Chapter Review: Plato, Aristotle and the Origins of Political Psychology

Plato

In his 2103 book, Political Psychology: Neuroscience, Genetics and Politics, political science professor George Marcus describes the origin of the Western intellectual framework that shapes and constrains how social sciences approach the science of politics. That framework both reveals and hides questions for research. For the most part, Marcus conveys a cautionary tale about the modern mindset and its conceptions of time, reason and emotion.

He is trying to teach self-awareness and some humility in the face of the subtle power of the modern intellectual framework. It is a lens or mindset that can distort reality and understanding. Nonetheless, we view politics through that modern Western lens even though it sometimes misleads us. The trick for the open-minded is to be self-aware and on guard. The following is based on chapter 3, A Short History of a Long Tradition.

The short history and its lessons were written for students of political psychology and related disciplines such as sociology. However, the core facts and ideas are helpful, maybe necessary, for people who want to be informed, rational citizens operating on the basis of objective evidence to the extent that influencer is available to the public. Even though social sciences knowledge and reality is constrained by empirical data and error-correction by peer-review, there is a powerful, subtle agenda that operates mostly unconsciously.

The Enlightenment Agenda: That modern agenda is grounded in the 17th and 18th century intellectual ferment in the Europe and the US. The ferment is called The Enlightenment and it constitutes a powerful social science agenda. Marcus points out that an agenda identifies ideas that are seen as important and what one would expect to find based on those ideas or assumptions. Regarding The Enlightenment, he comments: “Those ideas, and the agenda that they defined, have become so widely shared and so deeply embedded that they have become largely invisible with few to challenge its assumptions. And, as Plato argued, shared beliefs are not only likely to become invisible, when a rare iconoclast raises a challenge to accepted wisdoms, the response is hardly a welcome one.” Plato in his classic work, The Republic, in defense of philosopher kings and enlightened aristocrats as the best form of government, writes that the iconoclast will be killed. That is definitely not a welcome response.

Marcus points out that the human mind both hides and protects the unity we think we see. That Enlightenment unity gives the world coherence and meaning, even in situations where there is no rational basis for coherence. Regarding how the mind operates and self-deceives, Marcus comments: “As we shall see, Plato anticipated this research by more than two millennia. . . . . Rather, we all evince this same protective shield. The goal of the sections that follow is to make the invisible visible. This chapter is intended to ruffle some feathers: yours in particular.” One can only wonder what it is like to take professor Marcus’ political psychology class.

Also, one can only wonder how it was that Plato, by simple observation alone in his lifetime (c.428-347 B.C.), observed and correctly interpreted the fundamentally self-deceiving basis by which the mind operates when dealing with politics. That must have been some mind.

Aristotle

Two Western Conceptions of Time: Pre-Enlightenment & Enlightenment: Professor Marcus’ short history described two different Western conceptions of time. He argues that understanding the two different conceptions of time are necessary to understanding politics. Existing evidence shows that most people are inconsistent about which conception of time they apply in their thinking, and instead “most of us adhere haphazardly to one or the other as circumstances warrant.” The pre-Enlightenment mind conceived of time as operating in cycles. In that mindset, political regimes started, grew, matured and then lost vitality and withered. It was an endless cycle. The parallels to spring, summer, fall and winter are obvious. The modern or Enlightenment conception of time see it as a one-way arrow, always moving forward with increasing knowledge and social progress.

The philosopher Hannah Arendt is credited with pointing out that the distinction between the premodern and the modern conceptions of time constituted a radical mindset change. In the premodern mind, political regime change was seen as a ‘revolution’, which reflected the view of time as cyclical. Both mindsets have major implications for how the world is perceived and understood. In the case of the premodern mindset: “We search for the recurring patterns that provide us with confidence that our past foretells our future.” In other words, the cycle of time defines our fate. In turn, that leads many people to a belief that it is best not to go against our fate or destiny because that can lead to disaster. At this point, Marcus argues: “Time as cyclical, especially when married to the idea of fate and destiny, is inherently conservative, protective of the established social order, established political authority, and dominant traditions.” That thought leads to this important point:

“In addition, with time as cyclical, the debate between advocates of democracy, such as Aristotle, and those who advocated aristocratic rule, such as Plato, is stable. Nothing new will alter that debate as human nature is fixed and our natures either suit us for democracy, as some have it, or for aristocracy as others have it.”

Marcus then points out that with the premodern view of time as cyclic, the role of political psychology is limited because what government and politics can do, at most, is ease the passage of time for people. Trying to challenge the limits that cyclical time imposes is pointless folly. From that point of view, an important political psychology goal would be to develop knowledge of what leads to virtue and what leads to corruption. Obviously, that is an important goal for adherents of the modern linear, or probably any other, view of time. At least, that is how it appears to this observer.

By contrast with the premodern continual vision of self-renewing cycles of time, the modern or Enlightenment thinkers “reconceived time as an engine that, as a train on tracks, drives along a line from past to future. Time as progress replaced time as cyclical repetition. . . . . The modern conception of time understands time as a linear progression from an older and archaic way of life to a new, younger, and more progressive way of life.” Here, life is seen to progress from early, immature stages of political belief and behavior to later, more refined stages. The later stages are better able to adapt to changing forces such as social, economic and environmental changes.

