Pragmatic politics focused on the public interest for those uncomfortable with America's two-party system and its way of doing politics. Considering the interface of politics with psychology, cognitive science, social behavior, morality and history.
Etiquette
DP Etiquette
First rule: Don't be a jackass.
Other rules: Do not attack or insult people you disagree with. Engage with facts, logic and beliefs. Out of respect for others, please provide some sources for the facts and truths you rely on if you are asked for that. If emotion is getting out of hand, get it back in hand. To limit dehumanizing people, don't call people or whole groups of people disrespectful names, e.g., stupid, dumb or liar. Insulting people is counterproductive to rational discussion. Insult makes people angry and defensive. All points of view are welcome, right, center, left and elsewhere. Just disagree, but don't be belligerent or reject inconvenient facts, truths or defensible reasoning.
Wednesday, August 14, 2019
Essentially Contested Concepts: What is Racism?
Essentially contested concept: Essentially contested concepts (ECC) involve widespread agreement that a concept exists, e.g., racism, fairness, hate, but not on the best realization or real world examples of when the concept applies to speech or behavior. ECC are concepts the proper definition and use of inevitably involve endless disputes about their proper definitions and uses on the part of their users. These disputes cannot be settled by appeal to empirical evidence, linguistic usage, or the canons of logic alone. The disputes are socially polarizing and damaging when people in disagreement are unwilling to compromise for the sake of social harmony and function, or any other reason.
Racism: Prejudice, discrimination, or antagonism directed against someone of a different race based on the belief that one's own race is superior.
The New York Times reported yesterday that for tomorrow’s Mississippi senate runoff election, Mike Espy, the Democrat challenging the Republican Cindy Hyde-Smith faces a very difficult problem in his campaign. Regarding a recent debate between the candidates, the NYT writes that Espy “had to make a choice: confront Ms. Hyde-Smith over her comments about attending ‘a public hanging’, which evoked the state’s racist history, or take a milder approach to avoid alienating the conservative-leaning white voters who will most likely decide the election.
He chose the latter.
‘The world knows what she said, the world knows that those comments were harmful and hurtful’, Mr. Espy said afterward, sounding not entirely convinced.
In a state where politics has long been cleaved by race, Mr. Espy was reckoning with a conundrum that Democrats face across the South — from Mississippi and Alabama, which have been hostile to the party for years, to states like Florida and Georgia that are more hospitable in cities but still challenging in many predominantly white areas. Even as they made gains in the 2018 elections in the suburbs that were once Republican pillars, Democrats are seeing their already weak standing in rural America erode even further.
Now, as Democrats mount a last-minute and decidedly against-the-odds campaign to snatch a Senate seat in this most unlikely of states, they are facing the same problem that undermined some of their most-heralded candidates earlier this month.
More ominous for Democrats was that the deep losses this year among rural and some exurban whites were not just confined to Southern states where they nominated unabashed progressives with hopes of transforming the midterm electorate. They lost four Senate seats, as well as governor’s races in states like Iowa and Ohio, with more conventional candidates whose strength in cities and upper-income suburbs was not enough to overcome their deficits in less densely populated areas.”
Is this racism or something else?: The question is so obvious it cannot be avoided. Why are many rural white voters seen as so sensitive about a candidate who directly confronts appearances or actual racism that they will be alienated? Is that merely tribal politics with no racist component, or is it evidence of racism? Survey data indicates that social unease among white voters about the impending change in their status from white majority to white minority and accompanying loss of social privilege was the most significant factor in Trump's win in 2016.
Since his election, President Trump has employed rhetoric that millions of Americans consider to be racist. Even House Speaker Paul Ryan once referred to a bit of Trump rhetoric as a “textbook definition of a racist comment”. Not surprisingly, Trump and most of his supporters strongly deny any racism plays any role in their political thinking, their rhetoric or their behavior. Some claim they are merely defending their culture, values and/or history. But that logic is flawed. What they defend includes what was overtly racist at one time all across America. Racism was never limited to just the South, and it still isn't. How can one separate defense of a culture, values and/or history that included racism as a significant component of society from a time before the founding of the Republic from a defense of racism?
Campaigning with one hand tied: In his Senate race, Mr Espy arguably is severely handicapped. For the most part, his opponent can use racist dog whistles to fire up whites who are (i) socially uneasy with impending demographic changes, and (ii) outright racist to some non-trivial degree. She can stoke fear and anger, while Espy cannot mount a rational defense without alienating white voters. She can deny any racism on her part and on the part of her supporters. Given the power of emotions and attitudes such as fear and racism to win hearts, minds and votes, Espy faces an almost impossible task. He has one hand tied behind his back.
