Book review: One Nation After Trump

The Washington Post published the following review of One Nation After Trump: A Guide for the Perplexed, the Disillusioned, the Desperate, and the Not-Yet Deported by Beverly Gage, a teacher of U.S. political history at Yale. The book is authored by E.J. Dionne (liberal - Washington Post columnist), Norman J. Ornstein (conservative - American Enterprise Institute) Thomas E. Mann (non-partisan - Brookings Institute).

Gage writes:

“President Trump is not forever. At some point in the not-too-distant future, he will no longer be president, and it will be time to assess the post-storm damage and begin the recovery process. We don’t know when this will happen: this year or next, in 2021 or 2025. . . . . But it will happen, and the people in the best position to take advantage of that moment will be those who are already thinking about where we ought to go next.

. . . . Their [the author's] bipartisan — or, perhaps, tripartisan — work seems intended to send the rest of us a message: It’s time to find some common ground before obstructionism, demagoguery, fake news and racial resentment become the dominant features of our national politics. . . . .

The book begins with an assessment of the 2016 election, asking how on earth we ended up with our reality-star “Normless President.” Its emphasis is less on Trump, however, than on the long-term structural and cultural changes that made his election possible. The authors have no patience for a “both sides” argument about the degradation of our political culture. They lay the blame firmly within the Republican Party, where a process of “radicalization” that began in the 1980s has now resulted in a “Jurassic Park”-style disaster, with the creators of that change unable to control their own monster.

. . . . .

So what is to be done? If the book’s first half focuses on the sorry state of things today, the second half focuses on how to not make the same mistakes in the future. The authors claim to be genuinely — if tentatively — hopeful about what Trump’s election may ultimately yield for American civic life. “We believe that the popular mobilization and national soul-searching he has aroused could be the occasion for an era of democratic renewal,” they write. But that will happen only if Trump’s opponents across the political spectrum come up with “a hopeful and unifying alternative.”

The authors present an impressive list of policy ideas designed to do just that and perhaps even to dispel some of Trump’s allure within the MAGA base. They make a distinction between the “legitimate” (read: economic) grievances of Trump voters and the illegitimate expression of those grievances in the politics of racial and nativist resentment. They chastise Democrats for paying insufficient attention to the real pain of working-class voters, sidelined for decades by deindustrialization and now by an incomplete recovery from the financial crisis. But they insist — rightly — that any attempt to address those problems cannot come at the expense of other social justice movements.

. . . . .

It is hard to object to much about these plans, with their emphasis on fairness and comity and partisan goodwill. And yet there is something incongruous about the authors’ belief that good policy, judiciously presented, will yield the desired political transformation. As the authors note, one of the more depressing lessons of the 2016 election was that policy simply didn’t matter much. Nobody, including his own voters, thought Trump had much policy expertise. On the campaign trail, however, his abuse of wonks and elites and bureaucrats seemed to work in his favor.

In this context, a book that draws upon the best research of Harvard political scientists, Atlantic writers and think-tank staffers seems like a leap of faith as much as a matter of hard-nosed analysis. Some of the authors’ calls for unity have a similar wishful-thinking quality. “The imperative of turning back Trump and Trumpism will require unusual forms of discipline and commitment,” they write. “It will mean not allowing the ideological and tactical battles with the Democratic Party between factions loosely defined as Clinton and Sanders Democrats to tear it asunder.” Great! But how, exactly, will that happen?”

In an interview on today's To The Point program broadcast by KCRW, host Warren Olney did a 10 minute interview with Ornstein.[1] Ornstein pointed out poll data showing that voters who felt unfair treatment compared to other racial groups tended to be a solid base of Trump's core supporters. The MAGA mindset comes with a list of fairly common traits that include protectionism and xenophobia, sometimes tinged with racism.

Questions: Is it fair to lay most of the blame for incivility, extremism, a non-compromise mindset and a dysfunctional federal government on republicans? Does the plan that Doinne, Ornstein and Mann lay out seem plausible, or is partisan distrust and animosity too much to fix in anything short of a sustained multi-generational effort?

Footnote:
1. Ornstein and Mann wrote the 2012 book It’s Even Worse Than It Looks: How the American Constitutional System Collided With The New Politics of Extremism. In it they write: “One of the two major parties, the Republican Party, has become an insurgent outlier — ideologically extreme; contemptuous of the inherited social and economic policy regime; scornful of compromise; unpersuaded by conventional understanding of facts, evidence and science; and dismissive of the legitimacy of its political opposition.”

