Wonk alert: Perplexity tinkering with pragmatic rationalism

This post is really wonky. I want a place to save this, so this blog post is it. I just discovered that at least one of my links to a Perplexity search lead to nothing, i.e., the Q&A were simply gone. I have no idea why. Fortunately I posted the lost Perplexity Q&A here, so I still have access to it at that blog post. I just cannot access it at Perplexity itself.

Two links to the following new set of Q&A about pragmatic rationalism - I do not know how I wound up with two links:

https://www.perplexity.ai/page/analyzing-germaine-s-political-.YPHnAiwTsGoGDoOMBtNgw

https://www.perplexity.ai/search/based-on-the-politics-expresse-ylnWlloYShGZVyMhzKIrJA

Q1: Based on the politics expressed at Dissident Politics, https://dispol.blogspot.com/ , is Germaine at that site far left, left, centrist or something else in his political leaning or ideology? Germaine claims to adhere to what he calls pragmatic rationalism, which he characterizes on the basis of cognitive biology and social behavior as an anti-biasing, anti-ideology ideology, e.g., https://dispol.blogspot.com/2019/06/pragmatic-rationalism-anti-biasing-anti.html and https://dispol.blogspot.com/2019/12/pragmatic-rationalism-short-simple.html .

A1: Germaine, the author of Dissident Politics, does not fit neatly into traditional political categories such as far left, left, or centrist. Instead, he identifies with pragmatic rationalism, a philosophy he describes as an anti-biasing, anti-ideology ideology based on cognitive biology and social behavior. This approach aims to minimize biases and ideological influences in decision-making, focusing on rational analysis and empirical evidence.

Key Points of Germaine's Pragmatic Rationalism:

Anti-Biasing: Germaine emphasizes the importance of recognizing and mitigating cognitive biases that can cloud judgment and decision-making processes.

Anti-Ideology: He critiques the dogmatic adherence to political ideologies, suggesting that such adherence can lead to irrational and biased outcomes.

Cognitive Biology: His philosophy is grounded in understanding human cognition and behavior, aiming to align political and social decisions with biological and psychological realities.

Empirical Evidence: Decisions should be based on observable facts and data rather than ideological commitments. [that's only partly correct - decisions will be based on that plus personal morals, biases, loyalties to a variable extent because that cannot be avoided - perfectly rational politics is not possible for humans, but self-awareness helps reduce reducible irrationality, but to some degree "irrationality" cannot be completely eliminated and if that was possible, humans would not be human]

Given these principles, Germaine's political stance can be described as:

Non-Traditional: He does not align with conventional political spectrums but rather seeks to transcend them through a rational, evidence-based approach.

Pragmatic: His focus is on what works in practice, rather than what fits into a particular ideological framework.

Skeptical of Ideologies: He views ideologies as potentially harmful when they become dogmatic or when they ignore empirical evidence. [that's a key point: ideologies foster and rationalize reality disconnects and reason flaws when empirical evidence and/or sound reasoning is inconvenient]

In summary, Germaine's political leaning or ideology at Dissident Politics is best characterized as pragmatic rationalism, which positions him outside the typical left-right political spectrum, focusing instead on a method of analysis that seeks to be as unbiased and rational as possible.

Q2: Germaine relies on his understanding of cognitive biology, social behavior and the moral philosophy of lying and deceit ( https://dispol.blogspot.com/2019/10/book-review-lying-moral-choice-in.html ) to derive pragmatic rationalism as an evidence-based, pro-democracy, pro-public interest political ideology or mindset. At this link, https://dispol.blogspot.com/2024/10/pragmatic-rationalism-explained-by.html , Perplexity search referred to pragmatic rationalism as a meta-ideology. Is it a meta-ideology?

A2: Germaine's pragmatic rationalism can indeed be considered a meta-ideology. Here's why:

Transcends Traditional Ideologies: Pragmatic rationalism does not align with conventional political ideologies but rather seeks to provide a framework for evaluating and navigating them. It aims to be a method of analysis that transcends the biases and dogmas inherent in traditional political thought.

Focus on Rationality and Evidence: It emphasizes rational analysis, empirical evidence, and cognitive biology to inform political and social decisions, positioning itself as a higher-order approach to understanding and addressing political issues.

Anti-Biasing and Anti-Ideology: By explicitly aiming to be anti-biasing and anti-ideology, pragmatic rationalism critiques and seeks to mitigate the influence of ideological biases, making it a meta-ideology that critiques and evaluates other ideologies.

Pro-Democracy and Public Interest: Germaine's approach is described as pro-democracy and pro-public interest, suggesting that it seeks to serve the broader societal good by promoting rational decision-making processes.

In summary, pragmatic rationalism, as articulated by Germaine, functions as a meta-ideology by providing a framework for evaluating and navigating political ideologies, focusing on rationality, evidence, and the public interest, while explicitly critiquing and aiming to mitigate the biases inherent in traditional political thought.

Q3 and 4: Pragmatic rationalism is based on Germaine's understanding of aspects of cognitive biology that can lead people to false beliefs, especially in the face of demagoguery and propaganda deceit and emotional manipulation. Factoring prominently into his thinking, he points to human cognitive traits such as unconscious biases, mental heuristics, prejudices, self-esteem, self-identity etc., and aspects of human social behavior, e.g., family, group or tribe loyalty, strictures of social institutions and sociological phenomena as Germaine discussed here https://dispol.blogspot.com/2020/03/book-review-invitation-to-sociology.html . Pragmatic rationalism also asserts core moral values of (i) fidelity to facts, true truths and sound reasoning, even when they are inconvenient, (ii) support for secular democracy, including reasonable compromise, and (iii) a dominant focus of service to the public interest over special interests., i.e., rebalancing power from special interests to the public interest. The goal of pragmatic rationalism is to formulate a meta-ideology or mindset that is designed to reduce human susceptibility to demagoguery, irrational emotion-fomenting propaganda, crackpot reasoning and the like. What else could pragmatic rationalism include to improve the effectiveness of the pragmatic rationalist meta-ideology or mindset?

A4: To improve the effectiveness of pragmatic rationalism as a meta-ideology or mindset, several additional elements could be incorporated:

1. Critical Thinking and Media Literacy:

Incorporate Critical Thinking Frameworks: Pragmatic rationalism could benefit from integrating established critical thinking frameworks that help individuals evaluate information critically. This includes teaching people to recognize logical fallacies, understand cognitive biases, and assess the reliability of sources 2.

Media Literacy: Promote media literacy to help individuals discern between factual reporting, opinion pieces, and propaganda. This would involve understanding how media shapes narratives and the importance of seeking out diverse sources of information 2.