Moral questions: Americans are clearly divided about whether populists and Republicans are being racist to some extent in their political rhetoric and behavior. In this, racism arguably is an essentially contested concept. Nearly all racist rhetoric and behavior is constitutionally protected free speech, so there is no legal recourse against it. Since this is in the context of a political campaign, there isn't anything to compromise about. Can one call politics with a racist component immoral to the extent that component exerts influence? If not, why not? Are racism and morality completely unrelated matters?
People like Trump who intentionally employ divisive tactics like racism are acting to normalize a concept that, if acted on in some ways, is illegal. When a leader like Trump works to normalize racism, some non-trivial segment of society adopts the thinking and acts on the new thoughts. If one accepts that President Trump is normalizing racism by employing dark free speech,[1] is that immoral? The law is not the only way to define what is moral and what isn't. Legal actions outside the law can be immoral and this is an example if normalizing racism is an aspect of what Trump is doing, whether he intends it or not or whether he is conscious of it or not.
Can racism include prejudice, discrimination, or antagonism directed against someone of a different race based not on the belief that one's own race is superior, but on a simple dislike of people of another race without any judgment of one’s own racial superiority?
Footnote:
1. Dark free speech: Lies, deceit, unwarranted opacity and fact hiding, unwarranted emotional manipulation including fomenting unwarranted fear, hate, intolerance, anger, racism, xenophobia, misogyny, homophobia, disgust, etc.
B&B orig: 11/26/18
Constitutional Interpretation: The Shifting Defense of Originalism
I believe in individual liberty and personal responsibility. I also believe in science as the greatest instrument ever devised for understanding the world. So what happens when these two principles are in conflict? My libertarian beliefs have not always served me well. Like most people who hold strong ideological convictions, I find that, too often, my beliefs trump the scientific facts. This is called motivated reasoning, in which our brain reasons our way to supporting what we want to be true. Science historian and prominent libertarian, Michael Shermer commenting in 2013 on his epiphany about how political ideology elicits the powerful, unconscious motivated reasoning bias and what effect on conscious reason it has.
A recent B&B discussion centered on different modes that courts and others have applied to interpret the constitution. From this observer's point of view, some modes of interpretation such as originalism is a means that many political ideologues employ to reason or rationalize their way into finding interpretations that fits with their personal ideology and morals. According to one source, originalism arises from one of three theories of interpretation, original intent, original meaning and textualism:
The original intent theory, holds that interpretation of a written constitution is or should be consistent with what was meant by those who drafted and ratified it. This is currently a minority view among originalists.
The original meaning theory, which is closely related to textualism, is the view that interpretation of a written constitution or law should be based on what reasonable persons living at the time of its adoption would have understood the ordinary meaning of the text to be. Most originalists, such as Antonin Scalia, are associated with this view.
Textualism is a formalist theory in which the interpretation of the law is primarily based on the ordinary meaning of the legal text, where no consideration is given to non-textual sources, such as: intention of the law when passed, the problem it was intended to remedy, or significant questions regarding the justice or rectitude of the law.
Andrew Shankman, Associate Professor of History at Rutgers University-Camden commented on originalism as described in his 2017 book, Original Intents: Hamilton, Jefferson, Madison, and the American Founding. In view of his book and his academic position, it is reasonable to see Shankman as an expert on the topic of constitutional interpretation. Shankman's essay is entitled What Would the Founding Fathers Make of Originalism? Not much. Shankman examines the validity and authority of originalism based on his interpretation of the record of thinking and behavior of Hamilton, Jefferson and Madison (HJM).
Shankman: “President Trump’s nomination of Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court likely ensures the continued significance of originalism for constitutional interpretation. Originalism is a complex legal theory. But boiling it down, it means that judges and lawmakers are bound by the meaning the words in the Constitution had when it was ratified. The original public meaning of those words cannot change. Pressing contemporary issues and compassionate wishful thinking cannot allow the words of the Constitution to justify actions that were not intended when the Constitution became the nation’s fundamental law.”
Shenkman poses the question of whether there is a solid historically defensible claim for applying the original intent theory of originalism. He asserts that the historical records of thinking and behavior by HJM “shows that it is impossible to ascribe a single original intent to even so small a group of critically important founders. Instead, we find multiple original intents and competing meanings.” The conclusion he draws is that Hamilton and Madison both endorsed a “living, expansive, and flexible Constitution, one that changes with the times and over time.”