For example, Karl Marx saw politics as an inevitable progression of class conflict from feudalism to mercantilism to capitalism, to socialism and finally to communism. In a way, time is seen as an arrow. For Marx, the engine of progress is class struggle. For Immanuel Kant, the engine is war. For Alexis de Tocqueville, based on his direct observations of, and thinking about, the new US democracy in 1831 and thereafter, the engine of progress is democracy: “Hence, democracy becomes the institutional regime most likely to accelerate progress because a democratic regime enables more people to engage in private and public deliberation on the means by which their sundry preferences can be justified and realized.”

Pre-Modern vs Modern Visions of the Role of Emotion and Reason: Disagreements on the nature and political importance of emotion and reason date at least back to Plato and Aristotle. Plato’s view led him to the conclusion that the masses are too influenced by emotion and thus enlightened and trained aristocrats and/or an enlightened philosopher king constituted the best form of government. Plato argued that knowledge alone should be the basis for governance, and as mentioned above, people will kill in defense of the false beliefs, myths and illusions that most people live by. He saw that as placing beliefs over truth: “Plato argued that to give the public a role in public affairs would introduce assertive opinion, what today political psychologists would call ‘motivated reasoning’. Hence, it is no surprise that Plato predicted that when truth confronts belief, the result would be the killing of truth-sayers.”

By contrast, Aristotle advocated for democracy based on the collective wisdom of the crowd as a source of intellectual and situational diversity. Aristotle believed rule by many was a better basis for governance than intellectual and situational diversity of one or a few rulers. In his view, collective public wisdom was superior to the wisdom of the one or the few. He saw governance as best based on a combination of objective knowledge and subjective goals of the people. Aristotle correctly understood that emotions and passions cannot be ignored in political thinking.

Marcus points out that Plato’s teacher, Socrates, was put to death by a democratically elected Athenian jury precisely for the crime of challenging sacred Athenian beliefs. Could that have influenced Plato to some extent? It is also interesting to note that Aristotle was an Athenian where political leaders were elected. Plato was citizen of Sparta, which was governed by kings.

Marcus commented on reason and emotion: “The interest in reason and emotion arose because it addressed the foremost question that has long engaged us: Where can we find the knowledge so that whichever regime we adopt it will be virtuous?” That arguably is the central question of our time. For example, why is the obvious corruption of President Trump seemingly acceptable to so many of his supporters and populists in general?

Emotion was generally viewed by all observers as an impediment to rational, good government and thus something that people should and can set aside. Modern cognitive science and neuroscience has shown it is impossible to separate emotion from politics. Emotion is biologically unavoidable. And, it can be very helpful. What needs to be kept in mind is that emotion can mislead and sow deep civil divisions, misery and war. When that happens, self-awareness is necessary for conscious reason to temper irrational, destructive emotions. Marcus argued that emotions are not rational.

The Three Key Influencers: Reason, Emotion & Interest: In view of the possibility, if not inevitability, of emotion in politics, philosophers have long struggled with how to deal with that reality. Enlightenment thinkers came up with the concept of interest, meaning self-interest and the public interest, to account for differences between conscious reason and emotion, which exerts effects in mostly unconscious ways. Pre-Enlightenment thinking held that reason and emotion were the main influencers. Enlightenment thinking held that reason, emotion and interest were the driving influencers. Current research has shown that interest is a powerful unconscious influence on perceptions of political reality and thinking or reasoning about it.

Therein lies a major issue: “Because interests do not reside in the self-aware mental region, we may not know what our ‘interests’ are.” That can lead to false beliefs about what objectively a person’s or the public’s interests are. The power of interest arises from a combination of unconscious calculating emotion and conscious reason heavily influenced by the emotion. The evidence that interest exerts major influences on both perception and reason is solid and not debated among experts. Evidence that people are significantly unaware of their own and the public interests is strong, maybe close to the point of being settled science.

Conservatism vs Liberalism: Marcus points out that most social scientists self-identify as liberals. One study found more than 95% of social scientists are liberals.[1] Therein lies a problem for the social sciences. Shared liberal values become invisible. That can obscure the conservative point of view and its values. Marcus cautions: “Perhaps the answer is that in any given case, our species is better off for having both orientations distributed among us than having just one modal position.” He argues that there are potential dangers and rewards in taking either a liberal or a conservative path. He also criticizes the Enlightenment view that has unduly downplayed emotions, thereby skewing visions of reality. He sees progress as both an empirical tale and a moral story.

The Human Condition: Marcus gives a sobering assessment. Progress has not been a straight line. Politics has not gone according to the Enlightenment plan. Accumulating evidence continues to show that reason and rationality is not displacing the role of emotion. Interest helps explain some aspects, but emotion continues to be a powerful influencer. The issue is coming to terms with what it is to be human. In reference to economics, sociology and social psychology there is an ongoing problem: “Blindness to the constraints induced by progressive convictions is not limited to political psychology. . . . . The problem of explanation without a clear recognition and understanding of the normative foundations of political psychology [] will limit the value of our research to show us what is and what is not plausible, let alone possible.”

