Beyond the most imminent foreign policy challenges facing the new administration looms a macro-trend that deserves attention: the rise of personalist “strongmen” authoritarian governments.Classic examples of personalist regimes include Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the Soviet Union’s Joseph Stalin, and the Kim dynasty in North Korea. Yet less overtly repressive authoritarian regimes are progressing from consolidating power within their borders to projecting power beyond them. In Russia, for example, the centralization of internal power under Putin has taken place alongside adventurist foreign policies and military strategies in Ukraine, the near abroad, and in the Middle East.
Over the last decade, authoritarians have pushed back against the world’s prevailing democratic order. For the 11th year in a row, Freedom House has announced an overall drop in freedom worldwide. Most countries today (55 percent) are considered not free or partly free according to the civil liberties and political rights citizens enjoy. At the same time, highly personalized regimes are taking control of autocratic and even democratic political systems.
Compared to the Cold War era when powerful Communist and socialist parties presided over most dictatorships, today around 40 percent of autocratic governments are ruled by strongmen. Across regions, consolidated power is settling into the hands of one man or a small group of illiberal individuals, ranging from Russian President Vladimir Putin to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the Philippines’ Rodrigo Duterte and leaders in Ecuador, Venezuela, Hungary, and Poland.Classifying this global trend is complicated by the fact that authoritarian governments in the 21st century do not look like Stalinist Russia or Fascist Germany. In the absence of mobilizing ideologies, modern autocratic leaders abuse and corrupt other sources of power, including those that we recognize in democratic systems such as political competition, the rule of law, public debate, and access to open information.
Moreover, autocrats have taken advantage of globalized communications and advanced technologies to maintain control over their populations. Governments have more elusive and powerful tools of monitoring, censorship, and disinformation available at their fingertips, allowing political leaders to move their instruments of persuasion from the pulpit to the digital space. Leaders in nations as varied as Russia, Turkey, the Philippines, and Venezuela have tapped into popular national narratives that highlight how their countries have been exploited by the United States and the West. These leaders then project their ability to stand up to such exploitation, which resonates with their populations.
Personalist rule is just one distinct mold of autocracy. Other types of authoritarian systems include single-party regimes (where a strong party organization exercises some power over the leader) and military autocracies (in which one or several high-ranking military officers maintain centralized control). In comparison, personalist regimes concentrate power in the hands of one individual or a small group not accountable to the military or an institutionalized party. Personalist leaders have limited constraints on their decision making abilities and are held less accountable for policies, including those with negative outcomes. They are able to appoint friends, relatives, and cronies to important offices. These handpicked insiders have strong incentives to remain loyal to and uncritical of the leader.
The analysis considers personalist dictator traits. As a group, personalist dictators are ambitious, cut-throat and divisive. That drives them to be more aggressive internationally compared to democracies. Of course, some people will dispute that some democracies are not internationally aggressive. Personalist leaders appear too see lower costs of war than leaders of democracies or more limited autocracies with fewer aversions to force. Personalists do not feel or internalize the costs of war. They seem to view force as more effective than diplomacy or international cooperation. A lack of strong institutions that can punish the personalist for mistakes leaves lots freedom for violence and bad policies without adverse consequence. Finally, personalist leader enablers and subordinates are unwilling to challenge the leader’s personal biases. Profound groupthink and overestimation of the likelihood of victory is the typical result.
Putin is what political scientists like us call a personalist dictator. The center of power in Russia is not a political party or the military. It’s him, personally. Strongmen’s choices are relatively unconstrained by these institutions. All power is thus concentrated in his hands, including, most notably, personal discretion and control over decision-making and appointments to state offices.
This is the type of dictator who causes much of modern global strife. They start conflicts with other nations, invest in nuclear weapons and repress their own citizens. In addition to Putin, notable examples from recent history include Moammar Gadhafi, Saddam Hussein, Idi Amin and three generations of North Korean leaders.