For context, the idea of originalism is new and championed mainly by politically conservative ideologues. Historian Mary Sarah Bilder commented:
“The tradition of American constitutionalism, practiced by judges of all political persuasions over two centuries, has always held out an important place for history in the interpretation of the Constitution. But originalism is not constitutionalism. When the word ‘originalism’ began appearing in legal periodicals in the 1980s, a number of influential scholars and judges, primarily on the right, quickly came to treat it as the sole legitimate method to decide constitutional cases. Originalists initially thought that the judge should interpret the text of the Constitution according only to the intent of the men who drafted and ratified it. Today, most originalists contend that a judge should abide by the text’s ‘original public meaning’ — a term of art that originalist scholars have written thousands of pages trying to explain.”
According to one commentator, proponents of originalism have begun to change the intellectual basis of their support for the concept because historians keep showing there the historical record simply does not support originalist reason or rationalizations. The new intellectual battle ground has shifted to history-free safe zones including the philosophy of language and legal doctrine:
Whether it be the various political, social, or economic contexts from which the Constitution developed, the motivations of the participants involved in its construction, or the broader purposes that constitutional partisans hoped to achieve through its enactment, none of these have much bearing on the Constitution’s purely linguistic public meaning.
In short, Originalism 2.0 was a neat trick: it had the imprimatur of history without the actual work and, in fact, asserted that the work was wholly unnecessary. This turn towards public meaning has enabled originalists to claim, as they now frequently do, that they and historians, by targeting categorically distinct kinds of meaning, are simply engaged in fundamentally different tasks. The Constitution’s legal and historical meaning are simply different in kind. If historians claim otherwise, it is because they are guilty of conceptual confusion; because they have made—not a historical error—but a philosophical one. Rather than pledging to do history—as Originalism 1.0 did—Originalism 2.0 claims instead to have escaped history.
In other words, originalists have stopped trying to beat historians at their own game—by rewriting the very rules by which that game is played. They seem to have realized that they will never know as much as historians about the Constitution’s origins or historical development, so instead of fighting a losing empirical battle why not stake out different conceptual foundations altogether? That way, most disputes can turn on philosophy of language, interpretive method, and legal doctrine (as they now do) without dwelling on the details of the historical past. And if historians wish to object, they dare not mention the Framers’ thoughts or agendas or the broader political, social, or intellectual contexts of the late eighteenth century; they must, instead, offer a series of methodological and philosophical arguments targeting originalists’ conceptual formulations. In other words, historians must fight originalists on their own non-historical turf. So even while those few historians who have engaged Originalism 2.0 have leveled a persuasive bevy of criticisms against it—Jack Rakove has correctly called it “tone deaf to the past” and Saul Cornell has appropriately labeled it “thin description”—champions of Originalism 2.0 have easily sidestepped such assessments. For, in appealing to precisely the kinds of historical materials that originalists have studiously circumvented, historians have played into originalists’ hands. Originalists have not engaged this historical work on its merits, but simply dismissed it as irrelevant, mocking historians’ conceptual confusion in the process.
Motivated reasoning in politics: If the shift in defense of originalism from arguing historical antecedents to non-history sources of authority accurately assesses the situation, it is a brilliant maneuver. Originalists have the problem of pounding the irregular-shaped constitution that lies over the irregular-shaped real world to fit into the perfectly square peg of political, social and religious conservatism. They tried relying on fake history and that failed. Originalists finally conceded that point. They have retreated to defenses that ignore history. If that isn't a case of motivated reasoning distorting reality to fit ideology, then what is?