B&B orig: 9/29/17

Book Review: The Quartet

California wild rose

“I confess that I do not entirely approve this Constitution at present, but Sir, I am not sure I shall never approve it. . . . In these sentiments, Sir, I agree to this Constitution, with all its Faults, if they are such; because I think a General Government is necessary for us. . . . . I doubt too whether any other Convention we can obtain, may be able to make a better Constitution. . . . . It therefore astonishes me, Sir, to find this System approaching so near to Perfection as it does; and I think it will astonish our Enemies, who are waiting with confidence to hear how our Councils are Confounded, like those of the Builders of Babel, and that our States are on the Point of Separation, only to meet, hereafter, for the purposes of cutting one another's throats. Thus I consent, Sir, to this Constitution because I expect no better, and I am not sure that it is not the best.” Benjamin Franklin, 1787, stating his consent, if not approval of the new US Constitution

“Some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence, and deem them like the ark of the covenant, too sacred to be touched. They ascribe to the preceding age a wisdom more than human, and suppose that what they did to be beyond amendment. I knew that age well; I belonged to it and labored with it. It deserved well of its country. . . . . But I know also, that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. . . . . institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the times.” Thomas Jefferson, 1816, looking back and commenting on the Constitution and social change

In his 2015 book[1], The Quartet: Orchestrating The Second American Revolution, historian Joseph Ellis argues that the American revolution was two separate revolutions, both of which were probably necessary to launch the American Republic. Ellis singles out the four Founders who worked closely together and were necessary for the successful outcome of the 2nd revolution, Washington (roughly, the legitimizer), Hamilton (the firebrand), Madison (the thinker) and John Jay (the diplomat). Two other key players were Robert Morris (wealthy financier) and Gouvernor Morris ( the orator). All six of those Founders were nationalists who wanted a strong central government with tax and veto power over the existing 13 states.

The ultimate outcome of the first revolution, the war of independence, created a situation where the colonies and later settlement of the continent could lead to various political outcomes. Ellis argues that the second revolution pitted confederationists against nationalists, and the ultimate nationalist victory came with the ratification of the US Constitution and then the Bill of Rights.

According to Ellis, most Americans and politicians were confederationists who opposed the constitution. They wanted to stay with the existing post-war Articles of Confederation (AoC) and sovereign states that could act more as independent nations than as a cohesive political unit or a single nation with a central government.

Ellis relies heavily on primary sources, including Quartet members own written words. One thing that was very clear, until just before the Continental Congress called for a convention to amend the Articles of Confederation, Quartet members believed that there was no chance for the nationalist cause to replace the AoC with a new national constitution. Two unexpected events led to the possibility that the nationalist cause might have some reasonable chance of success. One was Shay's Rebellion, a small revolt of farmers in western Massachusetts. The press grossly overstated the rebellion's significance. For whatever reasons, both Washington and Madison came to believe that American independence could be lost to later events as the colonies splintered into regional groups and/or as Britain or Spain intervened to reassert control in the face of disunited colonies. In hindsight, both Washington and Madison badly misjudged the rebellion's significance, but it nonetheless was a necessary part of their mindset before the constitutional convention.

The second unexpected event was the refusal of conservatives from all colonies except New York to attend the convention. That left two groups to attend, the nationalists and moderates who wanted to amend the AoC, but not replace it. Without pro-AoC conservatives in attendance, the chance of nationalist success went from low (~1%?) to about 50:50, based on the numbers of nationalists and moderates that were picked to attend.

Ellis's book conveys two points that are highly relevant and important in modern American politics.

Compromise and ambiguity was necessary: At the end of the convention with the convention's approval of the Constitution, Washington, Hamilton and Madison all thought they had failed the nationalist cause and that the US would remain a confederation doomed to ultimate failure via dissolution, civil war and then obscurity. That was the fate of all past confederations until that point.

Circumstances at the convention forced compromises and ambiguities in the distribution of power between the central government and the states. Madison used "the People" as a repository of power in cases where central vs. state governments was at issue. That helped cloud the issue of exactly where power resided. The best the Quartet could do was to create enough ambiguity in the constitution to render the issue of who had what power a matter that needed to be negotiated on a case-by-case basis.

Although they believed they failed, the Quartet later came to see that the Constitution, coupled with the Bill of Rights accomplished as much as could have been done at the time under the prevailing pro-state, anti-federal circumstances. Public fear of King George was palpable and so was fear of any central government with any political power. Franklin may have been the convention attendee who most clearly saw the nationalist merits of the Constitution at the time. If nothing else, he had more life perspective than any of the Quartet members.