2. Emotional Intelligence and Empathy:

Emotional Awareness: Encourage the development of emotional intelligence to recognize and manage one's own emotions and those of others. This can help in understanding how emotions are manipulated in propaganda and demagoguery 2.

Empathy Training: Foster empathy to understand different perspectives, reducing the likelihood of falling into ideological echo chambers and promoting more constructive dialogue 4.

3. Self-Reflection and Ideological Awareness:
Self-Reflective Practices: Implement practices that encourage individuals to reflect on their own ideological beliefs, understanding how personal experiences, upbringing, and environment shape their worldview 4.

Meta-Ideological Awareness (MIA): As suggested by the concept of MIA, pragmatic rationalism could include self-reflective questions about how personal ideologies affect interpretations of information, promoting a more detached and nuanced approach to political and social issues 2.

4. Ethical Decision-Making:

Ethical Frameworks: Integrate ethical decision-making models that emphasize the importance of considering the broader implications of actions, not just immediate practical outcomes. This could involve principles from utilitarianism, deontology, or virtue ethics to guide decision-making beyond mere expediency 1.

Moral Reasoning: Encourage the development of moral reasoning skills to navigate complex ethical dilemmas, ensuring decisions are not only pragmatic but also morally sound 1.

5. Community Engagement and Dialogue:

Promote Dialogue: Foster environments where open, respectful dialogue is encouraged, allowing for the exchange of ideas and the challenging of one's own beliefs in a constructive manner 4.

Community-Based Learning: Implement community-based learning initiatives where individuals can engage with diverse groups, promoting understanding and reducing tribalism 2.

6. Continuous Learning and Adaptation:

Lifelong Learning: Encourage a mindset of continuous learning and adaptation, recognizing that knowledge and understanding evolve over time. This includes staying informed about new research in cognitive science, sociology, and political theory 4.

Feedback Loops: Establish mechanisms for feedback and self-correction, ensuring that pragmatic rationalism remains a dynamic and evolving approach rather than a static ideology 5. [great idea - need to cogitate on how to do that]

7. Institutional Reforms:

Educational Reforms: Advocate for educational systems that teach critical thinking, media literacy, and ethical reasoning from an early age, embedding pragmatic rationalism into the educational curriculum 2.

Political Reforms: Support reforms that promote transparency, accountability, and public interest in political processes, reducing the influence of special interests 3.

By incorporating these elements, pragmatic rationalism can become a more robust meta-ideology, better equipped to navigate the complexities of modern political and social landscapes, reduce susceptibility to manipulation, and foster a more informed, empathetic, and rational public discourse.

Q7: You suggest establishing mechanisms for feedback and self-correction, ensuring that pragmatic rationalism remains a dynamic and evolving approach rather than a static ideology. How can one do that?

A7: To ensure that pragmatic rationalism remains a dynamic and evolving approach, several mechanisms can be implemented:

1. Feedback Loops:

Government Responsiveness: Instead of focusing solely on feedback loops, emphasize government responsiveness as a broader concept. This involves not just responding to citizen feedback but integrating it throughout the entire policy and governance cycle 1.

Citizen Engagement: Encourage active citizen participation in policy-making, ensuring that their feedback is not just heard but acted upon, fostering a sense of inclusion and accountability1.

Visibility and Traceability: Design policies with characteristics that make the government's role in providing benefits visible and traceable, enhancing public trust and understanding of policy impacts 3.

2. Self-Correction Mechanisms:

Political Evaluation: Implement regular evaluations of political processes and outcomes to identify areas for improvement and correction 2.

Political Competition: Foster a competitive political environment where parties and politicians are incentivized to adapt and improve based on public feedback and electoral outcomes 2.

Freedom of Speech: Protect and promote freedom of speech to allow for open critique and discussion of policies, enabling self-correction through public discourse 2.

3. Policy Feedback Theory:

Policy Characteristics: Design policies with characteristics that facilitate positive feedback loops, such as longer durations of benefits, immediate delivery, centralized and streamlined policy delivery, and minimal administrative burden 3.

Target Populations: Consider the social construction and power dynamics of target populations when designing policies to ensure inclusivity and responsiveness 3.

4. Civil Society Engagement:

Building Power: Civil society organizations should strategically build power among target populations to influence policy and alter existing power dynamics 3.

Messaging and Organizing: Coordinate messaging and organizing strategies to shift policy discourse and public perceptions, facilitating long-term policy wins 3.

5. Continuous Learning and Adaptation:

Lifelong Learning: Encourage a culture of continuous learning and adaptation, recognizing that knowledge and understanding evolve over time 3.

Feedback Loops in Education: Integrate feedback loops into educational systems to teach critical thinking, media literacy, and ethical reasoning from an early age 3.

6. Institutional Reforms:

Transparency and Accountability: Advocate for reforms that promote transparency, accountability, and public interest in political processes, reducing the influence of special interests 3.

Responsive Governance: Cultivate a whole different set of attitudes and behaviors among government actors and citizens to foster responsive governance 1.

By incorporating these mechanisms, pragmatic rationalism can evolve into a more robust and adaptive meta-ideology, ensuring that it remains relevant and effective in addressing the complexities of modern political and social landscapes.

A collision: The Hegseth dustup, communications theory and pragmatic rationalism

Marshall McLuhan (1911-1980)

Communications media philosopher

This is really wonky, but I find it fascinating. A comment here yesterday about the MAGA idiot Pete Hegseth and other MAGA elites stupidly breaching national security sparked this post. 

NOTE: Nothing in this blog post is intended to shift any blame or responsibility whatsoever from the MAGA morons involved in the national security breach to any form of social media. All blame and responsibility is with Pete Hegseth and the other MAGA morons for breaching national security and djt, Hegseth and all the other morons for lying to us about it and denying actual facts. Social media may have been a non-trivial contributing factor in impairing the judgment of everyone involved, but that does not absolve them of their outrageous failure and lies to cover it up.

Comment: I'm trying to stay off for awhile, but this Hegseth dust up is an irresistible example of what annoys me most. The Screen.

Hegseth and his bros were talking on mildly secure Signal about a military attack. Did it mess up the attack? No. Were they saying anything critical to national defense? No. Did using an open app installed on otherwise secure devices create a hackers dream?..
The issue here should be the use of the internet at all.