B&B orig: 11/29/18
The Anti-Bias Ideology Revisited
The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist. Philosopher Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 1951
Intolerance is almost inevitably accompanied by a natural and true inability to comprehend or make allowance for opposite points of view. . . . We find here with significant uniformity what one psychologist has called ‘logic-proof compartments.’ The logic-proof compartment has always been with us. Master propagandist Edward Bernays, Crystallizing Public Opinion, 1923
Ever since college I have been a libertarian—socially liberal and fiscally conservative. I believe in individual liberty and personal responsibility. I also believe in science as the greatest instrument ever devised for understanding the world. So what happens when these two principles are in conflict? My libertarian beliefs have not always served me well. Like most people who hold strong ideological convictions, I find that, too often, my beliefs trump the scientific facts. This is called motivated reasoning, in which our brain reasons our way to supporting what we want to be true. . . . . My libertarianism also once clouded my analysis of climate change. I was a longtime skeptic, mainly because it seemed to me that liberals were exaggerating the case for global warming as a kind of secular millenarianism—an environmental apocalypse requiring drastic government action to save us from doomsday through countless regulations that would handcuff the economy and restrain capitalism, which I hold to be the greatest enemy of poverty. Then I went to the primary scientific literature on climate and discovered . . . . [that anthropogenic climate change is real]. Libertarian Michael Shermer describing his epiphany about the power of his ideology exerted to unconsciously distort objective truth and the conscious reason he applied to facts and evidence he thought he was seeing
. . . . the typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the political field. He argues and analyzes in a way which he would readily recognize as infantile within the sphere of his real interests. . . . cherished ideas and judgments we bring to politics are stereotypes and simplifications with little room for adjustment as the facts change. . . . . the real environment is altogether too big, too complex, and too fleeting for direct acquaintance. We are not equipped to deal with so much subtlety, so much variety, so many permutations and combinations. Although we have to act in that environment, we have to reconstruct it on a simpler model before we can manage it. Social scientists Christopher Achen and Larry Bartels, Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government, 2016
We found ourselves at the end of chapter 3 with a dystopian assessment of democracy, an apparent ill-suited match between the mental apparatus of the public and the high-minded requirements of democracy: People should be well informed about politically important matters, but they are not. People should think rationally, but they most often do not. Political psychologist George Marcus, Political Psychology: Neuroscience, Genetics, and Politics, 2013
The success or failures of ideas depends on what they contribute to the robust experience of human life. We may generate the ideas, but reality decides if they are any good. Political psychologist George Marcus, Political Psychology: Neuroscience, Genetics, and Politics, 2013
I confess that I do not entirely approve this Constitution at present, but Sir, I am not sure I shall never approve it. . . . In these sentiments, Sir, I agree to this Constitution, with all its Faults, if they are such; because I think a General Government is necessary for us. . . . . I doubt too whether any other Convention we can obtain, may be able to make a better Constitution. . . . . It therefore astonishes me, Sir, to find this System approaching so near to Perfection as it does; and I think it will astonish our Enemies, who are waiting with confidence to hear how our Councils are Confounded, like those of the Builders of Babel, and that our States are on the Point of Separation, only to meet, hereafter, for the purposes of cutting one another's throats. Thus I consent, Sir, to this Constitution because I expect no better, and I am not sure that it is not the best. Benjamin Franklin, stating his consent to the new US Constitution, 1787
CONTEXT: From time to time, B&B and its predecessor site, Dissident Politics, discusses or explains the main concept this channel advocates as the core of a social engineering experiment. That concept amounts to an objective, pragmatic or anti-bias political ideology designed to reduce bias and distortion of conscious reason or logic and perceptions of reality and facts that normally arise from human cognition and from social influences. Distorting cognitive and social influences are reflections of the human evolutionary heritage and cannot be completely eliminated.
Prior discussions of the anti-bias or ‘pragmatic rationalist-realist’ ideology, or parts thereof, are here (https://disqus.com/home/discussion/channel-biopoliticsandbionews/pragmatic_ideology_a_12_point_explanation/ ), here (https://disqus.com/home/discussion/channel-biopoliticsandbionews/a_pragmatic_ideology/ ), here (http://dispol.blogspot.com/2015/02/the-pubic-interest-defined.html ), here (http://dispol.blogspot.com/2015/02/why-non-ideological-fact-and-reason.html ), here (https://ivn.us/2015/12/04/save-public-interest-two-party-politics/ ), here (http://dispol.blogspot.com/2015/08/objective-politics-criticisms-and.html ), and here (https://ivn.us/2015/09/24/opinion-two-party-politics-fails-serve-public-interest/ ). Criticisms of the rationalist or ‘objective’ ideology and rebuttals are here (http://dispol.blogspot.com/2015/08/objective-politics-criticisms-and.html ).
The anti-bias political ideology: The original anti-bias ideology conception posited three necessary core (highest) moral values or principles, (1) fidelity to trying to find and see facts and truth with less bias, (2) applying conscious effort to be less biased or partisan in thinking about the facts and truths we think we see, both of which are focused on (3) an ‘objective’ vision of service to the public interest, based on the idea of a transparent, fact- and logic-based competition among competing interests and ideas. Those three moral values are envisioned to better connect politics with reality and reason.
More recently, a fourth core moral value, willingness to reasonably compromise, became apparent as necessary for the ideology. The rationale for the compromise moral is simple: One can try to be more objective or rational about politics, but if there is no realistic political basis to apply it, there is no point in trying to rationalize politics at all. Unless political power is concentrated on one side, some degree of compromise is usually necessary. The ‘Faults’ Franklin referred to in his statement of consent included the bitterly contested compromises necessary for the Constitution to come into existence.