Ambiguity means flexibility: Since the Constitution intentionally left many matters ambiguous, that necessitated later negotiations and political machinations to address new situations as they arose. The Founders knew that they could not predict all exigencies a new nation would face.

Referring to Jefferson's 1816 comments quoted above, Ellis concludes The Quartet like this: “Jefferson spoke for almost all the prominent members of the revolutionary generation in urging posterity not to regard their political prescriptions as sacred script. It is richly ironic that one of the few original intentions they all shared was opposition to any judicial doctrine of ‘original intent.’ To be sure, they all wished to be remembered, but they did not want to be embalmed.”

Questions:
If ambiguity is built into the concept of federal vs state power, what objective basis exists, if any, can one point to and find the “Founder’s intent” for modern political issues that implicate use of power or the balance of state vs federal power?

In view of current political circumstances, does America need a 3rd revolution of some sort to defend itself against demagoguery riding on dark free speech, including the dark speech that American’s enemies, especially Russia, use against to divide and weaken us?

Is Madison’s vision of a large republic with counterbalancing interests to keep demagoguery and tyranny in check still working in the US? Did it ever work?

Did the Founders generally believe that the constitution is a living document because, e.g., (i) as Jefferson put it, “laws and institutions must also go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind”, and/or (ii) as Ellis put it, “It is richly ironic that one of the few original intentions [all the most prominent members of the revolutionary generation] shared was opposition to any judicial doctrine of ‘original intent’”

Is refusal to compromise in modern two-party politics evidence of political success or failure?

Footnote:
Ellis's book is easy to read and cites plenty of sources for many of the book's points. Many of the references are to primary sources. The book is short, 220 pages plus appendices, e.g., the Articles of Confederation. Ellis has been criticized for omitting some relevant history, but in a 220-page book that is understandable. Thousands of pages of history have been written on the constitutional convention.

One historian includes this in his critique: “The weakness of “The Quartet” is that it does not look past the figures standing center stage in Ellis’s story. As a result, Ellis omits or plays down the politics that led to the Convention and the Constitution — the institutions and processes that gave rise to and sustained the movement to reform the government of the United States, as well as the debates on framing, ratifying and implementing the Constitution.”

B&B orig: 10/10/17

Book Review: The Death Of Expertise

The thesis of Tom Nichols’ 2017 book, The Death Of Expertise: The Campaign Against Established Knowledge And Why It Matters, posits that widespread rejection and distrust of expert knowledge. He argues this amounts to a democratic dysfunction that can easily lead to some form of mob rule or autocracy. Nichols is a professor of national security affairs and expert on Russian politics.

In this short, easy to read book, Nichols builds a compelling case that Americans’ anti-elitist attitudes are moving the U.S. toward some form of mob rule or autocracy, a trend that, in Nichols’ opinion, Donald Trump’s presidency reflects. Although Nichols points to concrete actions that experts can take by increasing their own transparency, accountability and public engagement, he is ultimately not optimistic: “Tragically, I suspect that a possible resolution will lie in a disaster as yet unforeseen. It may be a [major] war or a [major] economic collapse. . . . . It may be in the emergence of an ignorant demagoguery, a process already underway in the United States and Europe, or the rise to power of a technocracy that finally runs out of patience and thus dispenses with voting as anything other than a formality.”

Nichols lays much of the blame on the American people and their distrusting attitudes toward experts, knowledge itself and democratic institutions. “The death of expertise is not just a rejection of existing knowledge. It is fundamentally a rejection of science and dispassionate rationality, which are foundations of modern civilization.” He asserts that for “the average American”, their knowledge base is so low it has passed “uninformed” and “misinformed” to a level that is “aggressively wrong”. Many Americans just believe “dumb things” and often reject information that undermines false beliefs.

Nichols is aware that significant natural barriers against respect for knowledge and experts lie in human cognitive biology: “ We all suffer from problems, for example, like ‘confirmation bias,’ the natural tendency to only accept evidence that confirms what we already believe.” He argues that human biases are easily and routinely exploited by an ocean of online sources that are “making many of us dumber,” “meaner” and “enabling and reinforcing our human failings.” Maybe calling cognitive biases ‘failings’ misses the mark a little. Biases are normal and served well in early human evolution.

The problem is that in complex modern societies, playing on that biology is the key route that demagogues, autocrats and tyrants take in their runs for power. Understanding of that point dates at least back to Plato and Aristotle, both of whom were acutely aware of this human aspect of politics. This issue is extremely serious, not trivial.

