Wealth Distribution in the Pre-Civil War South

Wealth was not well distributed and most whites were poor. Nonetheless, there were minimal class tensions in the South among whites because they were united by racism. One source writes:

The South prospered, but its wealth was very unequally distributed. Upward social mobility did not exist for the millions of slaves who produced a good portion of the nation’s wealth, while poor southern whites envisioned a day when they might rise enough in the world to own slaves of their own. Because of the cotton boom, there were more millionaires per capita in the Mississippi River Valley by 1860 than anywhere else in the United States. However, in that same year, only 3 percent of whites owned more than fifty slaves, and two-thirds of white households in the South did not own any slaves at all. Distribution of wealth in the South became less democratic over time; fewer whites owned slaves in 1860 than in 1840.

At the top of southern white society stood the planter elite, which comprised two groups. In the Upper South, an aristocratic gentry, generation upon generation of whom had grown up with slavery, held a privileged place. In the Deep South, an elite group of slaveholders gained new wealth from cotton. Some members of this group hailed from established families in the eastern states (Virginia and the Carolinas), while others came from humbler backgrounds. South Carolinian Nathaniel Heyward, a wealthy rice planter and member of the aristocratic gentry, came from an established family and sat atop the pyramid of southern slaveholders. He amassed an enormous estate; in 1850, he owned more than eighteen hundred slaves. When he died in 1851, he left an estate worth more than $2 million (approximately $63 million in 2014 dollars).

Wealthy plantation owners like Edward Lloyd came close to forming an American ruling class in the years before the Civil War. They helped shape foreign and domestic policy with one goal in view: to expand the power and reach of the cotton kingdom of the South. Socially, they cultivated a refined manner and believed whites, especially members of their class, should not perform manual labor. Rather, they created an identity for themselves based on a world of leisure in which horse racing and entertainment mattered greatly, and where the enslavement of others was the bedrock of civilization.

Below the wealthy planters were the yeoman farmers, or small landowners. Below yeomen were poor, landless whites, who made up the majority of whites in the South. These landless white men dreamed of owning land and slaves and served as slave overseers, drivers, and traders in the southern economy. In fact, owning land and slaves provided one of the only opportunities for upward social and economic mobility. In the South, living the American dream meant possessing slaves, producing cotton, and owning land.

Despite this unequal distribution of wealth, non-slaveholding whites shared with white planters a common set of values, most notably a belief in white supremacy. Whites, whether rich or poor, were bound together by racism. Slavery defused class tensions among them, because no matter how poor they were, white southerners had race in common with the mighty plantation owners. Non-slaveholders accepted the rule of the planters as defenders of their shared interest in maintaining a racial hierarchy. Significantly, all whites were also bound together by the constant, prevailing fear of slave uprisings.

Because race bound all whites together as members of the master race, non-slaveholding whites took part in civil duties. They served on juries and voted. They also engaged in the daily rounds of maintaining slavery by serving on neighborhood patrols to ensure that slaves did not escape and that rebellions did not occur. The practical consequence of such activities was that the institution of slavery, and its perpetuation, became a source of commonality among different economic and social tiers that otherwise were separated by a gulf of difference.

Southern planters exerted a powerful influence on the federal government. Seven of the first eleven presidents owned slaves, and more than half of the Supreme Court justices who served on the court from its inception to the Civil War came from slaveholding states. However, southern white yeoman farmers generally did not support an active federal government. They were suspicious of the state bank and supported President Jackson’s dismantling of the Second Bank of the United States. They also did not support taxes to create internal improvements such as canals and railroads; to them, government involvement in the economic life of the nation disrupted what they perceived as the natural workings of the economy. They also feared a strong national government might tamper with slavery.