Underlying assumptions: The biological and social basis for an anti-bias ideology is grounded in a number of assumptions. First, bias, distortion and irrationality in politics arises mostly from a combination of normal innate mental or cognitive processes and from social institutions, customs and norms. It is possible that human thinking and intelligence could have evolved differently such that biological and social influences were less irrational and reality-distorting, but that is not the reality of the human condition.
Second, there is an urgent need for politics that is generally less subjective and more objective relative to what it is now, at least in America at this time. That assumes that more objectivity will lead to more peaceful and more sustainable policies and social outcomes in the long run compared to the situation now. Politics gone bad, as it has in America today, is a potential existential threat to civilization and the human species.
Third, it is clear from recorded and modern history that playing on normal human cognitive processes and relevant social contexts is a major pathway to power for authoritarians, tyrants, kleptocrats, oligarchs and other ‘bad leaders’. Bad leaders invariably intentionally manipulate human emotions and work ruthlessly to obliterate distinctions between fact and fiction, true and false and sound reasoning and incoherent partisan reasoning (drivel) to the extent they can do so. Bad leaders need to do that to foster social divisions and intolerance. By fostering unwarranted emotions, bad leaders dampen people’s recourse to conscious reason. Fear, anger, hate, racism, intolerance and other negative feelings tend to dampen conscious reason while increasing the mind’s susceptibility to lies, deceit and incoherent reason. Propagandists and bad leaders have been aware of the effectiveness of such tactics for millennia, even though science had not caught up with and started applying empirical data to explain the power of deceit and emotional manipulation phenomena until recently.
Fourth, for long-term human survival (millions of years) and well-being, the concept of service to the public interest is a highly pro-self and pro-civil society moral force or moral belief. It is something the human species can strive to adopt, implement and live by. That said, conceptions of the public interest always have been and probably always will be heavily biased and distorted by narrower economic, social and ideological interests. Conflicts are unavoidable. Special interests will fight for their interests. That is an unavoidable aspect of being human. Bad leaders can use brute force to resolve disagreements, but compromise among competing interests is the best way to resolve dispute with a minimum of coercion.
Fifth, looking at politics leads to an inescapable conclusion that, for the most part, civilized liberal democratic politics is ‘made of’ perceived facts and truths, which can be true, false or ambiguous, unconscious thinking and to a smaller extent, conscious thinking (roughly, reason), some conception of self and/or society the facts and thinking is designed to serve in some way, and compromises when there is significant disagreement. By focusing to two key components, facts and logic, it should be possible to partially rationalize politics and somewhat narrow the bases for intractable disagreements by draining some of the emotion and false reality from the process. Also, for people who believe in a need for at least some degree of compromise in many situations, that moral value arguably will sometimes help some people approach political issues with a more open mindset.
Service to the public interest: This concept is the most complicated of the four moral concepts. Although there will be disagreements about all four morals, the public interest is impossible to pin down in precise terms. Disagreement is inherent in the concept. All four concepts are going to be contested to an extent that will vary with specific circumstances. That is an inevitable consequence of the human condition.
One conception of service to the public interest envisions it as trying to see and employ less biased facts and reality, and less biased (partisan) logic to assess and implement competing ideas for governance in a transparent competition that balances considerations of efficiency, freedoms and fairness among competing individual, public, private, national, social, global and environmental interests to the extent that relevant circumstances can sustainably support for the long run. It amounts to a more transparent, more honest merit-based competition of ideas than is at play now. Clearly, more complex articulations of the concept are possible.[1]
Can it ever work?: Some major obstacles are obvious. One is human cognitive biology and social behavior. Past efforts to make politics more objective have all failed. Why would this concept fare any better? The main difference between now and the past is the new empirical knowledge of the biological and social bases from which irrationality and uncivil and ineffective politics flow. Two considerations suggest that partial rationalization is possible at least in theory. The first is evidence that some people naturally are more rational about their approach to the world and those people can be taught to get better. Maybe that can translate to whole societies and nations. The second is the fact that if a social institution in support of anti-bias as a social value can be built, it would be expected to exert a powerful motivating influence on perceptions of reality, thinking and behavior just like other social institutions do now and always have.
Another major obstacle is constitutionally protected dark free speech (DFS). DFS includes lies, deceit, unwarranted emotional manipulation, mainly fomenting unwarranted fear, anger, hate, intolerance, racism and other polarizing and reason-killing states of mind. The power of dark free speech to de-rationalize politics has been amplified by social media and the rise of relentless propaganda attacks on the American people by enemy states including Russia and China. On top of ruthless external enemies, there are ruthless internal interests who are hostile to the idea of citizens being better able to defend themselves by adopting an anti-bias moral mindset that is inherently hostile to DFS.