Nichols sees flaws in modern higher education: “When students become valued clients instead of learners, they gain a great deal of self-esteem, but precious little knowledge; worse, they do not develop the habits of critical thinking . . . .” And, economic pressures on the press aren't helpful either: “In this hypercompetitive media environment, editors and producers no longer have the patience -- or the financial luxury -- to allow journalists to develop their own expertise and deep knowledge of a subject.”[1] This media critique raises the question of whether a free press operating in a capitalist, for-profit environment can ever be up to the task of reasonably informing a public that hungers far more for entertainment and self-affirming content than ice cold, usually uncomfortable knowledge. That's a question for the experts to chew on.

The death spiral: Nichols sees the current state of affairs as one where distrust in experts and knowledge has led America to enter a death spiral that “presents an immediate danger of decay either into rule by the mob or toward elitist technocracy . . . . and both threaten the United States today. . . . . the most disturbing aspect of the American march toward ignorance is not lack of knowledge per se but arrogance about that lack of knowledge.”

Focus on fostering transparency, finding good leaders and boosting institutional efficacy, not issues: From this observer's cognitive and social biology-based point of view, Nichols paints a picture of a society overwhelmed by an ocean of false information and effective cognitive manipulation,[2] an economically stressed professional press unable to keep up with events, inept institutions such as congress and a failing higher education system. Maybe Nichols would dispute that picture, but that is how this reader sees it.

Regardless, if that is a reasonably accurate description of the American condition, then Nichol’s call for American citizens to become better informed won't succeed. Other analyses of democracy and social and technological complexity make it clear that it is impossible for citizens to be even ‘reasonably’ informed on enough issues to make ‘informed’ voting decisions.[3] Nichols himself says almost the same thing: “. . . . there are not simply enough hours in the day for a legislator, even in a city council or a small US state . . . . to master all of the issues modern policymaking requires.”

A plausible alternative option that might break out of the death spiral is to focus not on understanding issues, an impossible task, but on trying to foster more transparency, find good leaders somehow, e.g., look for morality and honesty, and look for institutional efficacy as evidence of good governance. Whether that would have any impact is an open question, but at least it’s another way to think about things. Questions: Does Nichols put too much blame on ordinary citizens and too little on other things such as America’s corrupted pay-to-play two-party system or ideologically-inspired gridlock in governance?

Is Nichols too pessimistic about where America is heading?

Footnote:
1. Nichols cites the fascinating case of Ben Rhodes playing an inexperienced press corps to sell president Obama’s nuclear deal with Iran. Rhodes was Obama’s Deputy National Security Adviser. A dysfunctional congress was in the background was a key driver of the press manipulation. “We created an echo chamber,” he admitted when I asked him to explain the onslaught of freshly minted experts cheerleading for the deal. . . . . When I asked whether the prospect of this same kind of far-reaching spin campaign being run by a different administration is something that scares him, he admitted that it does. “I mean, I’d prefer a sober, reasoned public debate after which members of congress reflect and take a vote,” he said shrugging. “But that's impossible. . . . . The average reporter we talk to is 27 years old . . . . They literally know nothing. Rhode’s implication was clear. Not only did he think the public was too stupid to understand the deal -- which was not wrong . . . . --but that everyone else, including congress, was too stupid to get it as well.”

Nichols calls this incident intolerable and assigns blame all around, including experts’ share of blame, but notes that “. . . . there is only one group of people who must bear the ultimate responsibility for this state of affairs, and only they can change any of it: the citizens of the United States of America.”

2. Regarding cognitive manipulation, Nichols comments: “Emotion is an unassailable defense against expertise, a moat of anger and resentment in which reason and knowledge quickly drown. And when students learn that emotion trumps everything else, it is a lesson they will take with them for the rest of their lives.”

All a speaker needs to do is provoke an emotion(s) such as fear, anger, hate, disgust and/or distrust. Once that is accomplished, they have disabled the listener’s conscious reason and made their message far more persuasive regardless of its truth or falsity.

3. Regarding politics, two social scientists comment in their book Democracy for Realists: “. . . . the typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the political field. He argues and analyzes in a way which he would readily recognize as infantile within the sphere of his real interests. . . . cherished ideas and judgments we bring to politics are stereotypes and simplifications with little room for adjustment as the facts change. . . . . the real environment is altogether too big, too complex, and too fleeting for direct acquaintance. We are not equipped to deal with so much subtlety, so much variety, so many permutations and combinations. Although we have to act in that environment, we have to reconstruct it on a simpler model before we can manage it.”