As John Stewart said on 3/24 internet/social media is a machine. Interactive Media is a machine Designed in laboratories to change the behavior and rewire the brains of those who engage it. It is a programmed machine that programs those who use it, no matter the users intended use.
. It is NOT a conduit for speech like an old phone, and free speech has nothing to do with this problem.
He says it better than I do.
The machine takes your input, every nuance of your life on or off social media, in your car, everywhere all the time. and crafts a specific and personalized response to get you to think and do what they want.
But mention that and people invariably say, "well what do you want me to do?, The net is essential to everything. It cannot be shut down, I need it.." And they are right.
Hegseth, and the rest of the gang, are not the problem. They are there because the social media created Trump and MAGA. The media , divided us, and taught us to fear, and sold us lie after lie and we drank it all down like an abused child begging, clinging to the leg of the parent beating them to death. .
The message on the medium is not the message. The medium is the message.
The Medium is the message.
The medium is the Message.

Response: Pxy (pro-search and deep research modes):

Q1: What does the Medium is the message mean?

A1: "The medium is the message" is a phrase coined by Canadian communication theorist Marshall McLuhan in 1964. It means that the form of communication (the medium) itself has a significant impact on how the message is perceived and understood, often overshadowing the actual content of the message. The shift from oral culture to print-based ones changed societal focus from auditory to visual. Understanding this concept is crucial in today's rapidly evolving digital landscape, as it helps us anticipate and potentially shape the effects of new communication technologies on our culture and society.

Q2: Exactly why is understanding this concept crucial in today's rapidly evolving digital landscape? What is the social science data on this point?

A2: McLuhan’s axiom “the medium is the message” asserts that communication technologies—not just their content—reshape human behavior, social structures, and cultural norms. In the digital age, this principle remains critically relevant, as platforms like social media, search engines, and streaming services fundamentally alter how information is processed, identities are formed, and power is distributed. Empirical research reveals that digital mediums amplify polarization, reshape cognitive processes, and create systemic inequities in digital literacy. Understanding these effects is essential for fostering informed citizenship, mitigating misinformation, and ensuring equitable participation in a technology-driven world.

Is that about right? I think it is.

The issue here should be the use of the internet at all. .... Hegseth, and the rest of the gang, are not the problem. They are there because the social media created Trump and MAGA. The media , divided us, and taught us to fear, and sold us lie after lie and we drank it all down like an abused child begging, clinging to the leg of the parent beating them to death.

If I understand your analysis, which I might not, social media has had effects significantly more harmful than beneficial to society, knowledge generally, government, democracy, human rationality, etc. (good things generally). If that's your argument, we are in agreement. I think I have been arguing the same thing about social media for years, at least ~15, maybe ~20.

But I articulate the same (similar? overlapping?) concept differently. I don't anchor my arguments to McLuhan's insight, which I do not dispute. My anchor is human cognitive biology, social behavior and pragmatic rationalism, a pro-rationality, morals-based, anti-biasing, anti-ideology ideology (a meta-ideology according to Pxy).

Stepping back how does McLuhan fit into pragmatic rationalism , assuming it fits at all? I asked Pxy:

Q3: In what ways, if any, does the meta-ideology (anti-biasing, anti-ideology ideology) called pragmatic rationalism as described here, https://dispol.blogspot.com/2024/12/wonk-alert-perplexity-tinkering-with.html , fit with McLuhan's insight? Or, are the two concepts non-overlapping? Take steps to reduce errors from sycophancy and other sources of AI error.

A3: Pragmatic rationalism—an anti-biasing, anti-ideology framework emphasizing empirical evidence and cognitive self-awareness—intersects with Marshall McLuhan’s media theory in their shared focus on how cognitive environments shape human reasoning. While McLuhan’s axiom “the medium is the message” analyzes how communication technologies restructure perception and social organization, pragmatic rationalism seeks to counteract distortions introduced by ideological frameworks and cognitive biases. The two concepts converge in their recognition of systemic influences on cognition but diverge in their assumptions about human agency and the role of technological determinism. Empirical studies of digital polarization and algorithmic bias illustrate how McLuhan’s insights about media environments necessitate pragmatic rationalism’s methodological defenses against irrationality.

Conclusion: Complementary Lenses for a Fractured Media Landscape
Pragmatic rationalism and McLuhan’s media theory offer complementary diagnostics for contemporary epistemic crises. While pragmatic rationalism provides tools to counteract cognitive biases, McLuhan’s insights reveal why such biases emerge from media environments themselves. Together, they suggest a dual approach: reforming both individual reasoning and the media architectures that shape it. However, unresolved tensions about agency and determinism highlight the need for further research into how anti-biasing frameworks can adapt to rapidly evolving media ecologies.

Future directions might explore neuroplasticity-informed media design—creating platforms that align with pragmatic rationalism’s goals while respecting McLuhan’s warnings about technological subliminality.

Dang, that turned out to be a really interesting rabbit hole. Now I have a better feel for McLuhan. Pragmatic rationality as a tool to reform reasoning and McLuhan as as a warning. I like that a lot.

Germaine: Irrationality fighter . . . . 

. . . . and snarling watchdog of the public interest

Criticisms of Germaine; Why resort to authority over personal opinion?

In the last couple of weeks I have received a fair amount of explicit or implicit criticisms. If I recall right they boil down to six things:

1. Arrogance in how I express myself
2. Seeing the world in black and white, maybe part of the arrogance problem
3. Relying too much on experts to guide my opinions
4. Being way too alarmist about various authoritarian threats to American democracy, the rule of law, and civil liberties from Trump and the MAGA movement (kleptocratic autocracy, plutocracy and Christian theocracy)
5. Being too biased or unreasonable by being trapped in partisan identity politics 
6. Being way too partisan in favor of extreme liberalism, although the labels socialist or communist have not yet popped up

Those criticisms are sincere and come from people of good will, so I take them seriously. In short, they blow me away. I’ve apparently been seriously blind to my own flaws. I thought I was basically the opposite of criticisms #1 and #2. Regarding #4, I thought that I was very careful to lay out a lot of evidence to support my deep fears about America turning into some form of a bigoted, authoritarian kleptocracy. Criticism #5 baffles me because I don’t know what identity I am trapped in.

However, there is both truth and misunderstanding behind criticism #6. I am very partisan from in favor of pragmatic rationalism and its core moral values. But pragmatic rationalism is not liberalism or politically left. It is something else. I thought it was mostly centrist. Assuming I was an exemplar of pragmatic rationalism and being usually in accord with majority public opinion about most things with poll data, centrism felt like a reasonable label. However, Perplexity convinced me I am not a centrist. Instead, Perplexity gave what I believe is a more accurate description of my brand of politics:  

“Pragmatic rationalism, as presented by Germaine, aims to transcend conventional political labels and ideologies. It focuses on using cognitive biology and social behavior insights to counteract biases and promote more rational decision-making in politics and policy. 

While Germaine may touch on issues that align with various points on the political spectrum, his overall framework appears to be an attempt to create a meta-ideology that critiques and aims to improve upon traditional political thinking.