Hostile domestic interests include (1) President Trump and the Trump brand of the republican party, (2) authoritarians and kleptocrats of all political beliefs, (3) most of the business community that at least significantly relies on propaganda and opacity to manipulate the public, while buying favors from the two-party system, (4) political and religious ideologues who see ideological or moral threat in fact- and reason-based rationality, and (5) America’s two-party system itself, which has repeatedly employed DFS against the public just as ruthlessly as America’s external enemies.
The only apparent defense against DFS that could be at least partially effective is adopting an anti-bias moral mindset. To a significant extent, that mindset will neutralize ideological extremism and undue special interest influence because ideological fantasy and narrow influence is more difficult to sustain when facts and logic are contradictory.
Another concern is that, even if the anti-bias mindset does gain public acceptance and come to exert significant political power on the national level for an extended period of time, would it work well enough to actually make a detectable difference for the better? There is no way to know that in advance. One can argue that it is reasonable to think that more rational politics ought to be better than less rational. Nonetheless, that is just a hypothesis. There appears to be no empirical evidence for this based on nations operating with an anti-bias political mindset.[2] There is only limited experimental data that seems to suggest some measure of success would flow from pro-rational politics.
If nothing else, the sources and intensity of opposition to an anti-bias moral mindset reflect politics that operate with completely different morals and political agendas. Among other things, anti-bias is focused on a more civil, equitable, sustainable world than the goals the opposition strives for. That argues the moral superiority of anti-bias morals compared to the competition. That aside, the open question is will reality decide that the anti-bias moral mindset is good and it survives and grows or it is bad and it remains obscure.
Footnotes:
1. Service to the public interest means governance based on identifying a rational, optimum balance between serving public, individual and commercial interests based on an objective, fact- and logic-based analysis of competing policy choices, while (1) being reasonably transparent and responsive to public opinion, (2) protecting and growing the American economy, (3) fostering individual economic and personal growth opportunity, (4) defending personal freedoms and the American standard of living, (5) protecting national security and the environment, (6) increasing transparency, competition and efficiency in commerce when possible, and (7) fostering global peace, stability and prosperity whenever reasonably possible, all of which is constrained by (i) honest, reality-based fiscal sustainability that limits the scope and size of government and regulation to no more or less than what is needed and (ii) respect for the U.S. constitution and the rule of law with a particular concern for limiting unwarranted legal complexity and ambiguity to limit opportunities to subvert the constitution and the law.
2. A caveat is that some modern nations may be operating on politics that are close enough to the anti-bias ideology to constitute real world evidence of success or failure. It is also possible that some nations or societies in the past operated similarly. In either case, there could be some probative evidence about an anti-bias mindset or something closer to it than what passes for politics now. One thing that is certain on this point is that the concept has not been tested with modern America under its current circumstances. That alone arguably constitutes a separate, unique social engineering experiment.
B&B orig: 12/2/18
Partisan Ideology Wrecks Reason: An Example
A New York Times article today nicely illustrates the power of partisan, bias-based ideology to trash conscious reason but still be used as support for false beliefs. Regarding the CIA investigation of the Saudi murder of US-based reporter Jamal Khashoggi as ordered by the murdering goon Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman, the NYT writes:
“Mr. Graham [ Senator Lindsey Graham - R-SC] had initially threatened to withhold support for legislative priorities until he was briefed by Ms. Haspel. He said on Tuesday that it was clear Mr. Pompeo and Mr. Mattis were being ‘good soldiers’ for the White House when they briefed senators last week.
But he also called their assessments misleading, and alluded to Mr. Mattis’s insistence that American officials had seen ‘no smoking gun’ to indicate Prince Mohammed was to blame in Mr. Khashoggi’s killing.
‘There is not a smoking gun, there’s a smoking saw,’ Mr. Graham said.
‘You have to be willfully blind’ not to see it, he said.”
The situation is simple and clear. Graham characterizes Pompeo and Mattis, as ‘good soldiers’ who are willfully blind in their support of President Trump. Graham also says there is not a smoking gun, but there is a smoking saw referring to the bone saw the goons that Mohammed bin Salman ordered to murder Mr. Khashoggi used in his murder.