B&B orig: 10/18/17; DP repost 5/18/20

Book review: Free Will

A major question in philosophy and science asks, do humans have free will? Like politics, concepts in philosophy and science need to be defined for the question or an answer to have a meaning that is understood by more than just a single person or group of like-minded people. For many people, free will means that their actions are matters of free will because they do what they consciously want to do. That belief is intuitively appealing, but is mostly false (~98% false?) based on objective evidence. Most of our actions and behaviors are controlled by our unconscious minds making unconscious decisions we never become aware of. If the phrase ‘I have free will because I do what I want to do’ includes doing what I decide consciously or unconsciously, then that conception of free will at least acknowledges the role of the unconscious mind.

However, that description of free will does not accurately frame the free will concept based on current neuroscience and philosophical thinking. From that point of view, unconscious decisions and actions do not arise from free will because they are not consciously inspired. As described in his book Free Will, philosopher Mark Balaguer (The MIT Press, Cambridge, 2014) free will applies to a small set of ‘torn decisions.’ Torn decisions decisions are decisions that people make when they are in situations where they are about equally inclined to select one option among multiple roughly equally appealing (or least worse) choices. Torn decisions range from trivial, e.g., choose chocolate ice cream, not vanilla, to life-changing, e.g., marry person X, not person Y. Few decisions are torn. If one believes that free will means doing what they consciously want or desire, there is for the most part no such thing as free will.

Balaguer’s short (126 page) book goes through the key philosophical logic and neuroscience data and their underlying strengths and weaknesses in simple, clear language. There is very little technical jargon in Free Will and the few terms that are necessary are clearly described in simple language. Some people may criticize Balaguer for oversimplification, but from this reviewer’s biology point of view, the biology simplifications do not undermine the book’s logic or conclusions. It is reasonable to assume that the philosophical simplifications, which Balaguer clearly points out when relevant, also do not undermine logic or conclusions.

One thing that supports Balaguer’s credibility is his openness about his biases. For example, he is biased to want to believe that humans have free will. Also, although Balaguer is an atheist, he clearly points out where and how arguments in favor of an immaterial soul and free will are compatible with existing logic and data. Despite his contrary biases, he clearly explains the weaknesses of arguments in favor of free will belief and the strengths of arguments against it. This book is well worth the cost in money ($11.54 at Amazon) and time it takes to read. Average readers will probably finish this book in about 10 hours or less.

The broad context of this debate centers on whether there is true free will in making torn decisions or whether there are no situations in which free will exists. Determinism, the belief that there is no such thing as free will under any circumstances, holds that all human decisions and actions are pre-determined since the moment of the big bang. The evidence in favor of determinism is strong. Growing numbers of philosophers and scientists are coming to believe it. Despite the current situation, Balaguer argues that it is too soon to write off free will as non-existent. Although this reviewer is also biased to want to believe in free will, Balaguer’s arguments and logic are convincing on their merits, not on bias. Additional biological evidence against free will needs to be generated and verified.

Existing biological evidence is that neurological signals in the brain signal show that decisions to act or behave are unconscious and are made before we are consciously aware of the decision. Those signals can be detected as early as about 10 seconds before a decision becomes conscious. Balaguer explains that those signals are compatible with decisions being unconscious, which is how that biological data is usually interpreted. Despite that, Balaguer argues the data can also be interpreted as a biological phenomenon that correlates with an unconscious decision being made, but isn’t necessarily causal of the decision per se. Resolving that question will take time, but at least it does seem plausibly resolvable by science.

Balaguer believes it will take many decades before sufficient data can be generated to reasonably decide the issue, assuming it can ever be decided. Some people now believe that the question can never be resolved by human inquiry. However, that belief is increasingly weak as new data continues to be generated. From this reviewer’s point of view, Balaguer is unduly pessimistic about how long it will take to resolve the question. This may be personal bias speaking, but it looks like reasonable resolution of the free will question is no more than 25-50 years off.

At least some people alive today just might come to know if humans have free will or not. Of course, that time frame assumes the human species doesn’t destroy modern civilization or the species itself before then. Whether that assumption is optimistic or not is beyond the scope of this book review.