Clearly, the evidence-based anti-bias ideology advocated here at B&B crashes directly into this concern about the nature and limits of the human mind acting alone and in groups, tribes and societies. How much more and what more, if anything, are possible in terms of evidence- and reason-based politics? The answers are unknowable. So far, no major ideology and social institution predicated on elevating the role reason to some non-trivial extent has had a fair test on a large, nation-size scale. Given that, the immense power of social institutions as sociologist Peter Berger described in his 1963 book, Invitation to Sociology, has never been tested in human history.

The situation is not all bleak. Marcus point out that neuroscience is rapidly changing our view of time, reason, emotion and knowledge, all of which can point to new possibilities. Therein lies the best hope for new understandings in how to try to deal with the problems that political psychology has been struggling with at least since Plato and Aristotle engaged in their sparring match over two thousand years ago.

Footnote:
1. One observer pointed out that maybe conservatives avoid the social sciences because much of what has been found contradicts conservatism to some extent. Some research suggests that conservatives are generally more uncomfortable with cognitive dissonance associated with ambiguity and contradictions than most liberals tend to be. In other words, social science just might be too psychologically uncomfortable for most conservative minds to find much appeal in that branch of the sciences.

B&B orig: 11/22/18

Chapter Review: Time, Memory & Unconsciousness

CONTEXT: A defensible belief holds that existing political ideologies are more bad than good for various reasons related to cognitive biology and social behavior and influences. That is what B&B argues. Ideologies tend to foster in-group thinking and behaviors and that tends to make it easy to distort reality, facts, truths and thinking into beliefs that are unreasonably detached from reality, facts and truths. It makes politics more irrational than it has to be. One idea would propose that people simply adopt a science mindset that looks to impose more rationality into politics.

In his blog post at Neurologica entitled, Against Ideology, skeptic Steven Novella discusses some thinking about problems with existing political ideologies. Novella comments on problems with ideology and the exhilarating experience of walking away from one: “The skeptical movement has always struggled with some unavoidable ironies. We are like a group for people who don’t like to join groups. We actively tell our audience not to trust us (don’t trust any single source – verify with logic and evidence). Our belief is that you really should not have beliefs, only tentative conclusions. Essentially, our ideology is anti-ideology.

This approach is both empowering and freeing. One of the most common observations I hear from those who, after consuming skeptical media for a time, abandon some prior belief system or ideology, is that they feel as if a huge weight has been lifted from their shoulders. They feel free from the oppressive burden of having to support one side or ideology, even against evidence and reason. Now they are free to think whatever they want, whatever is supported by the evidence. They don’t have to carry water for their ‘team.’

At the same time, this is one of the greatest challenges for skeptical thinking, because it seems to run upstream against a strong current of human nature. We are tribal, we pick a side and defend it, especially if it gets wrapped up in our identity or world-view.”

That, in a nutshell, is one of the biggest problems with standard ideologies, all of which are fairly called ‘pro-bias’ ideologies. Existing ideologies are powerful motivators to distort reality, facts, truths, and reason whenever those any of those things contradict or undercut the chosen ideology. Distortion and ensuing irrationality is probably the norm, not the exception.

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The Anti-Bias Ideology: A Simplified Explanation: Some years ago, it made sense to reject ideology as a framework for doing and thinking about politics. The science mindset of pragmatic, evidence-driven trial, error and course corrections seemed to be the best approach. Then, after some years of looking into cognitive biology and social behavior, it seemed that one cannot eliminate emotion and morals from the process. That lead to a science- and morals-based 'anti-bias' political ideology that focuses on the the key sources of irrationality, incivility and failure. Four core moral principles seem to be the most anti-biasing. The morals are (i) fidelity to seeing less biased fact and truth, (ii) fidelity to applying less biased conscious reason, service to the public interest (defined as a transparent competition of ideas among competing interests) based on the facts and reason, and (iv) willingness to reasonably compromise according to political, economic and environmental circumstances point to.

After considering politics through human history, most or all bad leaders (tyrants, oligarchs, kleptocrats, etc.) seem to share the four key traits. They generally disregard, deny or hide facts and truths when it is politically convenient to do so, which is most of the time. Bad leaders also routinely apply biased (bogus) reasoning to facts, fake or not, typically to foment unwarranted emotional responses such as fear, anger, bigotry, racism and distrust-hate toward out-groups or ‘the enemy’. All of that irrationality is focused in service to a corrupt self-serving conception of the public interest, and it is reinforced by a corrupt, self-serving unwillingness to compromise.

If one accepts that those four bad traits of bad leaders are real and the norm, then arguably the four core moral values of a pragmatic, evidence-based anti-bias political ideology would seem to make sense if one wants to fight against the rise and ability of bad leaders to gain power and then do bad things to people and societies.

The question is, would this ‘anti-bias’ mindset or ideology work. Maybe. Maybe not. The experiment appears to not have been tried in modern times with modern means for mass communication of dark free speech (lies, deceit, unwarranted opacity, unwarranted emotional manipulation, mostly fomenting unwarranted fear, intolerance, anger, and hate, etc.). Testing an anti-bias ideology for success or failure is a multi-generational social engineering experiment. It would be great to see it tried. Even if it failed, the failure might shed enough light on the human condition and politics to reveal another more civilized, sustainable and efficient way to do politics.