How can good soldiers possibly be willfully blind? Isn't willful blindness evidence of an incompetent and/or stupid soldier? That happens when the person expressing that kind of irrational drivel, Senator Graham, puts partisan advantage over the good of the country and the truth. That mindset directly reflects the current republican and populist view that partisan advantage is a higher moral value than service to the public interest. With that corrupt, incompetent mindset, any non-trivial sign of partisan loyalty absolves partisan crooks, liars and traitors of any significant criticism, much less any professional or criminal liability, for betraying the public interest in favor of republican partisan interest.
By now, this is just routine Trump brand politics under the immoral, corrupt, incompetent liar Trump and his now cowed into stupid submission political party called the GOP.
Or, is that too harsh an assessment? Is Senator Graham an insightful patriot fighting for the American people and the public interest? Did Mattis and Pompeo just make an honest mistake or are they corrupt ideologues who hold partisan advantage a higher moral value than service to the public interest and the truth?
In a liberal democracy like America, do political means, e.g., lies, blind stupidity, blind loyalty, etc., justify the ends?
B&B orig: 12/5/18
Analysis of single-stimulus measurement of animal-reminder disgust reliably differentiated between conservatives and liberals
Author Rob Smith
I expect this thread reprises material from a study that Germaine has already presented. The study is entitled Nonpolitical Images Evoke Neural Predictors of Political Ideology.
The images used to evoke animal-reminder-disgust were body mutilation images.
Analysis of MRIs showing areas of brain activation, when subjects were shown body mutilation images, was able to reliably distinguish between conservatives and liberals. Conservatives were found to respond to mutilation images in ways that increased activation in areas of the brain that have been found in previous studies to correspond to increased negative affective valence.
One thing I find of interest is the strong association that two "hot button" political issues, gun control and abortion, have with "body mutilation".
The first thing I notice here is that neither liberals nor conservatives are consistently seeking to lessen or prevent body mutilation in their positions on these issues. So there is not a simple, "Conservatives seek to lessen body mutilation and liberals are OK with it" response, or the reverse, happening.
I am wondering if other issues directly associated with body-mutilation have also been "hot button" political issues in the past. Or whether the apparent links between the political issues of gun control and abortion and animal-reminder-disgust are actually coincidental.
Some other political issues that might directly intersect with body mutilation would appear to be; compulsory car seat-belt, motorcycle and cycling helmet legislation, traffic safety regulations, especially speed limits, industrial safety legislation, declaration of war and commitment of soldiers to armed conflict, militarization of police forces, readiness of police to use deadly force, laws protecting pedestrians from vehicular traffic, restrictions on walkers accessing areas containing large carnivores, air safety regulations, regulation of the training and practice of surgery, regulation of patient safety in hospitals, nursing and aged care facilities, & regulation of prisoner safety in detention facilities.
Looking at this this it appears that many issues included are not "hot button" ones but are rather seen as of being low priority/low importance.
Clearly this is a very informal exploration that just scratches the topic. But there is some indication that the possibility of body mutilation in real life is insufficient by itself to have an issue become a "hot button" political issue.
If others want to add more political issues that intersect with body mutilation in real life, or give an alternative analysis of the data and experiment then please do so.
B&B orig: 12/6/18
I expect this thread reprises material from a study that Germaine has already presented. The study is entitled Nonpolitical Images Evoke Neural Predictors of Political Ideology.
The images used to evoke animal-reminder-disgust were body mutilation images.
Analysis of MRIs showing areas of brain activation, when subjects were shown body mutilation images, was able to reliably distinguish between conservatives and liberals. Conservatives were found to respond to mutilation images in ways that increased activation in areas of the brain that have been found in previous studies to correspond to increased negative affective valence.
One thing I find of interest is the strong association that two "hot button" political issues, gun control and abortion, have with "body mutilation".
The first thing I notice here is that neither liberals nor conservatives are consistently seeking to lessen or prevent body mutilation in their positions on these issues. So there is not a simple, "Conservatives seek to lessen body mutilation and liberals are OK with it" response, or the reverse, happening.
I am wondering if other issues directly associated with body-mutilation have also been "hot button" political issues in the past. Or whether the apparent links between the political issues of gun control and abortion and animal-reminder-disgust are actually coincidental.
Some other political issues that might directly intersect with body mutilation would appear to be; compulsory car seat-belt, motorcycle and cycling helmet legislation, traffic safety regulations, especially speed limits, industrial safety legislation, declaration of war and commitment of soldiers to armed conflict, militarization of police forces, readiness of police to use deadly force, laws protecting pedestrians from vehicular traffic, restrictions on walkers accessing areas containing large carnivores, air safety regulations, regulation of the training and practice of surgery, regulation of patient safety in hospitals, nursing and aged care facilities, & regulation of prisoner safety in detention facilities.