B&B orig: 11/21/17

Book Review: The Mind-Body Problem

In The Mind-Body Problem, philosopher Johnathan Westphal explains the the mind-body problem (MBP) and various logical and empirical attempts to provide solutions. In essence, Westphal argues that the MBP is an intractable paradox that requires a different way to look at the human mind and body in the real world if progress is to be made.[1] The MBP asks (1) how it is possible for the nonphysical mind to interact with the physical body if it is true that physical and nonphysical things cannot interact, and (2) how mind and body are related. Westphal's logic, which is open to criticism as not the correct way to frame the issue, is as follows:

1. The mind is a nonphysical thing
2. The body is a physical thing
3. The mind and body interact
4. Physical and nonphysical things cannot interact

Westphal comments: “The mind-body problem is a paradox.[2] . . . . It is very hard to deny any of these four propositions. But they cannot consistently be held to be true together. At least one of them must be false, and the attempt to show the exact way in which this plays out is the work of developing a solution to the mind-body problem.” For example, if propositions 1, 2 and 3 are true, then 4 is false. One class of proposed solutions, generally believed true until the 1960’s, was generically called ‘dualist’ theories.

Of necessity, dualists argue that proposition 4 is false and gave various rationales to support that belief. If they didn't, it would be the case that mind and body were different and could not interact. But mind and body obviously do interact somehow, so therefore proposition 4 is false in the dualist mind.

The Mind-Body Problem (2016) is a fairly short book (197 pages), written in easy to understand language. The simple logic is laid out as shown above. It is another easy to read book for a general audience in the Essential Knowledge Series that MIT Press has published. Free Will, reviewed here, is another short, well written book in that series.

Maybe the most significant progress to date comes from understanding just how subtle and easily confused the problem is, despite the simplicity of the underlying logic that clearly defines the problem.

Wrapping heads around problem: The subtlety of the MBP is revealed in how Westphal describes the way the problem first came to be understood and described with some degree of coherence. On Westphal’s account, which differs somewhat from some other historical accounts, Rene Descartes’ 1641 Meditations on First Philosophy, proposed that the body is spatial or exists in space, and the soul (mind) doesn’t and therefore the two cannot act on each other. Descartes describes the problem, but is actually unaware of it. He thought that somehow the mind got close to the body, but still wasn’t in space or physical. The problem was first articulated in letters to Descartes asking how on Earth is it possible for mind and body to interact when one is in physical space and the other isn’t.

Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia wrote to Descartes in 1643: “I beg you to tell me how the human soul can determine the movement of the animal spirits [roughly, nerve impulses] in the body so as to perform voluntary acts – being as it is merely a conscious substance. . . . .” Elizbeth goes on to claim that she simply could not comprehend how it is possible for the mind, which has no location in space, can come into contact with an unconscious substance like the body, which is located in space, thereby interacting with it.

In essence, Westphal argues that Descartes was describing a solution to the mind-body problem, substance dualism (the mind is one substance, separate and different from the substance of the soul), without being aware of the MBP. What forced the problem into the open was Descartes’ insistence on the sharp distinction of a body in space interacting with a mind that’s not in space. In 1649, sensing something was rotten, Descartes’ wrote in his Passions of the Soul and claimed that the soul (mind) worked through the pineal gland in the brain. Westphal: “. . . the whole idea [pineal gland] is a nonstarter, because the pineal gland is as physical as any other part of the body.”

Well, so much for that theory. Woof!

Science chastised: An interesting criticism Westphal levels at scientists who work on the MBP is that they sometimes lose sight of the simple underlying logic and think they can use the power of neuroscience, physiology, data processing and other science to solve this problem. For example, Westphal cites a 2005 science-based hypothesis that a highly interconnected layer of neurons below the neocortex (the claustrum) is the site of consciousness. Westphal observes that the hypothesis is an “inconsistent and unstable mixture” of prior hypotheses. They are mutually exclusive on pure logic grounds.

Regarding the two scientists who proposed the claustrum hypothesis, if that’s what it is, Westphal doesn’t mince words: “It seems to me that Crick and Koch did not have the measure of the true difficulty of the problem, and the kind of problem it is: the logical part of it must be solved before the scientific and psychological elements of a solution can begin to have any traction.”

Neutral theories: Westphal’s book marches from dualist theories through other major theories that have come and gone, e.g., property dualism, behaviorism theories, materialism theories, physicalism theories, identity theory, functionalism, theories with strange names, e.g., epiphenomenalism, panpsychism and panprotopsychism, science-based theories such as the claustrum hypothesis and the 35-70 Hz hypothesis, and so on. He clearly describes why he believes that that all theories have failed. All except one class. Among the theories, is a genus called neutral theories that Westphal does not believe has failed.

Westphal acknowledges that neutral theories fell out of favor as science took hold and pushed other theories aside. Despite that, Westphal believes that the science-based approach has stalled. In view of the failure of all other theories from Descartes to the present, he argues this class of theory needs to be reassessed. His preferred neutral monism theory affords a different way to see and think about the universe and minds.