Anti-bias is not just the scientific method applied to politics: The anti-bias ideology isn't just adoption of a scientific method mindset. It expressly includes moral values and treats them as such. In science, there tends to be less outright lying and grossly bogus reasoning. Those things tend to get called out and careers then tend to crash and burn if a course correction isn't made. In science, errors happen, but they are typically mistakes, not lies. Flawed reasoning in science tends to be honest support of a hypothesis, not sloppy thinking in defense of an indefensible ideological belief. In these regards, the anti-bias ideology directly accounts for human nature. Science tends to downplay that in a belief that fact and logic will quench errors to a reasonable extent. That may be generally true for science, but it is clearly not true for politics. Science and politics are simply not the same thing, at least not yet with existing pro-bias ideologies that dominate.

White-faced whistling ducks guarding the waterfall 

 B&B orig: 10/30/18

Chapter Review: A Classless Society

Hannah Arendt, 1906-1975

INTRODUCTION: In her 1951 book, The Origins of Totalitarianism, political theorist Hannah Arendt traces the historical origins of anti-Semitism, racism, imperialism and totalitarianism. Regarding Arendt, Wikipedia comments: “Arendt is widely considered one of the most important political philosophers of the twentieth century.” Arendt’s political ideology is hard to pin down, but maybe it can best be described as anti-totalitarian and pragmatic rationalist-realist. Her depiction of the human condition is cold, realist and disquieting.

Arendt, born in 1906, was an educated intellectual and a German Jew. She escaped Nazi Germany a few months before Europe closed its borders. She was thus personally familiar with the social moral hypocrisy and decay of European nations and the rising horrors the hypocrisy and decay engendered. Although anti-Semitism and racism predated the industrial revolution, Arendt argues it led to the modern foundations of anti-Semitism, racism as a political ideology, imperialism and totalitarianism.

This review was inspired by a search for where President Trump might fit among Western demagogues and tyrants from the point of view of someone who never knew Trump as a political leader. Trump was five years old when Arendt published her book. Regarding the book, Wikipedia comments: “The book is regularly listed as one of the best non-fiction books of the 20th century.”

Apparently, this reviewer's thought is not unique. Trump has inspired others to look to books on political theory for insight into whatever it is that Trump is. One reviewer wrote in 2017: “The book whose success is a surprise, however, is Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951). At 752 pages, Arendt’s magnum opus is not brief, and with its panoramic exploration of history, philosophy, politics and psychology, the book can exercise a reader’s mind. But recently it sold out on Amazon . . . . .”

The Origins of Totalitarianism is organized in three parts. Part one, Antisemitism chapters 1-4, Imperialism, chapters 5-9, and Totalitarianism, chapters 10-13. Given Arendt’s dense writing style and the length of the book, reviews of individual chapters are necessary to reasonably summarize the content and tenor of what Arendt is trying to convey. A review of the entire book seems inadequate, or at least beyond this reviewer’s capacity.

REVIEW: The Classless Society (chapter 10): Arendt opens chapter 10 with the observation that totalitarian regimes are transient. The conditions that lead to the possibility of a totalitarian regime are so unusual that only two existed in her time, Hitler’s Nazi Germany and Stalin’s Russia. Other contenders from the past might include Mussolini in Italy. Arendt does not put Mussolini in the totalitarian category, relegating him instead to the status of mere dictator. Totalitarians are different from dictators. Totalitarians seek global control and they ‘atomize’ their populations such that social classes, groups and even families are broken down. Atomized societies are classless societies.

Morality, truth and history are swept away as impediments to total control. Absolute, unquestioning loyalty to the leader is the only acceptable norm for the citizen. The propaganda and lies employed does not just play on “ignorance and stupidity”:

For the propaganda of totalitarian movements which precede and accompany totalitarian regimes is invariably frank as it is mendacious, and would-be totalitarian leaders usually start their careers by boasting of their past crimes and carefully outlining their future ones. The Nazis ‘were convinced that evil-doing in our time has a morbid force of attraction’. Bolshevik assurances inside and outside Russia that they do not recognize ordinary moral standards have become a mainstay of communist propaganda, and experience has proved time and again that the propaganda value of evil deeds and general contempt for moral standards is independent of mere self-interest, supposedly the most powerful psychological factor in politics. The attraction of evil and crime for the mob mentality is nothing new. . . . . .

Arendt elaborates on propaganda and the alliance between the mob and intellectual elites, who in their cynicism at the time were attracted to shiny and strange new things. In their cynicism, the elites were even willing to see the collapse of civilization “for the fun of seeing how those who had been unjustly excluded in the past forced their way into it.”

To this aversion of the intellectual elite for official historiography, to its conviction that history, which was a forgery anyway, might as well be the playground of crackpots, must be added the terrible, demoralizing fascination in the possibility that gigantic lies and monstrous falsehoods may cease to be objective and become a mere matter of power and cleverness, of pressure and infinite repetition. Not Stalin’s or Hitler’s skill in the art of lying but the fact that they were able to organize the masses into a collective unit to back up their lies with impressive magnificence, exerted the fascination.

That paints a bleak picture of significant portions of societies drowning in cynicism and willing to accept social collapse in exchange for something different, or at least entertaining. In that milieu, neither democracy nor the cold morality of a relentless quest for acquisition of greater wealth by the bourgeoisie seemed worth defending. Arendt argues that the morals, or lack thereof, of the capitalists had subverted democratic norms and put economic and property concerns before all other things. In essence, European nations had been conquered by a ruthless economic ideology and many people in society saw that, or at least felt the sting.