With the rise of democracy during the Jacksonian era in the 1830s, slaveholders worried about the power of the majority. If political power went to a majority that was hostile to slavery, the South—and the honor of white southerners—would be imperiled. White southerners keen on preserving the institution of slavery bristled at what they perceived to be northern attempts to deprive them of their livelihood. Powerful southerners like South Carolinian John C. Calhoun highlighted laws like the Tariff of 1828 as evidence of the North’s desire to destroy the southern economy and, by extension, its culture. Such a tariff, he and others concluded, would disproportionately harm the South, which relied heavily on imports, and benefit the North, which would receive protections for its manufacturing centers. The tariff appeared to open the door for other federal initiatives, including the abolition of slavery. Because of this perceived threat to southern society, Calhoun argued that states could nullify federal laws. This belief illustrated the importance of the states’ rights argument to the southern states. It also showed slaveholders’ willingness to unite against the federal government when they believed it acted unjustly against their interests.

Although slavery is gone, remnants of the old elitist mindset are still common. For example, many people in the South still fear and strongly oppose a strong national government and its defense of civil liberties. They prefer authoritarian autocrats to exert power and shape society. The unequal wealth distribution of the pre-war South looks rather like the wealth distribution of today. Some things just don't seem to change much.

Based on 2010 survey data

Footnote:
Recent research suggests (summarized here) that the standard of living for most whites was higher than previous accounts from some writers who visited the Antebellum South in the 1840s through the pre-war 1860s. One observer wrote in 1863 that “for all practical purposes we may still regard Southern society as consisting of aristocratic planters and ‘white trash’”.

States With No Legal Protections for LGBT: Our National Experiment

The AP reports that another local government employee has been fired after undergoing male to female gender transition. In this case, a local fire chief was fired for and alleged “lack of performance.” The firing occurred about 18 months after the transition was complete and the chief was openly working as a woman.

Twenty-eight U.S. states have no laws to prohibit workplace discrimination against LGBT employees. A few cities and counties offer protection, leaving Title VII of the Civil Rights Act as the only possible source of protection against discrimination for most affected people.

The Supreme Court is considering whether the Civil Rights Act cover sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination complaints. AP comments:

Only 21 states have their own laws prohibiting job discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity. Wisconsin outlaws discrimination because of sexual orientation but doesn’t protect transgender workers. And fewer than 300 cities and counties have local ordinances protecting LGBT workers, according to an advocacy group.

“If the Supreme Court sides against LGBT employees, it means they have to be really cautious and careful about living their lives openly and proudly,” said Jillian Weiss, a New York attorney who focuses on LGBT discrimination cases. “They may encounter a lot of discrimination, and there may not be anything they can do about it.”

The fired fire chief's life has spiraled down. AP writes:

Mosby said being jobless left her in financial straits. The public humiliation of her firing further strained relationships with her family, already stressed following her transition. “I’ve lost my family, I’ve lost my house,” Mosby said. “Now I’m living with friends that keep a roof over my head and food in my stomach, so I’m not having to live in my car. It’s been utterly devastating.”

INSIDE THE MINDS OF HARDCORE TRUMP SUPPORTERS

New research finds the president's earliest and strongest followers embody a particularly belligerent strain of authoritarian thinking.

https://psmag.com/news/inside-the-minds-of-hardcore-trump-supporters

Given the meteoric rise of Donald Trump, and the ill-defined phenomenon known as Trumpism, it's vital that we understand the psychology that attracted Americans to the real estate mogul in the first place. Research suggests such voters are driven by a combination of racial resentment and authoritarianism.

Sociologist David Norman Smith cited both in a just-published paper, in which he argues hardcore Trump supporters "target minorities and women" and "favor domineering and intolerant leaders who are uninhibited about their biases."

And yet, there's something puzzling about that equation. If authoritarians, by definition, revere authority, why would they support an anti-establishment candidate like Trump? And why are they OK with his administration slandering bedrock American institutions as the Federal Bureau of Investigation?

A second recently published study provides an answer: There are different strains of authoritarian thinking. And support for Trump is associated with what is arguably the most toxic type: authoritarian aggression.

The study suggests the bulk of his supporters, at least in the Republican primaries, were not old-fashioned conservatives who preach obedience and respect for authority. Rather, they were people who take a belligerent, combative approach toward people they find threatening.

The notion that there are different types of authoritarians was proposed in the 1980s by University of Manitoba psychologist Robert Altemeyer, and refined in 2010 by a research team led by John Duckitt of the University of Auckland. In the journal Political Psychology, that team defined right-wing authoritarianism as "a set of three related ideological attitude dimensions."