It sees the mental and physical as manifestations of a single thing, ‘neutral elements’ such as colors, pain and behavior. For intentional behavior, the hardest thing to explain, Westphal separately breaks behaviors down into mental elements and observable physical events (elements), finds them roughly the same and concludes that “mental events can ‘become’ or rather be taken to be physical elements, via their corresponding neutral elements.” In essence, this refutes proposition 1, that the mind is a nonphysical thing. In other words, proposition 1 is false because the mind is in fact a physical thing according to neutral monist theory. That’s rather appealing (personally), even though it’s somewhat hard to understand and internalize.

Not surprisingly, Westphal’s preferred theory, neutral monism, is subject to criticisms. Clearly, the MBP still isn’t solved. Or, maybe it is, but folks just don’t know it yet. Philosophy is a strange beast indeed.

For those interested, Westphal commentaries on neutral monism and Q&A with him are here at the Brains Blog. Turns out, Westphal actually responded to questions from the public, at least for a while. For an influential academic (Oxford) in any field, that’s very rare.

Footnotes:
1. Caveat: This channel is primarily focused on the biology of politics, the most important subject, and articulating a world view through a pragmatic, fact- and reason-based political ideology or lens (an ‘anti-bias’ viewpoint). Despite that, it is becoming more personally apparent that one cannot ignore at least some areas of philosophy, such as the philosophy of mind. Although the anti-bias ideology, thinking and mindset was originally grounded in cognitive and social science, it is clear that those areas alone cannot provide a sufficiently wide scope of informed vision about the human species. That raises caveats. I am academically trained and have decades of personal and professional experience in biology, mainly molecular biology and medical science, and law. Philosophy is outside my training and expertise, therefore, I do not know philosophy beyond what comes from the sources I discuss, The Mind-Body Problem in this case. The situation for cognitive and social science is better informed, being closer to my academic and professional experiences and subjects of informal study for about 14 years. In other words, there is no claim to real expertise in philosophy (or science) here. One can decide for themselves if that is a problem or not.

2. Westphal on paradox: “A paradox is a group of propositions for each of which we have apparently sound arguments, yet the propositions taken together are inconsistent. We cannot affirm all the propositions in the group, yet we have good reason to believe they are all true.” In other words, each piece of the logic framework seems to be true, but when all the pieces are put together, they just don't fit and are logically inconsistent. At least one of the propositions has to be false.

B&B orig: 11/27/17

Book Review: Thieves of State

Sarah Chayes

Former NPR correspondent Sarah Chayes wrote Thieves of State: Why Corruption Threatens Global Security, largely based on her years of experience in Afghanistan working with average Afhgani people as they struggled to build normal lives in the wake of years of war and systemic kleptocracy. Chayes, now at the Carnegie Endowment, has spent years surrounded by and trying to work within the systemic kleptocracy that is the government of Afghanistan. She came to Afghanistan as an NPR correspondent and shortly thereafter abandoned journalism to work as a free agent trying to rebuild civilization.

Chayes observes that over the centuries, many commentators on government, e.g., from Nizam al-Mulk in the 11th century to Erasmus and Machiavelli in the 16th century, repeatedly pointed to corruption and the injustice it inflicts on the innocent is the single most potent threat to stable governance and peace. al-Mulk, an influential 11th century administrator wrote The Book of Politics (Book of Government), which, among other things, (1) argued the need for a racially integrated army, and (2) proposed confiscating property of corrupt officials who take too much and repay those who were stolen from. Chayes: “Now there was an anti-corruption measure that would make an impact.”

Coming to see just how pervasive Afghan government corruption actually was took time. For example, Chayes co-founded a charity “of unclear mission,” that was run by President Hamid Karzai's brother, Qayum. Chayes had no idea that he was corrupt to the core: “At first I believed Qayum’s description of himself as constituting a ‘loyal opposition’ to his younger brother the president. . . . . Not for years would I begin systematically comparing his seductively incisive words with his deeds.” A chagrined Chayes finally came to understand that “I had, in other words, been an accessory to fraud.”

It turns out that kleptocrats like Qayum and his kleptocrat brother, president Hamid Karzai and the rest of the entire Afghan government know two things very, very well. First, they present themselves as a safe, rational, sincere refuge in the face of a vicious throat-cutting population. Chayes was terrified for a long time and another Afghani kleptocrat Chayes worked with did that number on her to keep her on a short leash. Kleptocrats need to keep outsiders like Chayes from directly interacting with average Afghanis as much as possible. Outsider and even leaders speaking directly to the people that non-leader kleptocrats have feared for centuries.