Looking at this this it appears that many issues included are not "hot button" ones but are rather seen as of being low priority/low importance.
Clearly this is a very informal exploration that just scratches the topic. But there is some indication that the possibility of body mutilation in real life is insufficient by itself to have an issue become a "hot button" political issue.
If others want to add more political issues that intersect with body mutilation in real life, or give an alternative analysis of the data and experiment then please do so.
B&B orig: 12/6/18
Personal Morals vs Social Context: A Science of Politics Paradox?
“I do not myself believe that many people do things because they think they are the right thing to do . . . . I do not think that knowledge of what is morally right is motivational in any serious sense for anyone except a handful of saints.” Richard Posner commenting about the influence of social context (society) on personal morals from his point of view as a US federal judge
Society not only controls our movements, but shapes our identity, our thought, and our emotions. . . . . [in large part social institutions are] structures of our own consciousness. Sociologist Peter Berger commenting on the power of social institutions to shape perceptions of reality and how we think about what we think we see
Republicans understand moral psychology. Democrats don’t. Republicans have long understood that the elephant is in charge of political behavior, not the rider, and they know how elephants work. Their slogans, political commercials and speeches go straight for the gut . . . . Republicans don’t just aim to cause fear, as some Democrats charge. They trigger the full range of intuitions described by Moral Foundations Theory. Psychologist Johnathan Haidt commenting on the basis for political thinking in the context of the individual
The foregoing observations raise the question about where the balance of power in the human mind resides. Are we mostly individual, independent thinkers, or are we mostly social creatures who see and act as members of the herd who usually go with the herd?
The debate dates back to Plato (we're members of the herd) and Aristotle (we're independent). The dispute underpins a debate about governance that dates at least back to Plato and Aristotle and continues today. The modern debate pits belief that authoritarian rule is best (Plato's choice) against belief that democratic rule is best (Aristotle's choice). In modern America, that more or less boils down to support for populist rulers like President Trump versus support for democratic norms, e.g., respect for truth and a free press, that existed in the US until Trump crushed them.
What is more influential, personal morals and thinking, or social influences? If we are Plato's herd creatures, he argued that benevolent authoritarian rule would be best because the herd is a spooky, emotional thing that is easily spooked and provoked into unwarranted fear, anger, hate and so forth. If Trump really is an example of an authoritarian, he appears to be a corrupt, not benevolent (virtuous) kind of authoritarian that Plato tried to argue against.
On the other hand, the malicious or corrupt 'Trump type' is probably part of what drove Aristotle to reject authoritarianism in favor of democracy. Of course, the problem with that is that Trump was sort of democratically elected. That shows the weakness in Aristotle's reasoning -- democracies can be corrupt. Authoritarian regimes can rise by persuading people to support a strong man. Complicating this for Trump is illegal Russian influence. Trump might have been a truly legitimate president, and that cloud of contention would would not be hanging over him and his presidency. Enough American voters in 2016 saw more good than bad in Trump and they (with Russia) helped elect a bad leader.
Is there a conflict between Haidt's conception of how the mind works with politics and the social creature conception expressed by Posner and Berger? Are we social sheeple or independent thinkers? Given how modern science sees this, there arguably is no significant conflict because both personal and social influences can and probably usually do operate simultaneously most or all of the time. That said, existing evidence suggests that most people are more influenced by social context and social identity than pure individual perceptions of reality and thinking.
That assessment makes sense because, if nothing else, doing all the thinking for one's self imposes a very high cognitive load. It is literally impossible to think everything through as an individual. Reliance on the herd helps to reduce the cognitive load to something semi-manageable. This isn't a matter of human stupidity. It is a matter of limited innate human cognitive data processing power that has to operate in an ocean of dark free speech intended to mislead, deceive and emotionally manipulate.
Was the situation about the same in ancient times? Probably. Human traits and temperaments do not seem to have changed much since Plato and Aristotle debated. They clearly saw and understood liars, deceivers, brutes and blowhards making runs for power. They tried to figure ways to avoid bad leadership through government structures intended to block bad governance. They wound up at odds. Since then no solution to the bad leader problem has been found.
There may be no full solution, because the problem is innate to human cognitive biology and social behavior. Maybe the best the species can do is to design a partial solution where government structure makes it hard for bad leaders to do bad things and almost impossible to do very bad things. If nothing else, it looks like building consensus for a better form of government will have to take account of individual and social influences because both are relevant.
B&B orig: 12/7/18
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)