They are:

• "Conventionalism," a.k.a. "traditionalism," which is defined as "favoring traditional, old-fashioned social norms, values, and morality."
• Authoritarian submission," defined as "favoring uncritical, respectful, obedient, submissive support for existing authorities and institutions."
• "Authoritarian aggression," defined as "favoring the use of strict, tough, harsh, punitive, coercive social control."

Duckitt and his colleagues created a survey designed to measure each of these three facets. It was measured by participants' responses to statements such as "The old-fashioned ways, and old-fashioned values, still show the best way to live" (traditionalism); "Our country would be great if we show respect for authority and obey our leaders" (submission); and "The way things are going in this country, it's going to take a lot of 'strong medicine' to straighten out the troublemakers, criminals, and perverts" (aggression).

A research team led by psychologist Steven Ludeke of the University of Southern Denmark used those scales to try to tease out why some studies link Trump support to authoritarianism, while others do not.

It discovered the problem with the latter is they tend to either heavily or exclusively focus on the "submission" dimension, which has traditionally been studied in the context of child-rearing (as in, "Do you expect your children to unquestioningly obey their elders?").

As it turns out, that's the facet of authoritarianism that has the least to do with support for Trump.

Ludeke's study, published in the journal Personality and Individual Differences, featured 1,444 participants recruited online in April of 2016. They responded to 18 authoritarianism-focused statements—six for each facet—and indicated who, among the presidential candidates remaining in the race at that point, they supported.

"Consistent with Trump's representation of the world as a dangerous place requiring harsh treatment of deviant minorities," they write, "Trump supporters were high on authoritarian aggression."

Strong support for conventionalism/traditionalism was also linked to support for Trump, but high scores on the submission category—that is, respect for authority, and obedience to superiors—was not.

Smith's analysis of data from the American National Election Study reaches a similar conclusion. He reports "enthusiastic Trump voters are also enthusiastic about domineering leaders, and that they are not especially enthusiastic about respectful children."

Authoritarianism in the Trump era "is not the wish to follow any and every authority but, rather, the wish to support a strong and determined authority who will 'crush evil and take us back to our true path,'" Smith and his co-author, Eric Hanley, conclude.

Participants in Ludeke's study also completed surveys measuring Social Dominance Orientation—the belief that one group has the right to dominate others. Replicating previous research, they found this philosophy, which often accompanies authoritarianism, correlated with support for Trump.

So the very things a majority of Americans find disconcerting, if not disqualifying, about Trump—his need to dominate, his thinly veiled white supremacism, and his blunt, bullying language—is precisely what appeals to his hardcore fans. They are very likely stand to by their man, whatever scandals might emerge.

That said, these results suggest Democrats have a decent chance of peeling away a different slice of the Republican-leaning electorate—if they can defend liberal policies while embodying a more traditional respect for authority. Those "submission"-oriented voters don't have a natural affinity for Trump. They may prefer candidates who embody a traditional sense of dignity—people they can feel comfortable looking up to.

That possibility aside, the picture painted in both of these studies is pretty bleak from a progressive perspective. Smith's paper, the lead article in the March 2018 issue of Critical Sociology, concludes this way:

Most Trump voters cast their ballots for him with their eyes open, not despite his prejudices but because of them. Their partisanship, whether positive (toward Trump and the Republicans) or negative (against Clinton and the Democrats), is intense. This partisanship is anchored in anger and resentment among mild as well as strong Trump voters.

Anger, not fear, was the emotional key to the Tea Party, and that seems to be true for Trumpism as well. If so, the challenge for progressives is greater than many people have imagined. Hostility to minorities and women cannot be wished away; nor can the wish for domineering leaders.

BY

 TOM JACOBS

Tom Jacobs is a senior staff writer at Pacific Standard, where he specializes in social science, culture, and learning. He is a veteran journalist and former staff writer for the Los Angeles Daily News and the Santa Barbara News-Press.

