A topic the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy discusses is the concept of evil. Evil is an essentially contested concept. People will not and cannot universally agree on when the term applies to specific acts. One section of the discussion of evil focuses on an attack on use of the concept in thinking and talking about it. Nietzsche’s attack on the concept of evil argues that the concept of evil is dangerous and should be abandoned. The Encyclopedia writes:
“The Dangers of ‘Evil’: An evil-skeptic might reply that we should abandon only the concept of evil, and not other normative concepts, because the concept of evil is particularly dangerous or susceptible to abuse. We can discern several reasons why ascriptions of evil might be thought to be more harmful or dangerous than ascriptions of other normative concepts such as badness or wrongdoing. First, since ascriptions of evil are the greatest form of moral condemnation, when the term ‘evil’ is misapplied we subject someone to a particularly harsh judgement undeservedly. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that evildoers not only deserve the greatest form of moral condemnation but also the greatest form of punishment. Thus, not only are wrongfully accused evildoers subjected to harsh judgments undeservedly, they may be subjected to harsh punishments undeservedly as well.
Other ambiguities concerning the meaning of the term ‘evil’ may be even more harmful. For instance, on some conceptions of evil, evildoers are possessed, inhuman, incorrigible, or have fixed character traits. These metaphysical and psychological theses about evildoers are controversial. Many who use the term ‘evil’ do not mean to imply that evildoers are possessed, inhuman, incorrigible, or that they have fixed character traits. But others do.
Nietzsche’s Attack on Evil: The most celebrated evil-skeptic, nineteenth century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, also argues that the concept of evil should be abandoned because it is dangerous. But his reasons for thinking that the concept of evil is dangerous are different from those discussed above. Nietzsche believes that the concept of evil is dangerous because it has a negative effect on human potential and vitality by promoting the weak in spirit and suppressing the strong. .... Nietzsche argues that the concept of evil arose from the negative emotions of envy, hatred, and resentment. He contends that the powerless and weak created the concept of evil to take revenge against their oppressors. Nietzsche believes that the concepts of good and evil contribute to an unhealthy view of life which judges relief from suffering as more valuable than creative self-expression and accomplishment. For this reason Nietzsche believes that we should seek to move beyond judgements of good and evil.
Nietzsche’s skeptical attack on the concept of evil has encouraged philosophers to ignore the nature and moral significance of evil and instead focus on the motives people might have for using the term evil.”
Pragmatic rationalism and human biology
The pragmatic rationalism political ideology is built on four core morals or moral values (simplified explanation here). The morals are respect for facts, respect for true truths, service to the public interest and reasonable compromise. The morals were derived primarily from cognitive and social science insights about the how the human mind works and how humans as social creatures behave in complex modern societies that are awash in a tidal wave of information, including an endless stream of dark free speech (DFS).[1]
If one believes that DFS is fundamentally immoral as at least one moral philosopher argues, then it directly or indirectly violates all four core morals. For example, reliance on DFS to persuade people damages service to the public interest and reasonable compromise because the basis for service or compromise are corrupted in some way(s). Can that immorality ever rise to the level of evil?
If one defines evil as (i) a manifestation of profound human immorality and wickedness, especially in people's actions, or (ii) intent to harm or malevolence, it is clear that DFS can be evil if one believes in pragmatic rationalism. If one believes in an different ideology that holds it is morally acceptable to use DFS in political discourse because the ends justify the means, then DFS arguably rarely or never rises to the level of evil or even mere immorality.
So if one has a pragmatic rationalist mindset, is it wrong to call certain DFS evil if it meets the definition of evil? Does that wrongfully accuse people who rely heavily on DFS or subject them to unreasonably harsh judgments undeservedly? By definition, political DFS is legal and thus calling it immoral or evil leads to no undeserved or punishments of any kind. The only sanction is social disapproval and at present, a significant slice of American society seems to more or less accept and even defend DFS.
