and behavior is personal social or group identity, not ideology or theory. For most voters, race, tribe and clan are more important than anything else.
That manifests as irrational voter thinking and behavior. For example, the “will of the people” that’s central to the folk theory is a mostly a myth. People are divided on most everything and they usually don’t know what they really want. Average voters usually do not have enough knowledge to rationally make such determinations.
For example, voter opinions can be very sensitive to variation in how questions are worded. This reflects a powerful unconscious bias called framing effects. For example, in one 1980’s survey, about 64% said there was too little federal spending on “assistance to the poor” but only about 23% said that there was too little spending on “welfare.” The 1980s was the decade when vilification of “welfare” was common from the political right. The word welfare had been co-opted and reframed as a bad thing.
Similarly, before the 1991 Gulf War, about 63% said they were willing to “use military force”, but less than 50% were willing to “engage in combat”, while less than 30% were willing to “go to war.” The subjective nature of political concepts is obvious, i.e., assistance vs. welfare and military force vs. combat vs. war. What was the will of the people? One can argue that serving the will of the people under the folk theory of democracy is more chasing phantom than doing the obvious.
Other aspects of voter behavior also make serving the people's will difficult at best. For example, voters are usually irrational about rewarding and punishing politicians for their performance in office. Incumbents are routinely punished at the polls for floods, drought, offshore shark attacks on swimmers, a recent local university football team's loss and, more importantly, when things are going badly in the last few months of the politicians current term in office. Where's the logic in any of that?
Why should an incumbent worry about the people's will, when the people don't reward or punish on that basis? Incentives matter.
Achen and Bartels show that there are sound biological reasons for why elections don't produce responsive governments.
Questions: Is the vision of democracy that Achen and Bartels portray reasonably accurate, nonsense or something else? If their vision is reasonably accurate, what, if anything can or should average voters do? Or, is what we have the about best that can be expected from the subjective (personal) biological basis of human social and cognitive biology?
Is trying to understand and serve the will of the people the highest calling of democratic governments, or, would something else such as serving the "public interest"** constitute a better focus?
** Defined here: http://dispol.blogspot.com/2015/12/serving-public-interest.html
B&B orig: 8/21/16
Saturday, March 23, 2019
Thursday, March 21, 2019
Are Some Platforms Wising Up to Lies and Propaganda?
Thursday, March 21, 2019
Last month, Pinterest initiated a policy of cracking down on anti-vaccine content. The NYT reported:
Dark free speech (DFS) forced this war: The rise of dark free speech[1] forced this situation. American conservative and populist politics is heavily infused with DFS. Independent fact checkers constantly reinforce this fact.
Whether these moves will significantly blunt the rise of DFS is unknowable. Maybe it is already too late. Regardless, these tentative steps are extremely welcome measures by the private sector in defense of liberal democracy, freedom and common decency. These mover are faint early signals that maybe significant portions of the private sector[2] in American is still on the side of truth, democracy, personal freedom and science.
An obvious question is this: Should DFS be suppressible by private entities because it is legal speech? DFS in public speech fora cannot be suppressed because that violates 1st Amendment free speech rights.
Footnotes:
1. Dark free speech = lies, deceit, misinformation, unwarranted opacity, and fact and truth hiding, unwarranted emotional manipulation especially including fomenting unwarranted fear, rage, hate, intolerance, distrust, bigotry and racism, and etc.
2. Obviously not including the carbon energy sectors who continue to deny climate science to protect their profit margins and political power.
Last month, Pinterest initiated a policy of cracking down on anti-vaccine content. The NYT reported:
Pinterest, a digital platform popular with parents, took an unusual step to crack down on the proliferation of anti-vaccination propaganda: It purposefully hobbled its search box.
Type “vaccine” into its search bar and nothing pops up.
“Vaccination” or “anti-vax”? Also nothing. Pinterest, which allows people to save pictures on virtual pinboards, is often used to find recipes for picky toddlers, baby shower décor or fashion trends, but it has also become a platform for anti-vaccination activists who spread misinformation on social media.
But only Pinterest, as first reported by The Wall Street Journal, has chosen to banish results associated with certain vaccine-related searches, regardless of whether the results might have been reputable.In another reaction to propaganda about vaccines, Amazon announced that it will remove some books that contain vaccine misinformation, while Facebook and YouTube are similarly moving to shut false information down on their platforms. The Washington Post writes:
YouTube said it was banning anti-vaccination channels from running online advertisements.