Given this information, it would be most accurate to describe Germaine’s political stance as: Unconventional/Alternative: Rather than fitting into established categories like far left, left, or centrist, Germaine’s pragmatic rationalism represents an attempt to forge a new approach to politics based on cognitive science and rational analysis.”

In my opinion, that nails it. That is me, and I am partisan about it. 

Q: What other criticisms reasonably apply to Germaine and/or pragmatic rationalism?

_______________________________________________________________________

_______________________________________________________________________

Personal opinion vs. expert opinion 

This post raises the question, as one critic put it about criticism #3, “why debate if it comes down to dueling AUTHORITIES to dismiss personal analysis and verification. .... why debate seriously if one cannot produce their own analysis and verification, relying on dueling authorities, dismissing each other as posters...or worse, assigning authority based on partisan and identity bias?”

Accompanying that question was a personally concerning assertion of insult, “I'll say it again: what if I show extreme investing success vs Suzie Orman or Robert Kiyosaki, being called a clown relative to them. And by the way...that is EXACTLY what some more or less have said in our community .... asserting I’m a clown vs their authorities...this from some posters perceived to be authoritative by many members of this community.”

Maybe unreasonable reliance on expert opinion is a big personal blind spot. And I very much I hope I did not call the commenter a clown because it is insulting. If I did, I’m truly sorry.

Rethinking the line of argument that commenter has been asserting here for a long time, I can see how arguing that successful active investing can be a significant source of personal wealth. That seems to be a solid truth. What I have no feeling for at all is (1) how one can reliably do that (the commenter makes it sound fairly easy), and (2) how to translate personal financial success into a political force that would stand in defense of morally vastly superior pluralist, secular democracy** to some form of morally rotted corrupt authoritarianism. 

** Yes, democracy over authoritarianism evinces solid partisanship and my moral logic. I am a partisan.

For me, there is a big disconnect between the goal of pragmatic rationalism, namely counteracting biases and promoting more rational decision-making in politics and policy. How to bridge that gap? Not all successful stock market investors will be pro-democracy. Some will be pro-authoritarian. What glue is there to tie financial success with democracy?

Hence my deep confusion about what role successful investing would have as a political strategy or mindset. But I do often adopt the opinions of what I believe are well-meaning, honest experts in various aspects of politics because I am not an expert. I know that experts are often or usually wrong in their predictions, a situation that is so well documented that I consider it to be a fact, not a debatable truth (book review 1, book review 2, book review 3).

Q1: What am I missing here by not seeing major connections between secular democracy politics and personal success in finance? I think I am missing something, but cannot put a finger on it.

Q2: How often should individual analysis and opinion trump expert analysis opinion, sometimes, usually, all the time, etc.? 

Two Very Different, Unrelated Things: Phronesis and Roger Stone

Phronesis

A long time critic came across this word this morning and thought it applied to my political ideology and interest in a 3rd political party. Early on, he referred to what I wanted as the PPs, which came from a now-extinct blog I ran for years called the Pragmatic Caucus. He liked calling me a PP, short for Pragmatic Party. He still likes doing that.

If I understand the concept at least reasonably well phronesis does sound a lot like my pragmatic rationalism ideology. According to Wikipedia: “Phronesis (Ancient Greek: φρόνησῐς, romanized: phrónēsis) is an ancient Greek word for a type of wisdom or intelligence. It is more specifically a type of wisdom relevant to practical action, implying both good judgement and excellence of character and habits, sometimes referred to as "practical virtue". Phronesis was a common topic of discussion in ancient Greek philosophy.”

It seems to refer to evidence and reason based thinking and judgment, which is what pragmatic rationalism is intended to foster. People like Aristotle approved of the concept and used it in his ethics. Anyway, if phronesis and pragmatic rationalism are roughly the same thing, then I did not invent pragmatic rationalism. If so that's a good thing. In her 1951 masterpiece of human savagery, The Origins of Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt asserted that no thought is politics was new. Only society and technology changes and that sweeps old ideas into them.

If Aristotle or his predecessors invented pragmatic rationalism under another name, that’s a comforting thought. If pragmatic rationalism really was new, that would be unsettling. It would suggest that it contained some flaw so serious as to have never even been worth describing in writing by minds far more intelligent and insightful than mine. Validation by ancient minds is far more comforting than any assertion of novelty in modern politics.

Roger Stone

The judge handed down a 40 month sentence for Stone’s seven felony convictions. That probably would have been the case despite the corrupt William Barr’s attempt to reduce the sentence for a felon ally of the president.

The gift to Trump: That kerfuffle aside, any Stone sentencing that includes time in the slammer provides a political solid gold asset for the president. Now, the president can pardon Stone the next time info comes out that is really embarrassing to the president. The Russians did that for Trump during the 2016 election, Wikileaks dumped stolen Podesta emails within an hour or two of the release of the Hollywood Access sex predator tape. That tactic it worked quite well.

So, if Bolton publishes his book and it shows the president to be what he is ( a liar, a crook, a traitor, etc,), the same day the president can just pardon Stone and the rabid, prostituted US mainstream media will devote slathering attention to the Stone thing. In essence, that will effectively deflect significant attention from what makes Trump look like what he is to froth about what he just did for Stone.

The judge comments: The judge commented: “There was nothing unfair about the investigation and the prosecution. He was not prosecuted for standing up for the president. He was prosecuted for covering up for the president. .... [he] took it upon himself to lie, to impede, to obstruct before the investigation was complete, in an endeavor to influence the result. .... The truth still exists; the truth still matters. .... Any suggestion that the prosecution in this case did anything untoward, unethical or improper is incorrect”

The truth still matters??: Trump supporters outside the courthouse were demanding a pardon for Stone. Apparently, being a serial felon doesn't faze some or most of the president’s supporters. If nothing else, the GOP (Trump Party) isn’t concerned about the rule of law as it applies to themselves. No doubt, the Trump Party will be happy to see it applied it with a vengeance to political enemies.

As long as the Trump party exerts power, America will continue it’s slide into a corrupt, lawless dictatorship. For most of then, their truth matters, not defensible truth.

Pragmatic rationalism explained by someone other than Germaine

Well, OK, something other than Germaine. Perplexity say this about Germaine’s politics:

Q: Based on the politics expressed at Dissident Politics, is Germaine at that site far left, left, centrist or something else in his political leaning or ideology? Germaine claims to adhere to what he calls pragmatic rationalism, which he characterizes on the basis of cognitive biology and social behavior as an anti-biasing, anti-ideology ideology, e.g., here.

A: Based on the content at Dissident Politics, Germaine's political ideology does not fit neatly into traditional left-right categories. He advocates for what he calls “pragmatic rationalism,” which he describes as an anti-biasing, anti-ideology approach.