The President's False & Misleading Claim Count: 13,435

The Washington Post fact checker keeps track of the president’s false and misleading claims. As of October 9, day 993 in office, the president has made 13,435 false and misleading claims to the public. Some are lies (intentional deceit) and some are BS (complete non-concern for truth), but all are false or misleading. WaPo comments:

“As of Oct. 9, his 993rd day in office, he had made 13,435 false or misleading claims, according to the Fact Checker’s database that analyzes, categorizes and tracks every suspect statement he has uttered. That’s an average of almost 22 claims a day since our last update 65 days ago. 

One big reason for the uptick: The uproar over Trump’s phone call with Ukraine’s president on July 25 — in which he urged an investigation of former vice president Joe Biden, a potential 2020 election rival — and the ensuing House impeachment inquiry. We’ve added a new category of claims, Ukraine probe, and in just a few weeks it has topped 250 entries.”

Normalized sleaze

At least for people who support the president, lies and BS are now fully normalized and acceptable when it comes from their own side. So is blatant double standard hypocrisy. Lies and false statements by political opponents are usually exaggerated and then ferociously attacked as evidence of the opponent’s untrustworthiness and immoral or corrupt character. None of that moral indignation and concern for pristine truth applies to the president’s lies and BS.

Most of the president’s supporters dismiss fact checkers as not believable, so information like this is ignored. On occasional instances when a supporter is exposed to this unpleasant sort of truth it is rejected as lies. For the few who do understand that the president lies chronically and considers truth to be irrelevant, they try but fail to justify the president's immorality by arguing that it’s no big deal and/or Obama lied, HRC lied, etc.

'Biggest Crisis No One Is Talking About': Quarter of Humanity Faces 'Extremely High Water Stress' Intensified by Climate Emergency

"A new generation of solutions is emerging, but nowhere near fast enough."

by

Jessica Corbett, staff writer

WORTH READING:

https://www.commondreams.org/news/2019/08/06/biggest-crisis-no-one-talking-about-quarter-humanity-faces-extremely-high-water

Queering Politics 2: The Child and Queer Purpose

fuck the social order and the Child in whose name we're collectively terrorized; fuck Annie; fuck the waif from Les Mis; fuck the poor, innocent kid on the Net; fuck Laws both with capital ls and with small; fuck the whole network of Symbolic relations and the future that serves as its prop" - J. Halberstam

To even begin to understand queer political theory in general we must understand the very essence of our own politics. We must ask ourselves why we even have politics, and what we are trying to accomplish with them.

What is the unifying point on which we build our future? Consider Baedan's take (A Journal of Queer Nihilism):

... the Child is the fantastic symbol for the eternal proliferation of class society. The Child represents the succession of generations and the continuation of this society beyond the lifespans of its living members. All politics, being concerned primarily with the Child, then reveal themselves to be only ever a process by which to manage and secure the continued existence of society.

This notion is referred to by queer theorists as variations of "reproductive futurity" or "the reproduction of futurity", and it represents a foundation of civilization itself, and all political discourse.

While the The Child is not literally the children, who are as bound up in social machinations as the rest of us, if not moreso, but rather the concept of a "better future for our children" that is bound up in reproduction. Naturally queer theorists would challenge this typically taken for granted notion since we queers aren't bound up in the reproductive cycle of humanity, but rather exist in its shadows, which itself carries some cost with it:

To quote Guy Hocquenghem (The Screwball Asses):

As long as we are not burned at the stake or locked up in asylums, we continue to flounder in the ghettos of nightclubs, public restrooms and sidelong glances, as if that misery had become the habit of our happiness. And so, with the help of the state, do we build our own prisons.

This is a byproduct of that existence outside the framework of reproductive futurity, and outside of the reproductive family unit. Interestingly enough, scripture rightly exiles us from the kingdom, reflecting this.

Social conservatives attempt to eradicate, convert or cast us out, understanding the crisis of our existence with respect to the the reproduction of futurity.

Social liberals attempt to bring us into that framework through same sex marriage and otherwise attempting to normalize us. In doing so however, there's assimilation involved as a matter of course.