Facebook announced it was hiding certain content and turning away ads that contain misinformation about vaccines, and Pinterest said it was blocking “polluted” search terms, memes and pins from particular sites prompting anti-vaccine propaganda, according to news reports.
Amazon has now joined other companies navigating the line between doing business and censoring it, in an age when, experts say, misleading claims about health and science have a real impact on public health.
NBC News recently reported that Amazon was pulling books touting false information about autism “cures” and vaccines. The e-commerce giant confirmed Monday to The Washington Post that several books are no longer available, but it would not release more specific information.Culture war explodes: People who believe false information and science including science of anthropogenic climate change have been adamant that their free speech rights includes the right to spread their views everywhere on an equal footing with real truth and established science. Proponents of false truth and false science vehemently argue they speak real truth and science to liberals, socialists, communists, corrupt corporations and other liars, deceivers and manipulators. Facebook, Amazon, Pinterest and other social media are privately owned and therefore they can choose what content they allow and disallow on their platforms. The point is this: Every person and company can choose to believe what is truth and valid science and what isn't. If a company chooses to block what it believes is lies and false science, that is its choice.
Dark free speech (DFS) forced this war: The rise of dark free speech[1] forced this situation. American conservative and populist politics is heavily infused with DFS. Independent fact checkers constantly reinforce this fact.
Whether these moves will significantly blunt the rise of DFS is unknowable. Maybe it is already too late. Regardless, these tentative steps are extremely welcome measures by the private sector in defense of liberal democracy, freedom and common decency. These mover are faint early signals that maybe significant portions of the private sector[2] in American is still on the side of truth, democracy, personal freedom and science.
An obvious question is this: Should DFS be suppressible by private entities because it is legal speech? DFS in public speech fora cannot be suppressed because that violates 1st Amendment free speech rights.
Footnotes:
1. Dark free speech = lies, deceit, misinformation, unwarranted opacity, and fact and truth hiding, unwarranted emotional manipulation especially including fomenting unwarranted fear, rage, hate, intolerance, distrust, bigotry and racism, and etc.
2. Obviously not including the carbon energy sectors who continue to deny climate science to protect their profit margins and political power.
Climate Change Warnings: Not Urgent Enough?
Thursday, March 21, 2019
Over the last couple of weeks, there has been intense blowback here and elsewhere from people who deny AGW (anthropogenic global warming) is real after scientists reported that the level of confidence it is real is now very high. The data now supports a so called 5 sigma level of confidence in the data showing AGW is real.
AGW skeptics dismiss the data with arguments including "blah, blah, blah" and the scientists are liars and faked their data. One AGW skeptic attack was an assertion of an unpublished, not peer-reviewed crackpot hypothesis by a scientist with zero peer-reviewed papers in climate science arguing that climate scientists are clueless about basic aspects of science. I finally got frustrated and banned the purveyor of the crackpot's theory after being accused of dishonesty, bias and whatnot. That raises a question:
Question: When is there enough evidence in support of something like AGW, if ever, that even trying to discuss it with people who simply reject accepted evidence and expert opinion is more socially harmful than not? I refuse to allow this channel to be used as a platform for dark free speech such as lies and quack science, and anything else that strikes me as socially more harmful than helpful. Is that unreasonably arrogant or misguided?
Complex adaptive systems: Things could be much worse: Also attacked and rejected as false was my assertion that there is about a 98% consensus among climate science experts that AGW is real. Long story short, that led me to look at a think tank skeptic who attacked the 98% expert consensus data as flawed and not believable. That led to this article by the Fraser Institute, Putting the 'con' in consensus; Not only is there no 97 per cent consensus among climate scientists, many misunderstand core issues. The article was written by Ross McKitrick, an economics professor at the University of Guelph, Canada.
The Fraser Institute received a high fact accuracy rating and a center-right bias by the Media Bias/Fact Check site. Given that, I read his article, which was originally published in the Financial Post. Dr. McKitrick's article includes this:
I wrote to McKitrick as asked if it was possible that the climate situation could be worse than now believed. After an initial evasion, his answer was that it could be much worse than is now believed. There is simply no way to know. The climate situation could be much better, much worse or about what most experts now believe. This is the first time I recall any AGW skeptic acknowledging that the climate situation could be worse than it is now believed to be. Here is the email string:
Based all the science, including the unpredictability problem, it is reasonable to believe that AGW skepticism is not defensible and is based on factors such as political ideology, personal bias, tribe identity and/or economic self-interest. One can also argue it is immoral. Is that logic and conclusion of immorality reasonable?