Arendt describes the sources of social cynicism and deep distrust she sees in the historical record.

An atmosphere in which all traditional values and propositions had evaporated (after the nineteenth century ideologies had refuted each other and exhausted their vital appeal) in a sense made it easier to accept patently absurd propositions than the old truths which had become pious banalities, precisely because nobody could be expected to take the absurdities seriously. . . . . In the growing prevalence of mob attitudes and convictions – which were actually the attitudes and convictions of the bourgeoisie cleansed of hypocrisy – those who traditionally hated the bourgeoisie and had voluntarily left respectable society saw only the lack of hypocrisy and respectability, not the content itself. Since the bourgeoisie claimed to be the guardians of Western traditions and confounded on all moral issues by parading publicly virtues which it only did not possess in private and business life, but held in contempt, it seemed revolutionary to admit cruelty, disregard of human values, and general amorality, because this at least destroyed the duplicity on which the existing society seemed to rest.

Thus, despite the bleak pictures of societies that Arendt describes, one can see in the reaction to a hypocritical and morally bankrupt bourgeoisie, many people were clearly repulsed by the corrupt sleaze at the top. That reaction is not one coming from pure apathy. That may have led to political apathy and grudging, silent tolerance of democratic governments. But at the least average people were looking for moral consistency, even if they could not see it was the morality of an insanely vicious and evil totalitarianism.

Arendt argues that totalitarians rise to power in two steps. First they rely on the mob for initial support, and then they harvest the masses and stay in power as long as the masses stay loyal to the leader. For Arendt, the mob is not the industrial working class or the people as a whole, but it is “the refuse of all classes . . . . . the riff-raff of bohemians, crackpots, gangsters and conspirators.” She asserts that although totalitarian leaders rise from the mob, the early supporters are cast aside or killed once the leader has power. What seems to attract the mob to totalitarians is their status as social castaways and the promise of social destruction with a new world order. The mob sees and rejects the deep hypocrisy of the dominant bourgeoisie morals and social norms that nation states of the time were built on. In a sense, the mob was the collateral damage of the industrial revolution, including its grotesque concentration of wealth at the very top.

Arendt’s vision of totalitarianism includes two other necessary components. One is a circumstance where the masses, normally apathetic, non-political citizens have “acquired the appetite for political organization.” This reflects a disaffected population that tolerates democratic government without enthusiasm. The totalitarian leader relies on charm, charisma and relentless propaganda to help create and shape the political appetite. These previously apathetic populations can be captured by totalitarian movements. The other component is a sufficient population of the masses. “Only where great masses are superfluous or can be spared without disastrous results of depopulation is totalitarian rule, as distinguished from a totalitarian movement, at all possible. . . . . they [German and Russian totalitarian movements] recruited their members from this mass of apparently indifferent people whom all other parties had given up as too apathetic or too stupid for their attention.” Arendt asserted that totalitarian movements in Eastern European countries all led to mere dictatorships because they did not have sufficient populations for the human slaughter necessary to atomize subject societies or nations. In all of this, Arendt casts the masses in a constantly negative light, e.g., inarticulate, apathetic or stupid.

With the necessary support of the masses, Arendt sees the end of two illusions that democratic governments deluded themselves with:

The first was that people in its majority had taken an active part in its government and that each individual was in sympathy with one’s own or somebody else’s party. On the contrary, the movements showed that the politically neutral and indifferent masses could easily be the majority in a democratically ruled country . . . . . The second illusion exploded by the totalitarian movements was that these politically indifferent masses did not matter . . . . . democratic government had rested as much on the silent approbation and tolerance of the indifferent and inarticulate sections of the people as on the articulate and visible institutions and organizations of the country.

Arendt makes many other important points. One is her assertion that, for the typical citizen, it does not make much difference what brand of totalitarianism one lives under. “Practically speaking, it will make little difference whether totalitarian movements adopt the pattern of Nazism or Bolshevism, organize the masses in the name of race or class, pretend to follow the laws of life and nature or of dialectics and economics.” In an atomized, classless society, the underlying ideology is as irrelevant as truth and reason.

Another assertion Arendt makes is that neither Nazism nor Bolshevism constituted a new form of government or that their political goals were ever attained, even after the movements attained power and control.

Their idea of domination was something that no state and no mere apparatus of violence can ever achieve, but only a movement that is constantly kept in motion; namely the permanent domination of each individual in each and every sphere of life. The seizure of power through means of violence is never an end in itself but only the means to an end, and the seizure of power in any given country is only a welcome transitory stage but never the end of the movement. . . . . a political goal that would constitute the end of the movement simply does not exist.

That seems to argue that totalitarianism, in view of its disregard for truth, morals, social class and most everything else, is simply an endless process of demanding and receiving loyalty and not much else. Whether one can count that as a form of government or an ideology seems to be open to debate.

