Sarah Chayes
Former NPR correspondent Sarah Chayes wrote
Thieves of State: Why Corruption Threatens Global Security (2015), largely based on her years of experience in Afghanistan working with average Afhgani people as they struggled to build normal lives in the wake of years of war and systemic kleptocracy. Chayes, now at the Carnegie Endowment, has spent years surrounded by and trying to work within the systemic kleptocracy that is the government of Afghanistan. She came to Afghanistan as an NPR correspondent and shortly thereafter abandoned journalism to work as a free agent trying to rebuild civilization.
Chayes observes that over the centuries, many commentators on government, e.g., from Nizam al-Mulk in the 11th century to Erasmus and Machiavelli in the 16th century, repeatedly pointed to corruption and the injustice it inflicts on the innocent is the single most potent threat to stable governance and peace. al-Mulk, an influential 11th century administrator wrote The Book of Politics (
Book of Government), which, among other things, (1) argued the need for a racially integrated army, and (2) proposed confiscating property of corrupt officials who take too much and repay those who were stolen from. Chayes: “Now there was an anti-corruption measure that would make an impact.”
Coming to see just how pervasive Afghan government corruption actually was took time. For example, Chayes co-founded a charity “of unclear mission,” that was run by President Hamid Karzai's brother, Qayum. Chayes had no idea that he was corrupt to the core: “At first I believed Qayum’s description of himself as constituting a ‘loyal opposition’ to his younger brother the president. . . . . Not for years would I begin systematically comparing his seductively incisive words with his deeds.” A chagrined Chayes finally came to understand that “I had, in other words, been an accessory to fraud.”
It turns out that kleptocrats like Qayum and his kleptocrat brother, president Hamid Karzai and the rest of the entire Afghan government know two things very, very well. First, they present themselves as a safe, rational, sincere refuge in the face of a vicious throat-cutting population. Chayes was terrified for a long time and another Afghani kleptocrat Chayes worked with did that number on her to keep her on a short leash. Kleptocrats need to keep outsiders like Chayes from directly interacting with average Afghanis as much as possible. Outsider and even leaders speaking directly to the people that non-leader kleptocrats have feared for centuries.
Second, all high level kleptocrats learned to speak English. They work hard to learn the jargon and acronyms that Western minds want to hear. On other words, they tell us exactly what we wanted to hear. The poison sounded so true and rational because it sounded so much like us.
The money pit bridge – finding the shallowest place to cross the river: Referring to a bridge outside Kandahar that foreign aid kept rebuilding “That bridge kept springing holes. And the foreigners kept paying more money for more repairs. And no one, as far as we knew, was called to account.” It’s not the case that ordinary Afghanis were blind to the corruption. One person ‘from the orchards north of town once told me’: “We all know this money is coming in. We just don’t know which hole it is spilling out through.”
The way it worked was simple. Foreign aid to fix the bridge would be awarded to an Afghani contractor. That contractor would then award the job to a subcontractor, but take a cut, and the sub would take another cut and award to job to another sub who took another cut and so on until there was little left of the money to fix the bridge. What repairs that were done was temporary band-aid. People got used to driving their cars and trucks off the road and through the river to get to the other side. The holes in the bridge afforded good, unobstructed views of the river below.
Chayes came to see the entire Afghanistan government as a vertically integrated criminal organization. Later, she came to see about the same thing in other countries, including Russia, Nigeria, Iraq, Egypt, Tunisia and so forth. If fact, if one looks at Transparency International’s transparency map, most countries are kleptocracies of some form or another.
So what? Where’s the security threat?: The central point that Thieves of State makes is that at some point, systemic corruption isn’t just a by-product of the war, but it morphs into a force that fosters and maintains global conflict. Corruption simply cannot be ignored as a serious source of international instability and conflict. The injustice and economic inequality of it enrages people. Chayes comments: “Abusive government corruption prompts extreme responses and thus represents a mortal threat to security.” She watched NGOs, NATO, and U.S. Army anti-corruption programs repeatedly fail.
The security threat comes from the rage and hate that grows in the soil of corruption. Citing cognitive science research on the point and her direct observations, Chayes points out that people who feel abused or cheated often do not always react rationally. Sometimes otherwise normal people moved into the arms of the hated Taliban because the government was so outrageous and the Taliban, speaking like normal Afghanis, began to sound rational and comforting enough. Screw democracy, Afghanis wanted justice. And, America and Western countries were seen by average Afghanis as complicit in and accepting of massive corruption because they allowed it to go unchecked, the thieves going unchecked. Chayes’ book is full of examples of how utterly inept and clueless American and Western diplomats, military, NGOs, aid groups and just about everyone else really was for a long time.
Chayes efforts as an official US military advisor finally began to sink in. Admiral Mullen (chairman, joint chiefs of staff) wasn’t stupid enough to let personal arrogance get in the way of seeing reality for what it was. But to finally get to that point, Chayes had to fight tooth and claw to get past the smug, clueless arrogance of US (and Afghani) military and diplomatic officials who fought her every step of the way. The CIA was a special sort of hell for Chayes – always quietly trying to undermine her to protect their ‘assets’. Some years after the US military woke up, the US State Department also started waking up. Everyone was now beginning to see just how serious and counterproductive US lives, efforts and money really had been. Systemic, pervasive corruption, not Islam or Afghani culture, was what made nation-building impossible. American efforts were doomed from the get go due to cluelessness.
Bin Ladn and 9/11: Just to make this strike home a bit more, Chayes argues that a significant driver of Bin Laden’s hate of the US and the West generally had nothing to do with religion. It was Bin Ladn’s white hot rage and hate flowing from decades of kleptocracy and what appeared to be, and often in fact was, decades of Western support and complicity in the moral outrage called corruption.
Although it’s not a full-blooded kleptocracy (yet), Chayes sees cause for concern even in America, pointing to the causes of the 2006-2007 financial meltdown and president Obama’s failure to see it for what it was and his failure to prosecute the responsible criminals. Of course, these days, there’s more than just Obama’s unfixable failures to be concerned about.
Solutions: Chayes isn’t naïve. Fighting corruption is hard and complex. There can be directly competing goals and priorities. Nonetheless, she does give a list of practical things that governments, multinational companies, Western militaries, diplomats even average citizens can do to fight global corruption.
In the overall scheme of things, corruption arguably ranks with the threat of nuclear war, catastrophic climate change, wealth inequality (significantly a function of corruption) and global overpopulation among serious threats to civilization and the fate of the human species.
For people wanting to learn about some reasons to reject isolationism and embrace proactive international engagement, this book is an excellent place to start.
B&B orig: 11/30/17; DP: 11/3/17
