How Afghanistan fell and why chaos ensued

A stream of articles is coming out that explains how the Taliban caused the army and government to collapse. The New York Times writes: 

In early May, a Taliban commander telephoned Muhammad Jallal, a tribal elder in Baghlan Province in northern Afghanistan, and asked him to deliver a message to Afghan government troops at several bases in his district.

“If they do not surrender, we will kill them,” Mr. Jallal said he was told.

He and other tribal elders complied. After several rounds of negotiations, two government bases and three outposts surrendered without a fight. More than 100 security forces handed over weapons and equipment and were sent home unharmed.

The Taliban’s strategy of coercion and persuasion was repeated across the country, unfolding for months as a focal point of the insurgents’ new offensive this year. The militants cut multiple surrender deals that handed them bases and ultimately entire provincial command centers, culminating in a stunning military blitz this summer that put the militants back in power two decades after they were defeated by the United States and its allies.

The negotiated surrenders were just one element of a broader Taliban strategy that captured heavily defended provincial capitals with lightning speed, and saw the insurgents walk into the capital, Kabul, on Sunday with barely a shot fired. It was a campaign defined by both collapse and conquest, executed by patient opportunists.

Each surrender, small or large, handed the Taliban more weapons and vehicles — and, vitally, more control over roads and highways, giving insurgents freedom to move rapidly and collect the next surrenders as the security forces were progressively cut off from ammunition, fuel, food and salaries.

The Taliban also received money, supplies and support from Pakistan, Russia and Iran, analysts said. That included 10,000 to 20,000 Afghan volunteers sent from Pakistan, a Taliban safe haven, and thousands more Afghan villagers who joined the militants when it became clear they were winning, said Antonio Giustozzi, a London-based analyst who has written several books about Afghanistan.

The volunteers swelled Taliban ranks to more than 100,000 fighters from most analysts’ estimates of 60,000 to 70,000, Mr. Giustozzi said. That was more than enough to crush a government force listed at 300,000 on paper but hollowed out by corruption, desertion and a staggering casualty rate — U.S. officials have said that perhaps only a sixth of that total was in the fight this year.

Regarding the chaos of the final days, Biden argues it was inevitable. The NYT writes:

Even before Mr. Biden announced the withdrawal of U.S. troops, his administration rejected frantic calls from lawmakers and activists to evacuate Afghans, who now find themselves in jeopardy.

Then this summer, Afghanistan’s president, Ashraf Ghani, implored Mr. Biden to hold off on evacuations until U.S. forces were gone for good, fearing that the image would undermine confidence in his government.

The president on Wednesday defended the U.S. withdrawal and said he did not see a way to leave Afghanistan without “chaos ensuing.” In an interview with ABC News, he was asked whether the exit could have been handled better.

“No, I don’t think it could have been handled in a way that we’re going to go back in hindsight and look — but the idea that somehow, there’s a way to have gotten out without chaos ensuing, I don’t know how that happens,” Mr. Biden said. “I don’t know how that happened.”

But critics said the administration was squarely to blame.

Some lawmakers, such as Representative Matt Rosendale, Republican of Montana, have expressed concerns about expediting the vetting process.

“Now we’re going to develop a procedure with which we can vet thousands of individuals and just relocate them to the United States?” he said in an interview. “Once they’re settled here, they can bring additional family members here. One kind deed does not make an ally.”

So, if T**** had been re-elected, there would have been at least as much chaos, probably significantly more. The Afghan government opposed evacuations, which make matters worse. US intelligence estimates were badly wrong. Biden relied on relied on intelligence showing a Taliban takeover was 18 months away.

And, it may be the case that a fair number of Afghan allies had hoped there was a lot more time to get out, so they didn't act sooner. If that is true, that could leave thousands of allies now stranded and unable to get to Kabul for evacuation assuming they don't get blocked for merely offering just one kind deed.

Failure on top of failure seems to have got us here.

So, was chaos in Kabul inevitable? Was the end result inevitable once T**** signed the agreement to withdraw in February of 2020, which was the start point for the Taliban's plan to get opposition to surrender and eventually collapse?