B&B orig: 3/6/19
Over the last couple of weeks, there has been intense blowback here and elsewhere from people who deny AGW (anthropogenic global warming) is real after scientists reported that the level of confidence it is real is now very high. The data now supports a so called 5 sigma level of confidence in the data showing AGW is real.
AGW skeptics dismiss the data with arguments including "blah, blah, blah" and the scientists are liars and faked their data. One AGW skeptic attack was an assertion of an unpublished, not peer-reviewed crackpot hypothesis by a scientist with zero peer-reviewed papers in climate science arguing that climate scientists are clueless about basic aspects of science. I finally got frustrated and banned the purveyor of the crackpot's theory after being accused of dishonesty, bias and whatnot. That raises a question:
Question: When is there enough evidence in support of something like AGW, if ever, that even trying to discuss it with people who simply reject accepted evidence and expert opinion is more socially harmful than not? I refuse to allow this channel to be used as a platform for dark free speech such as lies and quack science, and anything else that strikes me as socially more harmful than helpful. Is that unreasonably arrogant or misguided?
Complex adaptive systems: Things could be much worse: Also attacked and rejected as false was my assertion that there is about a 98% consensus among climate science experts that AGW is real. Long story short, that led me to look at a think tank skeptic who attacked the 98% expert consensus data as flawed and not believable. That led to this article by the Fraser Institute, Putting the 'con' in consensus; Not only is there no 97 per cent consensus among climate scientists, many misunderstand core issues. The article was written by Ross McKitrick, an economics professor at the University of Guelph, Canada.
The Fraser Institute received a high fact accuracy rating and a center-right bias by the Media Bias/Fact Check site. Given that, I read his article, which was originally published in the Financial Post. Dr. McKitrick's article includes this:
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change asserts the conclusion that most (more than 50 per cent) of the post-1950 global warming is due to human activity, chiefly greenhouse gas emissions and land use change. But it does not survey its own contributors, let alone anyone else, so we do not know how many experts agree with it. And the statement, even if true, does not imply that we face a crisis requiring massive restructuring of the worldwide economy. In fact, it is consistent with the view that the benefits of fossil fuel use greatly outweigh the climate-related costs.
One commonly cited survey asked if carbon dioxide is a greenhouse gas and human activities contribute to climate change. But these are trivial statements that even many IPCC skeptics agree with. And again, both statements are consistent with the view that climate change is harmless. So there are no policy implications of such surveys, regardless of the level of agreement.
Here is what the IPCC said in its 2003 report: “In climate research and modelling, we should recognize that we are dealing with a coupled non-linear chaotic system, and therefore that the long-term prediction of future climate states is not possible.”It made no sense to argue that (1) there are no policy implications in most experts agreeing with CO2 being a greenhouse gas and human activities contribute to climate change, and (2) long-term prediction of future climate states is not possible. If it is true that long-term prediction is impossible, which is necessarily true for a complex adaptive system like climate, then it is possible the climate situation could be much worse than what most experts now believe.
I wrote to McKitrick as asked if it was possible that the climate situation could be worse than now believed. After an initial evasion, his answer was that it could be much worse than is now believed. There is simply no way to know. The climate situation could be much better, much worse or about what most experts now believe. This is the first time I recall any AGW skeptic acknowledging that the climate situation could be worse than it is now believed to be. Here is the email string:
Me: Dear Dr. McKitrick, Your article, Putting the con in consensus, made a couple of statements that, taken together, are unclear in their logic. The article states: "One commonly cited survey asked if carbon dioxide is a greenhouse gas and human activities contribute to climate change. But these are trivial statements that even many IPCC skeptics agree with. And again, both statements are consistent with the view that climate change is harmless. So there are no policy implications of such surveys, regardless of the level of agreement." Since (1) even IPCC skeptics agree that CO2 is a greenhouse gas and human activities contribute to climate change, and (2) both statements are consistent with the view that climate change is harmless, why isn't it also possible that the statements are consistent with the view that climate change is much worse than whatever the expert consensus is? Why is it only possible that the situation could be neutral, beneficial or trivially negative, but not significantly or even catastrophically underestimated? I cannot see the logic on this point. Given the apparent ambiguity, it is arguable there are enormous policy implications of the surveys. What am I missing here? What is the flaw in the logic of arguing the situation could be modestly or even much worse than expert consensus currently holds? Thank you for your time and consideration.