Quoting Lee Edelman (No Future):

For the liberal’s view of society, which seems to accord the queer a place, endorses no more than the conservative right’s the queerness of resistance to futurism and thus the queerness of the queer. While the right wing imagines the elimination of queers (or of the need to confront their existence), the left would eliminate queerness by shining the cool light of reason upon it, hoping thereby to expose it as merely a mode of sexual expression free of the all-pervasive coloring, the determining fantasy formation, by means of which it can seem to portend, and not for the right alone, the undoing of the social order and its cynosure, the Child. Queerness thus comes to mean nothing for both: for the right wing, the nothingness always at war with the positivity of civil society; for the left, nothing more than a sexual practice in need of demystification.

If Edelman is correct, this leaves the existence of queerness as queerness in question. What happens when it's completely normalized? Or is it even possible, looking at the mixed success of US race relations and black integration as first class citizens?

If it is, Edelman is effectively arguing that this would mark the end of queerness. He's not exactly wrong, as it makes queerness completely mundane, removes the taboo of it, and he (and I) would argue, separates it from its very purpose, which is to subvert. Returning to Edelman, speaking on the purpose of queerness:

To figure the undoing of civil society, the death drive of the dominant order, is neither to be nor to become that drive; such a being is not the point. Rather, acceding to that figural position means recognizing and refusing the consequences of grounding reality in denial of that drive. As the death drive dissolves those congealments of identity that permit us to know and survive as ourselves, so the queer must insist on disturbing, on queering, social organization as such—on disturbing, and therefore on queering ourselves and our investment in such organization. For queerness can never define an identity; it can only ever disturb one. And so, when I argue, as I aim to do here, that the burden of queerness is to be located less in the assertion of an oppositional political identity than in opposition to politics as the governing fantasy of realizing identities, I am proposing no platform or position from which queer sexuality or any queer subject might finally and truly become itself, as if it could somehow manage thereby to achieve an essential queerness. I am suggesting instead that the efficacy of queerness, its real strategic value, lies in its resistance to a symbolic reality that only ever invests us as subjects insofar as we invest ourselves in it, clinging to its governing fictions, its persistent sublimations, as reality itself.

This is a powerful statement, but it can be difficult to unpack. He's basically saying here that queerness is subversive by nature, and that queerness operates best in the negative, as a sort of anti-politic that challenges the very nature of our relationship with and our persistent illusions of society, of politics, of our world.

It undermines the social order, and thus is both dangerous and necessary. The reactionaries are right to fear our integration.

Returning to Edelman once again:

We might do well to consider this less as an instance of hyperbolic rant and more as a reminder of the disorientation that queer sexualities should entail: "acceptance or indifference to the homosexual movement will result in society’s destruction by allowing civil order to be redefined and by plummeting ourselves, our children and grandchildren into an age of godlessness. Indeed, the very foundation of Western Civilization is at stake." Before the self-righteous bromides of liberal pluralism spill from our lips, before we supply once more the assurance that ours is another kind of love but a love like his nonetheless, before we piously invoke the litany of our glorious contributions to the civilizations of east and west alike, dare we pause for a moment to acknowledge that he might be right—or, more important, that he ought to be right: that queerness should and must destroy such notions of "civil order" through a rupturing of our foundational faith in the reproduction of futurity?

Queerness must exist in an antagonistic relationship with civilization.

Edelman never covers the root reasons for this which leaves his polemic floundering in nihilism.

I'd argue our relationship with civilization, indeed the entire relationship of the death drive with civilization is the lifeblood of adaptation. Existing outside of, and athwart civilization, ripping and tearing at its edges we give room for new social growth and change. Same sex marriage being an example of that adaptation, but it goes deeper. Our inroads into fashion, into media, into art, into cooking, into civil rights, into outrageous sexually tinged displays like Pride that expand or change what is acceptable, made more powerful because we're outsiders. We're more likely to sacrifice the queen/throw away the playbook and create. Drag performances and the very existence of trans people challenge social gender norms and change what we think about gender expression, presentation, and identity. In a myriad of ways, large and small, we are changing society the more society is embracing us. Edelman is right to call us the gravediggers of society. We bury your dead (social detritus, like the gender binary or your marriage stricture). But we also create.