Second, all high level kleptocrats learned to speak English. They work hard to learn the jargon and acronyms that Western minds want to hear. On other words, they tell us exactly what we wanted to hear. The poison sounded so true and rational because it sounded so much like us.

The money pit bridge – finding the shallowest place to cross the river: Referring to a bridge outside Kandahar that foreign aid kept rebuilding “That bridge kept springing holes. And the foreigners kept paying more money for more repairs. And no one, as far as we knew, was called to account.” It’s not the case that ordinary Afghanis were blind to the corruption. One person ‘from the orchards north of town once told me’: “We all know this money is coming in. We just don’t know which hole it is spilling out through.”

The way it worked was simple. Foreign aid to fix the bridge would be awarded to an Afghani contractor. That contractor would then award the job to a subcontractor, but take a cut, and the sub would take another cut and award to job to another sub who took another cut and so on until there was little left of the money to fix the bridge. What repairs that were done was temporary band-aid. People got used to driving their cars and trucks off the road and through the river to get to the other side. The holes in the bridge afforded good, unobstructed views of the river below.

Chayes came to see the entire Afghanistan government as a vertically integrated criminal organization. Later, she came to see about the same thing in other countries, including Russia, Nigeria, Iraq, Egypt, Tunisia and so forth. If fact, if one looks at Transparency International’s transparency map, most countries are kleptocracies of some form or another.

So what? Where’s the security threat?: The central point that Thieves of State makes is that at some point, systemic corruption isn’t just a by-product of the war, but it morphs into a force that fosters and maintains global conflict. Corruption simply cannot be ignored as a serious source of international instability and conflict. The injustice and economic inequality of it enrages people. Chayes comments: “Abusive government corruption prompts extreme responses and thus represents a mortal threat to security.” She watched NGOs, NATO, and U.S. Army anti-corruption programs repeatedly fail.

The security threat comes from the rage and hate that grows in the soil of corruption. Citing cognitive science research on the point and her direct observations, Chayes points out that people who feel abused or cheated often do not always react rationally. Sometimes otherwise normal people moved into the arms of the hated Taliban because the government was so outrageous and the Taliban, speaking like normal Afghanis, began to sound rational and comforting enough. Screw democracy, Afghanis wanted justice. And, America and Western countries were seen by average Afghanis as complicit in and accepting of massive corruption because they allowed it to go unchecked, the thieves going unchecked. Chayes’ book is full of examples of how utterly inept and clueless American and Western diplomats, military, NGOs, aid groups and just about everyone else really was for a long time.

Chayes efforts as an official US military advisor finally began to sink in. Admiral Mullen (chairman, joint chiefs of staff) wasn’t stupid enough to let personal arrogance get in the way of seeing reality for what it was. But to finally get to that point, Chayes had to fight tooth and claw to get past the smug, clueless arrogance of US (and Afghani) military and diplomatic officials who fought her every step of the way. The CIA was a special sort of hell for Chayes – always quietly trying to undermine her to protect their ‘assets’. Some years after the US military woke up, the US State Department also started waking up. Everyone was now beginning to see just how serious and counterproductive US lives, efforts and money really had been. Systemic, pervasive corruption, not Islam or Afghani culture, was what made nation-building impossible. American efforts were doomed from the get go due to cluelessness.

Bin Ladn and 9/11: Just to make this strike home a bit more, Chayes argues that a significant driver of Bin Laden’s hate of the US and the West generally had nothing to do with religion. It was Bin Ladn’s white hot rage and hate flowing from decades of kleptocracy and what appeared to be, and often in fact was, decades of Western support and complicity in the moral outrage called corruption.

Although it’s not a full-blooded kleptocracy (yet), Chayes sees cause for concern even in America, pointing to the causes of the 2006-2007 financial meltdown and president Obama’s failure to see it for what it was and his failure to prosecute the responsible criminals. Of course, these days, there’s more than just Obama’s unfixable failures to be concerned about.

Solutions: Chayes isn’t naïve. Fighting corruption is hard and complex. There can be directly competing goals and priorities. Nonetheless, she does give a list of practical things that governments, multinational companies, Western militaries, diplomats even average citizens can do to fight global corruption.

In the overall scheme of things, corruption arguably ranks with the threat of nuclear war, catastrophic climate change, wealth inequality (significantly a function of corruption) and global overpopulation among serious threats to civilization and the fate of the human species.

For people wanting to learn about some reasons to reject isolationism and embrace proactive international engagement, this book is an excellent place to start.

B&B orig: 11/30/17