Is Nietzsche correct to say that evil in the context of DFS and politics arises from negative emotions of envy, hatred, and/or resentment? Or can it simply arise from the moral authority inherent in pragmatic rationalism? Is it possible for one to call malevolent DFS, e.g., public incitement to a race riot or a lynching, immoral or evil merely because that's just what it is?
What about law breakers in society or politics? Can law breaking ever rise to the level of evil? Were Hitler or Stalin evil, and if not, then what were they from the pragmatic rationalist point of view? From an authoritarian point of view, some people might believe that Hitler and/or Stalin were good and moral.
In its intent, pragmatic rationalism tries to promote the strong in spirit (rationality, tolerance, moral courage, etc.), while suppressing the weak (hate, anger, bigotry, etc.). Is use of the concept of evil so emotionally powerful that the intent is swept away in all the hate, bigotry, intolerance, distrust that DFS foments in many or most people? Does it matter if one is an atheist or otherwise non-religious and applies evil as a concept in a secular context based on a secular mindset?
Is Nietzsche right or wrong about this? Should we get rid of the concept of evil because the human mind is, e.g., biologically, morally or otherwise too weak to handle ‘evil’ in a reasonably rational or socially useful way?
If one defines evil as (i) a manifestation of profound human immorality and wickedness, especially in people's actions, or (ii) intent to harm or malevolence, it is clear that DFS can be evil if one believes in pragmatic rationalism. If one believes in an different ideology that holds it is morally acceptable to use DFS in political discourse because the ends justify the means, then DFS arguably rarely or never rises to the level of evil or even mere immorality.
So if one has a pragmatic rationalist mindset, is it wrong to call certain DFS evil if it meets the definition of evil? Does that wrongfully accuse people who rely heavily on DFS or subject them to unreasonably harsh judgments undeservedly? By definition, political DFS is legal and thus calling it immoral or evil leads to no undeserved or punishments of any kind. The only sanction is social disapproval and at present, a significant slice of American society seems to more or less accept and even defend DFS.
Is Nietzsche correct to say that evil in the context of DFS and politics arises from negative emotions of envy, hatred, and/or resentment? Or can it simply arise from the moral authority inherent in pragmatic rationalism? Is it possible for one to call malevolent DFS, e.g., public incitement to a race riot or a lynching, immoral or evil merely because that's just what it is?
What about law breakers in society or politics? Can law breaking ever rise to the level of evil? Were Hitler or Stalin evil, and if not, then what were they from the pragmatic rationalist point of view? From an authoritarian point of view, some people might believe that Hitler and/or Stalin were good and moral.
In its intent, pragmatic rationalism tries to promote the strong in spirit (rationality, tolerance, moral courage, etc.), while suppressing the weak (hate, anger, bigotry, etc.). Is use of the concept of evil so emotionally powerful that the intent is swept away in all the hate, bigotry, intolerance, distrust that DFS foments in many or most people? Does it matter if one is an atheist or otherwise non-religious and applies evil as a concept in a secular context based on a secular mindset?
Is Nietzsche right or wrong about this? Should we get rid of the concept of evil because the human mind is, e.g., biologically, morally or otherwise too weak to handle ‘evil’ in a reasonably rational or socially useful way?
Footnote:
1. Dark free speech: Constitutionally or legally protected (1) lies and deceit to distract, misinform, confuse, polarize and/or demoralize, (2) unwarranted opacity to hide inconvenient truths, facts and corruption (lies and deceit of omission), (3) unwarranted emotional manipulation (i) to obscure the truth and blind the mind to lies and deceit, and (ii) to provoke irrational, reason-killing emotions and feelings, including fear, hate, anger, disgust, distrust, intolerance, cynicism, pessimism and all kinds of bigotry including racism, and (4) ideologically-driven motivated reasoning and other ideologically-driven biases that unreasonably distort reality and reason. (my label, my definition)
No comments:
Post a Comment