Is Trump a would-be totalitarian, or just a would-be dictator?: Based on chapter 10, Trump does not look to be a true totalitarian. Not only are circumstances in America not ripe, with powerful institutions standing in his way, Trump himself is too shallow and self-centered to aspire to the kind of brutal rule that Hitler and Stalin conceived. Aspects of Trump fit the totalitarian mold, e.g., his constant mendacity, ability to play on people’s discontent, contempt for democratic institutions and a lack of any cognizable moral compass are all there. But Trump just does not have it in him to kill millions by playing on racism and/or class conflicts. That is the case even if the independent press and independent law enforcement and our independent judiciary were swept away, which is what Trump would very much like to see. Trump wants to be a dictator and he makes that very clear in his public statements. Nonetheless, he clearly falls short of the creatively vicious mind and the work ethic it would take. Trump likes looking at himself in the mirror far too much for that kind of a project to appeal.

That said, Trump’s authoritarian successor just might consider it. Conditions will be better. Trump has done much to plow and prepare the soil for a serious totalitarian to make a run at total power. Trump has weakened the press by fomenting baseless distrust and his party is now openly favoring single-party rule status and willing to break laws to get it. Trump and his party are packing federal courts with unqualified and/or extremist ideologues, which is an important step in destroying judicial independence. Trump’s view of the rule of law is also clear – he hates it. For Trump, the law only applies to enemies, not himself or friends.

The 2020 elections will be interesting, to say the least. Whether they turn out to be frightening is a key question.

B&B orig: 1/4/18

Chapter Review: The Political Emancipation of the Bourgeoisie

Expansion is everything. I would annex the planets if I could. – Cecil Rhodes (1853-1902), capitalist, founder of the African territory of Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe and Zambia), founder of the Rhodes scholarship, and founder of the De Beers diamond company and the De Beers global diamond monopoly, despairing of the obvious economic limits of conquering planet Earth

Antisemitism (not merely the hatred of Jews), imperialism (not merely conquest), totalitarianism (not merely dictatorship) – one after the other, one more brutally than the other, have demonstrated that human dignity needs a new guarantee which can be found only in a new political principle, in a new law on Earth, whose validity this time must comprehend the whole of humanity while its power must remain strictly limited, rooted in and controlled by newly defined territorial entities. – Hannah Arendt, Summer 1950, Preface to the first edition of the Origins of Totalitarianism

This review is of chapter 5 of Hannah Arendt’s book, Origins of Totalitarianism, which is considered by some to be one of the most influential books of the 20th century. The Origins of Totalitarianism is organized in three parts. Part one, Antisemitism chapters 1-4, Imperialism, chapters 5-9, and Totalitarianism, chapters 10-13. Public interest in this book increased sharply after the election of Donald Trump in 2016.

REVIEW: The Political Emancipation of the Bourgeoisie (chapter 5): Chapter 5 opens with the observation that the 30-year span from 1884 to 1914 marked the height of Western imperialism. The imperialist period had characteristics of the rise of totalitarianism. Arendt observed that it “may be justifiable to consider the whole period a preparatory stage for coming catastrophes” in the form of the coming totalitarianisms under Hitler and Stalin. She argues that imperialism’s central event was the political emancipation of the bourgeoisie, “which up to then had been the first class in history to achieve economic pre-eminence without aspiring to political rule.” Emancipation was necessitated once it became apparent that “the nation-state proved to be unfit to be the framework for further growth of capitalist economy.” Once that realization dawned on the bourgeoisie, the “latent fight between state and society” became an open power struggle. During this 30-year period, neither the bourgeoisie nor the state decisively won. The decisive bourgeoisie win came later:

National institutions resisted throughout the brutality and megalomania of imperialist aspirations, and bourgeois attempts to use the state and its instruments of violence for its own economic purposes were always only half successful. This changed when the German bourgeoisie staked everything on the Hitler movement and aspired to rule with the help of the mob, but then it turned out to be too late. The bourgeoisie succeeded in destroying the nation-state but won a Pyrrhic victory; the mob proved quite capable of taking care of politics itself and liquidated the bourgeoisie along with all other classes and institutions.

In the struggle between traditional politicians and the capitalists who wanted state power behind their ambitions to conquer the world, and if they could the planets, the politicians were largely blindsided by what capitalism and the industrial revolution could do. Arendt describes European statesmen as having lost touch with the reality that trade and economic concerns had already entangled every nation in world politics. “The national principle was leading to provincial ignorance and the battle fought by sanity was lost.” The insanity Arendt refers to is the clash between civil society and the insanity of brutal subjugation of colonized populations in the name of wealth accumulation. The imperialist conquest of foreign lands ignites in the subjugated populations national aspirations that were not there to begin with and therein lies the beginning of the end for imperialist conquests. The existing generation of European politicians thought in terms of existing nations and opposed the idea of imperialist expansion. They misunderstood the raw power that the drive for unlimited wealth can exert.

Arendt asserts that “expansion as a permanent and supreme aim of politics is the central political idea of imperialism.” As a political thought, this was new in human history, which is a very rare event. However, she argues this idea is not a matter of politics. Instead, the imperialist ideal is a matter of business, where business expansion backed by state power is nothing more than an attempt to build a permanent broadening of means of production and markets.

How a competition between fully armed business concerns – empires – could end in anything but victory for one and death for the others is difficult to understand. In other words, competition is no more a principle of politics than expansion, and needs political power just as badly for control and restraint.