Pragmatic rationalism, as presented by Germaine, aims to transcend conventional political labels and ideologies. It focuses on using cognitive biology and social behavior insights to counteract biases and promote more rational decision-making in politics and policy. This approach suggests that Germaine's political leanings are:

1. Non-traditional: Rejecting standard left-right categorizations 

2. Evidence-based: Emphasizing scientific understanding of human cognition and behavior 

3. Pragmatic: Focusing on practical outcomes rather than ideological purity

While Germaine may touch on issues that align with various points on the political spectrum, his overall framework appears to be an attempt to create a meta-ideology that critiques and aims to improve upon traditional political thinking.

Given this information, it would be most accurate to describe Germaine’s political stance as: Unconventional/Alternative: Rather than fitting into established categories like far left, left, or centrist, Germaine's pragmatic rationalism represents an attempt to forge a new approach to politics based on cognitive science and rational analysis.

Dang! Germaine really thought he was a centrist because when he looks at opinion polls about various policies, he is agrees with majority opinion most of the time, maybe about 75%. Darned Germaine, self-deluded as usual. . . . . grumble, grumble . . . . . . 

Ooh, wait!! Pragmatic rationalism is a meta-ideology? I like that! Wait, what is a meta-ideology?

Q: What is a meta-ideology?

A: A meta-ideology is a higher-order or overarching ideological framework that provides the basis for other ideologies or ideological debates. Key aspects of meta-ideology include: 

1. It acts as a foundational system of ideas that shapes how other ideologies are formed and understood.

2. Meta-ideology posits that ideologies are coherent systems of ideas based on a few core assumptions about reality, which may or may not have a factual basis.

3. It views ideologies as neither inherently right nor wrong, but rather as intellectual strategies for categorizing and making sense of the world.

4. Meta-ideology examines the structure, form, and manifestation of ideologies, rather than advocating for any specific ideological position.

5. It can provide a common ground or framework within which different ideological perspectives can engage in dialogue.

6. Liberalism has been described as acting like a meta-ideology in some contexts, as it can incorporate and express alternative ideological positions through its versatile conceptual structure.

7. A meta-ideological approach aims to transcend rigid ideological thinking and foster more nuanced, empathetic understanding across different viewpoints.

8. It encourages self-awareness about one's own ideological assumptions and constructs, promoting a more reflective approach to political and social issues.

In essence, a meta-ideology provides a higher-level perspective on ideologies themselves, examining how they function, interact, and shape our understanding of politics and society.

Germaine really likes points 3, 5, 7 and 8.

Pragmatic Rationalism: A Short, Simple Explanation

Intolerance is almost inevitably accompanied by a natural and true inability to comprehend or make allowance for opposite points of view. . . . We find here with significant uniformity what one psychologist has called ‘logic-proof compartments.’ The logic-proof compartment has always been with us. Master propagandist Edward Bernays, Crystallizing Public Opinion, 1923

We found ourselves at the end of chapter 3 with a dystopian assessment of democracy, an apparent ill-suited match between the mental apparatus of the public and the high-minded requirements of democracy: People should be well informed about politically important matters, but they are not. People should think rationally, but they most often do not. Political psychologist George Marcus, Political Psychology: Neuroscience, Genetics, and Politics, 2013


On various occasions, I've tried to explain that pragmatic rationalism operates as an anti-ideology ideology by focusing on four core moral values that are intended to help reduce partisan distortion, bias and irrationality in how people perceive facts and truths and how they think about what they think they see. It's not clear that prior explanations have been particularly successful. This is another try. Hope springs eternal.

Context

Pragmatic Rationalism[1] is an anti-bias political ideology based on four core moral values instead of core political, economic, philosophical or religious beliefs that characterize standard pro-bias ideologies, which can be overlapping to some variable extent, e.g., capitalism, socialism, fascism, nationalism, globalism or Christianity. Three of the four morals (1, 2 and 4 in the list below) are chosen because they are more objective than most concepts in politics.

Most concepts in politics are not universally definable and people bicker endlessly over what a concept means and how it applies to the real world. Undefinable concepts like that are called essentially contested concepts. They include fairness, the rule of law, sovereignty, privacy, constitutionality, etc. In modern American politics, endless disagreements over what is fair or unfair, or what is constitutional or unconstitutional are unresolvable except by compromise. Minds will not agree willingly.

Pragmatic Rationalism -- what it is 

Pragmatic rationalism is an ideology that holds that the four most important political moral values are: 

1. fidelity to trying to see facts and truths with less bias, especially inconvenient facts and truths that undermine or contradict personal beliefs;

2. fidelity to trying to apply unbiased or less biased conscious reasoning or logic to the facts and truths we think we see, especially inconvenient reasoning that undermines or contradicts personal beliefs;

3. applying 1 and 2 in service to the public interest[2]; and 

4. reasonable compromise.

That's the whole ideology.

Morals 1 and 2 are at the heart of the modern scientific mindset or ideology, but in pragmatic rationalism they are just applied to the definitely unscientific, messy endeavor called politics.

Very brief explanation

1. Each moral value serves as a bulwark against (1) authoritarianism, (2) kleptocracy, (3) dark free speech (lies, propaganda, unwarranted emotional manipulation, etc.), and (4) ideological partisan bias and politics based on false or unreasonably distorted facts, false or distorted truths and abuse of power by the majority or minority in democracy.

2. Regarding moral 4 or compromise, in authoritarian regimes the person or people in power don't have to compromise with anyone they have the power to ignore, or even abuse if they are so inclined. Compromise also fights against the kleptocracy that usually accompanies highly concentrated power.

3. Fidelity to less biased facts, truths and reason fights directly and powerfully against dark free speech or propaganda.

4. Most everyone doing politics firmly but falsely believes they do politics based on unbiased facts, truths and logic. Most also believe their beliefs best serve the public interest.

5.  If one tosses any of one of the four morals out, you have dictatorship or oligarchy, not democracy.


Footnotes:
1. Political ideology is hard or impossible to authoritatively define, just like most other politics-related concepts. I define pragmatic politics as a way of thinking within a framework of a cluster of concepts that are grounded in the real world. In essence, it is pragmatic politics, which is non-ideological. Pragmatic rationalism is anti-ideological because it is explicitly intended to try to keep perceptions of reality and reasoning strongly tethered to objective facts and truths and sound logic or reasoning. Pro-bias ideologies tend to lead to distortions of inconvenient fact and truth and flawed reasoning. The distortions and flaws include outright denying of objectively true facts and reasoning that is objectively flawed or incorrect.