McKitrick: The point is that you can't say 97% think AGW is dangerous, as Obama and others assert. When 97% agreement is found, leaving aside the sampling problems, it is only on relatively trivial statements that are consistent with a wide range of views about the level of harm. I don't argue that 97% think AGW is not a problem, nor can we argue based on the surveys that 97% think the problem is worse than the IPCC states. Either statement goes well beyond what the surveys show, either because the questions weren't asked or if they were asked, the split was nothing like 97-3.
Me: Thanks for getting back. I appreciate it. Just so I understand you, it is possible that things could be very serious or at least significantly worse than is now often believed to be the case. That is consistent with a complex non-linear system being unpredictable.
McKitrick: Yes, that's in the range of what's possible.
Me: Thank you.My prior AGW post argued we are playing Russian roulette with the climate, civilization and maybe even the human species. If the unpredictability of climate as a complex adaptive system is correct, and there's no obvious reason to think otherwise, McKitrick is incorrect to claim that the survey data has no policy implications. We could be in a far worse climate situation than what most experts now believe.
Based all the science, including the unpredictability problem, it is reasonable to believe that AGW skepticism is not defensible and is based on factors such as political ideology, personal bias, tribe identity and/or economic self-interest. One can also argue it is immoral. Is that logic and conclusion of immorality reasonable?
B&B orig: 3/6/19
Religious Logic: Trump is Cyrus
Thursday, March 21, 2019
A 6 minute segment, Bully Idol, by Bill Maher explains the logic behind the belief by many Evangelical Christians that President Trump is a modern day Cyrus and was put in office by God. Maher's recitation of the facts and logic enlightens the basis for the gulf in perceptions of reality that is tearing America apart. Despite the comedy, the underlying facts and logic Maher describes are basically sound.
https://youtu.be/rQBIBjbpzoQ
B&B orig: 3/9/19
A 6 minute segment, Bully Idol, by Bill Maher explains the logic behind the belief by many Evangelical Christians that President Trump is a modern day Cyrus and was put in office by God. Maher's recitation of the facts and logic enlightens the basis for the gulf in perceptions of reality that is tearing America apart. Despite the comedy, the underlying facts and logic Maher describes are basically sound.
https://youtu.be/rQBIBjbpzoQ
B&B orig: 3/9/19
Free Will: Do We Have It Or Not?
Thursday, March 21, 2019
The TED Radio Hour program that NPR aired yesterday, Hardwired, examines the matter of free will and factors that affect both behavior and health. The broadcast was in four 10-13 minute segments, which are here: https://www.npr.org/programs/ted-radio-hour/?showDate=2019-03-08
In the first segment neuroscientist Robert Sapolsky argues that there is no such thing as human free will. He argues that that appears to be acts of free will are simply manifestations of biology we do not understand. Everything is predetermined and we simply live our lives according to factors and forces we cannot control and may never be able to fully understand. Sapolsky pointed to a famous experiment where judges set punishment for convicts. In that experiment, which I think has been questioned at least once, showed that punishments were most strongly correlated with how hungry the judges were, which correlated with lower blood sugar levels.
In the 2nd segment, geneticist Moshe Szyf points to our genes as hardware that is mutable over time. He cites a situation where pregnant women were in a period of unusual stress for a period of time. This capacity of DNA to be chemically altered by experience amounts to an experiential identity. That identity arises from personal experiences that chemically changes the DNA of developing fetuses ('epigenetic' changes). Over the next 50 years, the babies subjected to stress developed more autoimmune diseases, metabolic diseases and autism than babies that were not subject to the same source of stress. As the stress level increased, so did the level of later disease.
Referring to this and other research, Szyf argues that DNA is dynamic due to epigenetic changes from life experiences over time. He sees that at least some human free will can arise from the interactions between individuals and external influences such as family, language, culture and so forth. In his view, epigenetic DNA phenomena is a source of some free will. He points to lower levels of stress in modern life compared to life thousands of years ago as a major factor.
In the 3rd segment, pediatrician Nadine Burke discusses how stress in children manifest as various problems including asthma, ADHD, skin rashes, autoimmune diseases, and so forth. She found a high correlation between traumatic stress (domestic violence, drug abuse, divorce, parental mental illness, etc.) and child health. Stress exerts influences after birth including susceptibility to diseases and risky behavior. That is consistent with life experiences exerting influence on behavior and health.