Of the European powers, only France tried to build an Empire roughly modeled on the ancient Roman Empire. The failure of Napoleon to unite European nations under the French flag was evidence that conquered lands would develop a national consciousness and rebelliousness, leading to successful rebellion or tyranny by the conquering nation. France tried this out of fear of its powerful neighbors, especially Germany. People living in areas such as Algeria that France conquered were envisioned as French citizens who would come to the mother country’s aid in time of need. She saw conquered people as inexpensive cannon fodder for the next war. Arendt took a dim view of how that played out: “The result of this daring enterprise was a particularly brutal exploitation of overseas possessions for the sake of the nation.”

The British attempt to build a commonwealth did not fare much better. Ireland never accepted the idea. “The Irish example proves how ill fitted the United Kingdom was to build an imperial structure in which many different people could live contentedly together.” Perhaps we see echoes of this today in modern Scotland where a local temptation to stay with the European Union is being toyed with as the UK nears Brexit. The imperialists were basically ruthless, immoral businessmen, not statesmen. In this maybe one can see why the bourgeoisie was not much interested in politics until national resources and populations were beginning to limit the growth of profits and there were no good investment opportunities left in the mother land. Expansion by conquest backed by national power was the only option that might render their massive wealth something more than almost useless.

Hobbes and the rise of private interest: Despite her assertion that imperialism is not politics, but is business, Arendt states that political philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) in his book Leviathan anticipated the rise of government based on personal interest instead of national interest.

Hobbes’s Leviathan exposed the only political theory according to which the state is based not on some kind of constituting law – whether divine law, the law of nature, or the law of social contract – which determines the rights and wrongs of the individual’s interest with respect to public affairs, but on the individual interests themselves, so that ‘the private interest is the same with the publique’. There is hardly a single bourgeois moral standard that has not been anticipated by the unequaled magnificence of Hobbes’s logic. He gives an almost complete picture, not of Man, but of the bourgeois man, an analysis which in three hundred years has neither been outdated nor excelled. ‘Reason . . . . is nothing but Reckoning; ‘a free Subject, a free Will [are] . . . . words without meaning; that is to say, Absurd.’. . . . if man is actually driven by nothing more than his individual interests, desire for power must be the fundamental passion for man. . . . . Thus membership in any form of community is for Hobbes a temporary and limited affair which essentially does not change the solitary and private character of the individual . . . . or create permanent bonds between him and his fellow men.

Arendt asserts that Hobbes had anticipated by over 300 years the 20th century rise of an anti-traditional bourgeoisie and its self-centered value of endless wealth accumulation as a new political class. Apparently, Hobbes was one of those uncommonly astute observers of human nature who also had a knack for relentlessly applying cold logic to what he saw. Despite Hobbes, Arendt again argues that this is not a matter of politics, but human nature. In her view, the inevitable death of the individual is a central consideration: “Death is the real reason why property and acquisition can never become a true political principle.” At most, all the capitalist could do to fully secure his wealth is destroy it before he dies.

In Hobbes view, nations are tribes always against one another. There is a perpetual war of all against all, because that is the ‘state of nature’ for man. Arendt sees an inevitable end of the quest for expansion: “If the last victorious Commonwealth cannot proceed to ‘annex the planets’, it can only proceed to destroy itself in order to begin anew the never-ending process of power generation.”

Racism: Despite the insight that Arendt sees in Hobbes’ work, she asserts that he missed one factor, namely, modern racism as a rhetorical tool to stir the passions of the mob. Despite the omission, she argues that Hobbes laid the political groundwork for later racism.

The philosophy of Hobbes, it is true, contains nothing of modern race doctrines, which not only stir up the mob, but in their totalitarian form outline very clearly the forms of organization through which humanity could carry the endless process of capital and power accumulation through to its logical end in self-destruction. But Hobbes at least provided political thought with the prerequisite for all race doctrines, that is, the exclusion in principle of the idea of humanity which constitutes the sole regulating idea of international law. . . . . If it should be proved to be true that we are imprisoned in Hobbes’s endless process of power accumulation then the organization of the mob will inevitably take the form of transformation of nations into races, for there is, . . . . no other unifying bond available between individuals who in the very process of power accumulation and expansion are losing all natural connections with their fellow men. Racism may indeed carry out the doom of the Western world, and for that matter, the whole of human civilization. . . . . For no matter what learned scientists may say, politically speaking, not the beginning of humanity but its end, not the origins of people but their decay, not the natural birth of man but his unnatural death.

Arendt describes the mob as composed of the “refuse” of all classes and not the people as a whole. This class was the by-product of bourgeois society and thus not completely separable from it. She describes the mob as “the riff-raff of bohemians, crackpots, gangsters and conspirators.” Later in her book, she asserts that the mob is where totalitarians first find support as they make their run for power and control.

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Cognitive science, social science and the anti-bias ideology: Arendt argues in chapter 6 that in human history, only two political ideologies stood the test of time and persuasive attack. The first ideology interprets history as a struggle of economic classes. The second interprets history as a “natural fight of races.” She argues that these two ideas are deeply embedded in modern thinking and perceptions of reality: “The appeal of both to large masses was so strong that they were able to enlist state support and establish themselves as official national doctrines. . . . . . free public opinion has adopted them [class thinking and race thinking] to such an extent that not only intellectuals but great masses of people will no longer accept a presentation of past or present facts that is not in agreement with either of these views.”