2. Service to the public interest is an essentially contested concept and as I articulate it, it is larded full of additional essentially contested concepts. That is unavoidable because multiple concepts reveal the contours of politics in a democracy, but not the details. In essence service to the public interest outlines the contours of what is basically a food fight among competing interests over policy and everything else. But unlike most unresolvable partisan ideological disagreements, it is constrained by the other three core moral values, i.e., less biased facts, less biased reasoning and compromise.

For those interested, here's my current, but revisable, articulation of the food fight (service to the public interest):

The conduct of politics and governance based on identifying a rational, optimum balance between serving public, individual and commercial interests based on a transparent fact- and logic-based analysis of competing policy choices (evidence- and reason-based politics), while (1) being reasonably responsive to public opinion, (2) protecting and growing the American economy, (3) fostering individual economic and personal growth opportunity, (4) defending constitutional personal freedoms, (5) fostering improvement in the American standard of living, (6) protecting national security, (7) protecting the environment, (8) increasing transparency, competition and efficiency in government and commerce when possible, (9) fostering global peace, stability and prosperity whenever reasonably possible, including maintaining and growing alliances with non-authoritarian democratic nations, and (10) defending American liberal democracy and democratic norms, by replacing federal norms with laws, and (a) requiring states to maximize voter participation, making voting as easy as reasonably possible, (b) elevating opinions of ethics officials in the federal government to the status of laws or requirements that bind all members of all branches of the federal government, particularly including the President and all Executive Branch employees, (c) incentivizing voter participation by conferring a tax break on voters and a reasonable tax penalty on qualified citizens who do not vote, (d) prevent or limit corruption, unwarranted opacity, and anti-democratic actions such as gerrymandering voting districts to minimize competition or limiting voter participation, and (e) requiring allowing high level federal politicians and bureaucrats, federal judges and members of congress to show their tax returns for at least the six tax years before they take office or starting federal employment or service, all of which is constrained by (i) honest, reality-based fiscal sustainability that limits the scope and size of government and regulation to no more or no less than what is deemed needed and (ii) genuine respect for the U.S. constitution and the rule of law with a particular concern for limiting unwarranted legal complexity and ambiguity to limit opportunities to subvert the constitution and the law.

 

Hope springing eternal, again

Promoting the Strong in Spirit While Suppressing the Weak

A topic the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy discusses is the concept of evil. Evil is an essentially contested concept. People will not and cannot universally agree on when the term applies to specific acts. One section of the discussion of evil focuses on an attack on use of the concept in thinking and talking about it. Nietzsche’s attack on the concept of evil argues that the concept of evil is dangerous and should be abandoned. The Encyclopedia writes:

“The Dangers of ‘Evil’: An evil-skeptic might reply that we should abandon only the concept of evil, and not other normative concepts, because the concept of evil is particularly dangerous or susceptible to abuse. We can discern several reasons why ascriptions of evil might be thought to be more harmful or dangerous than ascriptions of other normative concepts such as badness or wrongdoing. First, since ascriptions of evil are the greatest form of moral condemnation, when the term ‘evil’ is misapplied we subject someone to a particularly harsh judgement undeservedly. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that evildoers not only deserve the greatest form of moral condemnation but also the greatest form of punishment. Thus, not only are wrongfully accused evildoers subjected to harsh judgments undeservedly, they may be subjected to harsh punishments undeservedly as well. 

Other ambiguities concerning the meaning of the term ‘evil’ may be even more harmful. For instance, on some conceptions of evil, evildoers are possessed, inhuman, incorrigible, or have fixed character traits. These metaphysical and psychological theses about evildoers are controversial. Many who use the term ‘evil’ do not mean to imply that evildoers are possessed, inhuman, incorrigible, or that they have fixed character traits. But others do. 

Nietzsche’s Attack on Evil: The most celebrated evil-skeptic, nineteenth century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, also argues that the concept of evil should be abandoned because it is dangerous. But his reasons for thinking that the concept of evil is dangerous are different from those discussed above. Nietzsche believes that the concept of evil is dangerous because it has a negative effect on human potential and vitality by promoting the weak in spirit and suppressing the strong. .... Nietzsche argues that the concept of evil arose from the negative emotions of envy, hatred, and resentment. He contends that the powerless and weak created the concept of evil to take revenge against their oppressors. Nietzsche believes that the concepts of good and evil contribute to an unhealthy view of life which judges relief from suffering as more valuable than creative self-expression and accomplishment. For this reason Nietzsche believes that we should seek to move beyond judgements of good and evil. 

Nietzsche’s skeptical attack on the concept of evil has encouraged philosophers to ignore the nature and moral significance of evil and instead focus on the motives people might have for using the term evil.”

Pragmatic rationalism and human biology

The pragmatic rationalism political ideology is built on four core morals or moral values (simplified explanation here). The morals are respect for facts, respect for true truths, service to the public interest and reasonable compromise. The morals were derived primarily from cognitive and social science insights about the how the human mind works and how humans as social creatures behave in complex modern societies that are awash in a tidal wave of information, including an endless stream of dark free speech (DFS).[1]

If one believes that DFS is fundamentally immoral as at least one moral philosopher argues, then it directly or indirectly violates all four core morals. For example, reliance on DFS to persuade people damages service to the public interest and reasonable compromise because the basis for service or compromise are corrupted in some way(s). Can that immorality ever rise to the level of evil?
If one defines evil as (i) a manifestation of profound human immorality and wickedness, especially in people's actions, or (ii) intent to harm or malevolence, it is clear that DFS can be evil if one believes in pragmatic rationalism. If one believes in an different ideology that holds it is morally acceptable to use DFS in political discourse because the ends justify the means, then DFS arguably rarely or never rises to the level of evil or even mere immorality.

So if one has a pragmatic rationalist mindset, is it wrong to call certain DFS evil if it meets the definition of evil? Does that wrongfully accuse people who rely heavily on DFS or subject them to unreasonably harsh judgments undeservedly? By definition, political DFS is legal and thus calling it immoral or evil leads to no undeserved or punishments of any kind. The only sanction is social disapproval and at present, a significant slice of American society seems to more or less accept and even defend DFS.

Is Nietzsche correct to say that evil in the context of DFS and politics arises from negative emotions of envy, hatred, and/or resentment? Or can it simply arise from the moral authority inherent in pragmatic rationalism? Is it possible for one to call malevolent DFS, e.g., public incitement to a race riot or a lynching, immoral or evil merely because that's just what it is?

What about law breakers in society or politics? Can law breaking ever rise to the level of evil? Were Hitler or Stalin evil, and if not, then what were they from the pragmatic rationalist point of view? From an authoritarian point of view, some people might believe that Hitler and/or Stalin were good and moral.