In the 4th segment psychologist Brian Little argues that we are born with traits that constrain our free will. He sees behavior and free will arising from our genes (biogenic authenticity), social forces that constrain behavior (sociogenic authenticity), and what we make of ourselves over our lifetimes (idiogenic authenticity). The latter influence can be at odds with the one or both of the former and the confluence of the three make us unique, which he implies is a course of free will.
On balance, the information presented here makes it sound like humans have, at most, little free will and what there is, is constrained. That is not a comforting conclusion. But is it correct? Is it too early to draw that conclusion, or is the science settled enough? If it is correct, what are the implications for politics?
B&B orig: 3/10/19
The TED Radio Hour program that NPR aired yesterday, Hardwired, examines the matter of free will and factors that affect both behavior and health. The broadcast was in four 10-13 minute segments, which are here: https://www.npr.org/programs/ted-radio-hour/?showDate=2019-03-08
In the first segment neuroscientist Robert Sapolsky argues that there is no such thing as human free will. He argues that that appears to be acts of free will are simply manifestations of biology we do not understand. Everything is predetermined and we simply live our lives according to factors and forces we cannot control and may never be able to fully understand. Sapolsky pointed to a famous experiment where judges set punishment for convicts. In that experiment, which I think has been questioned at least once, showed that punishments were most strongly correlated with how hungry the judges were, which correlated with lower blood sugar levels.
In the 2nd segment, geneticist Moshe Szyf points to our genes as hardware that is mutable over time. He cites a situation where pregnant women were in a period of unusual stress for a period of time. This capacity of DNA to be chemically altered by experience amounts to an experiential identity. That identity arises from personal experiences that chemically changes the DNA of developing fetuses ('epigenetic' changes). Over the next 50 years, the babies subjected to stress developed more autoimmune diseases, metabolic diseases and autism than babies that were not subject to the same source of stress. As the stress level increased, so did the level of later disease.
Referring to this and other research, Szyf argues that DNA is dynamic due to epigenetic changes from life experiences over time. He sees that at least some human free will can arise from the interactions between individuals and external influences such as family, language, culture and so forth. In his view, epigenetic DNA phenomena is a source of some free will. He points to lower levels of stress in modern life compared to life thousands of years ago as a major factor.
In the 3rd segment, pediatrician Nadine Burke discusses how stress in children manifest as various problems including asthma, ADHD, skin rashes, autoimmune diseases, and so forth. She found a high correlation between traumatic stress (domestic violence, drug abuse, divorce, parental mental illness, etc.) and child health. Stress exerts influences after birth including susceptibility to diseases and risky behavior. That is consistent with life experiences exerting influence on behavior and health.
In the 4th segment psychologist Brian Little argues that we are born with traits that constrain our free will. He sees behavior and free will arising from our genes (biogenic authenticity), social forces that constrain behavior (sociogenic authenticity), and what we make of ourselves over our lifetimes (idiogenic authenticity). The latter influence can be at odds with the one or both of the former and the confluence of the three make us unique, which he implies is a course of free will.
On balance, the information presented here makes it sound like humans have, at most, little free will and what there is, is constrained. That is not a comforting conclusion. But is it correct? Is it too early to draw that conclusion, or is the science settled enough? If it is correct, what are the implications for politics?
B&B orig: 3/10/19
The Biology Of Nationalism
Thursday, March 21, 2019
In an article in Foreign Policy magazine, This Is Your Brain on Nationalism: The Biology of Us and Them, neuroscientist Robert Sapolsky describes the cognitive biology of nationalism. A three minute interview by Fareed Zakaria with Sapolsky about this article and nationalism is here: https://www.facebook.com/fareedzakaria/videos/what-neuroscience-has-to-do-with-nationalism/1172179109608632/
Humans have a strong impulse to sort people into us and them groups. Sorting happens unconsciously. It is fast, taking about one-tenth of a second, and occurs before we are aware of any assessment. A portion of the brain that regulates fear and aggression reacts quickly, and a few seconds later the region of the brain that is crucial for impulse control and emotional regulation (prefrontal cortex) activates and normally suppresses the initial negative impulse. The unconscious brain reaction to images of faces of people of another race are different than images of same-race faces.
Sapolsky argues this is driven by evolution, which shaped how our brains perceive and think about sensory inputs from the world. He asserts that nationalism is a critically important phenomenon:
Is America capable of trying to harness nationalism in some way akin to Sapolsky's suggestion?