In its intent, pragmatic rationalism tries to promote the strong in spirit (rationality, tolerance, moral courage, etc.), while suppressing the weak (hate, anger, bigotry, etc.). Is use of the concept of evil so emotionally powerful that the intent is swept away in all the hate, bigotry, intolerance, distrust that DFS foments in many or most people? Does it matter if one is an atheist or otherwise non-religious and applies evil as a concept in a secular context based on a secular mindset?

Is Nietzsche right or wrong about this? Should we get rid of the concept of evil because the human mind is, e.g., biologically, morally or otherwise too weak to handle ‘evil’ in a reasonably rational or socially useful way?

Footnote:
1. Dark free speech: Constitutionally or legally protected (1) lies and deceit to distract, misinform, confuse, polarize and/or demoralize, (2) unwarranted opacity to hide inconvenient truths, facts and corruption (lies and deceit of omission), (3) unwarranted emotional manipulation (i) to obscure the truth and blind the mind to lies and deceit, and (ii) to provoke irrational, reason-killing emotions and feelings, including fear, hate, anger, disgust, distrust, intolerance, cynicism, pessimism and all kinds of bigotry including racism, and (4) ideologically-driven motivated reasoning and other ideologically-driven biases that unreasonably distort reality and reason. (my label, my definition)

Chapter Review: (Im)Morality in Political Discourse

Context

(Im)Morality in Political Discourse: The Effects of Moral Psychology in Politics is the sixth chapter in the 2017 book, Moral Psychology: A Multidisciplinary Guide, edited by Benjamin Voyer and Tor Tarantola. The book is directed to an academic and research audience in an attempt to nudge disparate streams of research into moral psychology into some form of convergence of knowledge (consilience). Researchers in neuroscience, cognitive science, psychology, sociology, political science, analytic philosophy, moral philosophy, anthropology, computer science, evolutionary biology and other disciplines have developed enough knowledge in disparate areas of research that unwanted siloing and isolation of streams of research and knowledge has begun.

This book attempts to fight against that trend. The point is to fertilize disparate minds with data and logic from related areas of research, accelerate the pace of research and introduce graduate students to the depth and breadth of research as of early to mid 2017.

Chapter six was written by Nicholas Nicoletti and William Delahanty. It is the longest chapter in the book and intellectually rather complex, at least for me.

Chapter 1 (reviewed here) deals with fundamental problems in moral psychology, mostly the difficulty the human mind has in trying to understand itself. Moral psychology is not a problem the human mind evolved to solve. It is a problem the human mind may not be able to solve with a high degree of precision. Chapter 2 (reviewed here) deals with  moral psychology from an evolutionary biology point of view. Again, the human mind is a central issue, which the author makes painfully clear: “While the human mind is not usually considered an impediment to scientific progress, it may present particular barriers to accurate models of the nature of morality and moral psychology. This is not the first research question that has been hampered by the fact that science is done by humans.”

Chapter review

Nicoletti and Delahanty (N&D) conclude chapter six with these sobering comments:

“To conclude, we argue that compromise is possible under certain conditions such as those mentioned above. However, the primary obstacle to overcome is the perverse incentive that elites have to frame issues in order to mobilize maximum support. Moral framing is a very effective way to gain support and mobilize voters. Moreover, while elites moralize issues to get elected, they also have policy preferences in line with their own moral preferences. This makes political discourse exceedingly more difficult, while simultaneously increasing political participation. The juxtaposition of destructive democratic discourse with an active politically engaged public underscores the promises and pitfalls associated with moral conviction in democratic politics.”

N&D are saying that compromise has been significantly undermined by weaponizing morality in politics. Injecting morality into political discourse politically engages many people but it also tends to make them less open understanding or tolerating differences of opinion. N&D argue that political discourse infused with morality constitutes ‘destructive democratic discourse’. That is a serious allegation.

N&D discuss the moral frameworks (1) that psychologist Johnathan Haidt proposed, the Moral Foundations Theory (discussed here), and (2) that cognitive linguist George Lakoff  (discussed here) and others proposed, something that N&D call the Equal Opportunity Motivator Hypothesis. Current research indicates that, despite explicit claims to the moral high ground by conservatives, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s, both liberals and conservatives have significantly moralized their politics. N&D comment:

“both sides of the aisle show high levels of moral conviction .... This suggests that there is not a conservative advantage in the realm of moral reasoning and politics. .... We suggest that moral conviction is a double-edged blade; it has the desirable tendency to increase political action but also to limit the ability of opposing sides to deliberate, compromise and build social capital in a democratic system. .... Those respondents who felt that an issue was connected to their moral conviction preferred more social distance from someone with a dissimilar attitude. .... Ryan’s (2014) study provides more evidence that when moral conviction makes its way into political discourse, democracy may be threatened.”

N&D point out that some evidence indicates that a person’s moral foundations are partly genetic. That accords with speculation by other researchers like John Hibbing who study how biology may influence political attitudes. Hibbing estimates that our personal politics is about 35% nature (genes) and 65% nurture (family, language, identity, social norms, etc).

Making connections

Trying to connect knowledge in different disciplines is likely to be necessary if moral psychology is to progress past its current early, fragmented stage. For example, a discussion here based on a recent Scientific American article focused on how human sentience appears to include an unconscious social distancing-mapping function. Social distance between people mapped to two dimensions, relative power and affiliation, e.g., family member vs complete stranger vs your boss. It may be the case (my speculation only) that social distancing also contains a basis in morality as well as the proposed basis in power and affiliation. If so, that might make social distancing a 3-dimensional function.

Personal analysis: What’s wrong with morality & what’s right with pragmatic rationalism

N&D point to a large body of research that shows when a political issue engages people's moral values, they are (i) less inclined to compromise and trust people they disagree with, and (ii) more inclined to accept extreme means to attain a moral end, i.e., moral political ends justify draconian means. Both of those attitudes are extremely dangerous for democracy, the rule of law and civil society. From what I can tell, moral concepts[1] are both flexible and essentially contested, making disagreements unresolvable without compromise. Social context changes moral beliefs. The rise of the president led to a major moral change among Evangelical Christians. Before Trump, they were more concerned with the morals and character of a president than any other group. After Trump, they were the least concerned group.

What I glean from N&D is that the rise of morality and the rise of attitude-constraining ideology are serious threats to democracy and civil society. The four core moral values that underpin pragmatic rationalism[2] were intended to counteract the anti-democratic nature all existing sets of moral and ideological beliefs. I posited pragmatic rationalism as anti-biasing and anti-ideology. I criticized political ideology too. Morals and political ideology tend to cause, among other unwanted things, reality-distorting bias and reduced willingness to compromise.

From what I can tell, the moral and political situation that N&D describe, and worry about as rising destructive democratic discourse, is exactly what pragmatic rationalism is an attempt to counteract. As evidence continues to flow in, pragmatic rationalism makes more and more sense.


Footnote:
1. N&D define values as the basis of morals in politics like this and the implication of the rise of ideology: “Political values may be structured by values, and these values exist within greater systems and form the underlying foundation for broader ideologies. Rokeach (1973) defined a value as ‘an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or a conversemode of conduct or end-state of existence.’ .... morality and moral conviction may be an outgrowth of individual value systems, with some of them forming along ideological lines. .... Recent research has demonstrated that attitude structure along ideological lines may be strengthening. .... Defined succinctly, a political ideology is a comprehensive political orientation that allows individuals to assess political phenomena by reference to assumptions about the proper role of government in society and the economy.”

2. The four core moral values are:
(i) fidelity to trying seeing fact and truth with less bias,
(ii) fidelity to applying less biased conscious reason to the facts and truths,
(iii) service to the public interest (defined as a transparent competition of ideas among competing interests) based on the facts, truths and reason, and
(iv) willingness to reasonably compromise according to political, economic and environmental circumstances point to.

Regarding Research on the Morality of Atheists

I do not myself believe that many people do things because they think they are the right thing to do . . . . I do not think that knowledge of what is morally right is motivational in any serious sense for anyone except a handful of saints. -- federal judge Richard Posner, referring to the power of social situations to compel behavior, moral or not, rational or not

Moral consequentialism (moral utilitarianism): morality is assessed by looking only at the consequences of an act or the state of the world that will result from what a person does; that absolutist attitude is persuasively criticized as not always the best way to do moral reasoning, but it is a reasonable way to include consideration of regarding moral dilemmas before arriving at a moral judgment

CONTEXT

An interesting research article, The amoral atheist? A cross-national examination of cultural, motivational, and cognitive antecedents of disbelief, and their implications for morality, examines the stereotype that atheists are untrustworthy and lack a moral compass. The paper looked at differences between believers and non-believers. The hypothesis was that social distrust of atheists was a major source of negative attitudes toward atheists and their perceived lack of morality. The research surveyed people in a religious country, the US, and a relatively non-believer country, Sweden. 

A 2019 survey generated data showing that 44% of Americans think that belief in God is necessary for morality. Many Americans believe that atheists are least in agreement with their vision of America compared to all other groups because they do not share their moral norms and values with 'normal' people. Some research has found that some atheists also believe that atheists are immoral, so there is solid evidence that this belief is common in most countries.

The results

The survey data indicated that compared to believers, disbelievers or atheists are less inclined to endorse moral values that serve group cohesion. By one hypothesis, those morals are socially binding moral foundations or values. Only minor differences were found in endorsement of other moral values referred to as individualizing moral foundations (care/harm and fairness/cheating morals) and epistemic rationality (something that some people do not believe is a moral value, but is the central moral value of pragmatic rationalism). The data also indicated that atheism correlated with cultural and demotivational antecedents (limited exposure to credibility-enhancing displays, low existential threat***) are associated with disbelief. Those moral beliefs correlated with weaker belief in binding moral foundations in both countries. The results also correlated disbelievers (vs. believers) with a more consequentialist source morality in both countries. Moral consequentialism was also correlated with analytic cognitive style, which is another hypothesized antecedent of disbelief.

*** Credibility enhancing displays (CREDS) were assessed by survey questions such as “Overall, to what extent did people in your community attend religious services or meetings?” (1 = to no extent at all, 7 = to an extreme extent). A low CREDS score is believed to constitute an antecedent or path to religious disbelief. Existential threat perceptions were assessed by questions such as “There are many dangerous people in our society who will attack someone out of pure meanness, for no reason at all”, and “Any day now, chaos and anarchy could erupt around us. All the signs are pointing to it” (1 = Completely disagree, 7 = Completely agree).

Commentary

As usual, the situation is complicated and data needs to be (i) considered with caution, and (ii) replicated to confirm and further explore the results. There multiple concepts discussed in this paper that I am not familiar with, e.g., measurement and interpretation of CREDS, antecedents to disbelief and analytic cognitive style. 

The authors speak of associations or correlations, not causal relationships. In addition, other research has shown that religiosity is positively related to some morally relevant behaviors, but unrelated or negatively related to others. Also, acting in a way that can be considered moral does not imply that the behavior was morally motivated. A behavior can arise from multiple motivations. For example, behavior is well-known to usually be variably, often strongly, influenced or even dominated by different social situations or contexts.

If the results hold up, they arguably point to a social and political weakness and strength in atheism and pragmatic rationalism. The weakness is the a mindset-ideology that is insufficient for good social cohesion and trust. The glue in the mindset-ideology may be too weak to sustain a liberal democracy, especially a racially diverse one. Although it's counterintuitive, that possible weakness suggests that atheism and pragmatic rationalism probably need to find some sort of spiritual component, e.g., Buddhism, that can afford some social glue. Atheists seem to be more like a herd of cats than any united kind of cohesive human group. If there are non-spiritual sources of pro-democracy social glue, they are not apparent to me. 

The strength is an analytic cognitive style that tends toward rationalism (epistemic rationality) as a moral value. Although I believe that mental trait is pro-democratic, anti-authoritarian, anti-corruption, anti-lies, etc., the paper points out that some people do not treat rationality as a moral value.**** The paper's authors comment that research on religious disbelief has also been linked to moralization of epistemic rationality. If that is true, both atheists and pragmatic rationalism may be fundamentally morally different from most significant political, religious and economic ideologies or moral frameworks that compete for influence, wealth and power today.

**** Humans did not evolve to be rational. We are intuitive, biased, social (~tribal) and arguably morally intolerant, unless one adopts tolerance as a moral value. According to psychologist Johnathan Haidt, we are designed by evolution to be “narrowly moralistic and intolerant.”[1] In other words, we evolved to be self-righteous little buggers.

Footnote:

1. The paper refers to morality in the context of Haidt's moral foundations theory. I do not know to what extent researchers have adopted this mental framework for morality research. Morality research is in its infancy. It is fraught with complexity, confounding factors, human biases, p-hacking, raging controversy and general messiness, including skepticism that morality research can ever rise to the level of a respectable scientific discipline. Despite the mess, morality research might reveal ways for humans to tame their innate tendencies to bigotry, hate and self-destructiveness enough that we avoid destroying civilization on a good day or maybe even avoid species self-annihilation on a bad day.

But isn't morality sometimes absent when spirituality is present?

Maybe morality is always necessary, unless it's bad morality

Why can't morality be a kind of spirituality?