B&B orig: 3/11/19
In an article in Foreign Policy magazine, This Is Your Brain on Nationalism: The Biology of Us and Them, neuroscientist Robert Sapolsky describes the cognitive biology of nationalism. A three minute interview by Fareed Zakaria with Sapolsky about this article and nationalism is here: https://www.facebook.com/fareedzakaria/videos/what-neuroscience-has-to-do-with-nationalism/1172179109608632/
Humans have a strong impulse to sort people into us and them groups. Sorting happens unconsciously. It is fast, taking about one-tenth of a second, and occurs before we are aware of any assessment. A portion of the brain that regulates fear and aggression reacts quickly, and a few seconds later the region of the brain that is crucial for impulse control and emotional regulation (prefrontal cortex) activates and normally suppresses the initial negative impulse. The unconscious brain reaction to images of faces of people of another race are different than images of same-race faces.
Sapolsky argues this is driven by evolution, which shaped how our brains perceive and think about sensory inputs from the world. He asserts that nationalism is a critically important phenomenon:
To understand the dynamics of human group identity, including the resurgence of nationalism—that potentially most destructive form of in-group bias—requires grasping the biological and cognitive underpinnings that shape them.
Such an analysis offers little grounds for optimism. Our brains distinguish between in-group members and outsiders in a fraction of a second, and they encourage us to be kind to the former but hostile to the latter. These biases are automatic and unconscious and emerge at astonishingly young ages. . . . . Humans can rein in their instincts and build societies that divert group competition to arenas less destructive than warfare, yet the psychological bases for tribalism persist, even when people understand that their loyalty to their nation, skin color, god, or sports team is as random as the toss of a coin. At the level of the human mind, little prevents new teammates from once again becoming tomorrow’s enemies.One aspect of our cognitive biology is that biases against out-groups is often learned, although some are completely innate or nearly so. Infants pick up on cues from parents and caregivers about who is in-group and who is out-group, and race is a key marker the brain picks up on. Sapolsky comments:
Put simply, neurobiology, endocrinology, and developmental psychology all paint a grim picture of our lives as social beings. When it comes to group belonging, humans don’t seem too far from the families of chimps killing each other in the forests of Uganda: people’s most fundamental allegiance is to the familiar. Anything or anyone else is likely to be met, at least initially, with a measure of skepticism, fear, or hostility. In practice, humans can second-guess and tame their aggressive tendencies toward the Other. Yet doing so is usually a secondary, corrective step.
For all this pessimism, there is a crucial difference between humans and those warring chimps. The human tendency toward in-group bias runs deep, but it is relatively value-neutral. Although human biology makes the rapid, implicit formation of us-them dichotomies virtually inevitable, who counts as an outsider is not fixed. In fact, it can change in an instant.Nationalism: The sorting trait applies to nationalism and globalism:
At its best, nationalism and patriotism can prompt people to pay their taxes and care for their nation’s have-nots, including unrelated people they have never met and will never meet. But because this solidarity has historically been built on strong cultural markers of pseudo-kinship, it is easily destabilized, particularly by the forces of globalization, which can make people who were once the archetypes of their culture feel irrelevant and bring them into contact with very different sorts of neighbors than their grand-parents had. Confronted with such a disruption, tax-paying civic nationalism can quickly devolve into something much darker: a dehumanizing hatred that turns Jews into “vermin,” Tutsis into “cockroaches,” or Muslims into “terrorists.” Today, this toxic brand of nationalism is making a comeback across the globe, spurred on by political leaders eager to exploit it for electoral advantage.
In the face of this resurgence, the temptation is strong to appeal to people’s sense of reason. Surely, if people were to understand how arbitrary nationalism is, the concept would appear ludicrous. Nationalism is a product of human cognition, so cognition should be able to dismantle it, too.
Yet this is wishful thinking. In reality, knowing that our various social bonds are essentially random does little to weaken them. . . . . The pull of us-versus-them thinking is strong even when the arbitrariness of social boundaries is utterly transparent, to say nothing of when it is woven into a complex narrative about loyalty to the fatherland. You can’t reason people out of a stance they weren’t reasoned into in the first place.Sapolsky argues that we could try to harness nationalist dynamics and not fight or condemn them. That would mean leaders need to avoid jingoism and xenophobia, and appeal to people’s innate in-group tendencies to socialize or incentivize cooperation and accountability. In this political scenario, nationalist pride is rooted in a country’s ability to do social good such as care for the elderly, teaching children empathy, and ensuring increased social mobility.
Is America capable of trying to harness nationalism in some way akin to Sapolsky's suggestion?
B&B orig: 3/11/19
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