From a sociological point of view, Arendt’s description of class and race thinking describes modern social institutions. In his book, Invitation to Sociology, sociologist Peter Berger makes it clear that, for people who inhabit the institution, social institutions shape both perceptions of reality and the thinking people apply to what they think they see.[1] Berger describes the racism institution of the American South as utterly mesmerizing for its adherents. In this regard, Arendt was correct to believe that race thinking constitutes a subtle but powerful mental trap that makes alternative views simply incoherent at best and a pack of lies at worst.

There is no obvious reason to believe that class thinking is any less subtle or powerful. In this reviewer’s experience, Arendt goes a long way to explain both the harsh anti-capitalist mindset of class thinkers, and the basis for fear and social unease among populist movements that are ongoing now in Europe, America, Brazil and elsewhere. Those populist movements are significantly, probably mostly, driven by race thinking. At least, that is what it looks like to this observer, and there is some empirical evidence to support that belief.[2]

Although Arendt could not have access to the mass of knowledge that cognitive and social sciences generated in the decades after she wrote The Origins of Totalitarianism, what she is describing is largely in accord with current scientific knowledge. Her assertion that people usually do not believe facts that contradict world views is spot on. The evidence on that point is not in dispute among experts. Also not disputed is the power of society and social institutions to trap and narrow what minds see and how they think. Some of Arendt’s facts or arguments may now be open to reinterpretation in light of later scholarship, but she nonetheless did see through her experiences to construct a plausible, probably mostly correct assessment of why and how 20th century imperialism developed.

In terms of political ideology, Arendt makes no proposals in chapter 5. The anti-bias ideology with its four highest moral values advocated here does not seem to fit with either class thinking or race thinking. The ideology is silent on class and race and instead looks to politics where interests compete on the more or less objective merits. Class thinkers, mainly socialists and communists, have criticized the anti-bias ideology because of its lack of explicit consideration for class.

All of this raises a question about whether it is possible for a ‘non-biological’ or race-neutral, and class-neutral political ideology can ever gain much, or any, significant level of public acceptance. It is likely impossible unless a social institution can be built around the concept. Human biology and social thinking and behavior cannot be ignored, nor will they change or go away any time soon. Politics as usual, with all of its lies, deceit and unwarranted emotional manipulation, including irrational appeal to racism, also is not going to go away either. Short of overt violence, all of the dark arts that politicians, partisans, billionaires and blowhards can bring to bear are legal and constitutionally protected. From a cognitive and social science point of view, those dark arts arguably have built social institutions, or something close to it, e.g., the current American vision of conservatism, liberalism, capitalism, socialism and so on.

One last thought. Is the anti-bias ideology a new thought in politics? Arendt correctly points out that there is not much left that is new. What is new is the mass of science knowledge that can be brought to bear. But that begs the question of whether people even want to be at least somewhat less biased and more rational about politics. Politics as it is now is easy and enjoyable because it is usually quite self-affirming. Facing unvarnished reality and applying cold logic can lead to unpleasant, self-denigrating or confusing conclusions. That seems to argue for a need to build a social institution if anti-bias is to ever have any chance of exerting political and social influence.

Footnote:
1. “Society not only controls our movements, but shapes our identity, our thought, and our emotions.” Social institutions are therefore, to a significant extent, “structures of our own consciousness. Sociologists speak of ‘ideology’ in discussing views that serve to rationalize the vested interests of some group. Very frequently, such views systematically distort social reality in much the same way that an individual may neurotically deny, deform or reinterpret aspects of his life that are inconvenient to him. . . . . the ideas by which men explain their actions are unmasked as self-deception, sales talk, the kind of ‘sincerity’ that David Riesman has aptly described as the state of mind of a man who habitually believes his own propaganda.”

2. “Support for Donald J. Trump in the 2016 election was widely attributed to citizens who were “left behind” economically. These claims were based on the strong cross-sectional relationship between Trump support and lacking a college education. Using a representative panel from 2012 to 2016, I find that change in financial wellbeing had little impact on candidate preference. Instead, changing preferences were related to changes in the party’s positions on issues related to American global dominance and the rise of a majority–minority America: issues that threaten white Americans’ sense of dominant group status.”

This reviewer interprets concern over “American global dominance” as possibly including a racial component. The rise of China as a challenger to American dominance arguably includes a perceived Chinese race for at least some race-thinking Americans is a plausible source of unease, conscious or not.

Whether we like it or not, or deny it or not, humans are human. We cannot escape our biological and social heritage.

B&B orig: 1/6/19

Chapter Review: The Rise of Race Thinking, Racism and the Imperialist Bureaucracy

Racism: prejudice, discrimination, or antagonism directed against someone of a different race based on the belief that one's own race is superior; the belief that all members of each race possess characteristics or abilities specific to that race, especially so as to distinguish it as inferior or superior to another race or races

Race thinking: being short of overt racism, it is a mode of thinking or mindset, conscious or not, where race is a factor or category in perceiving people, which tends to create a moral distance between races, thereby making stereotyping and inevitable associations of superiority vs inferiority more easily seen as plausible and likely valid; the stereotyping mindset tends to lock perceptions of individuals in different races into something that is unchangeable due to circumstances of one’s birth; it arises not from accepting that race differences exist, which is harmless, but from thinking about people in terms of race as such

This is a review of chapters 6 and 7 of Hannah Arendt’s influential 1951 book, The Origins of Totalitarianism. These chapters are from Imperialism, which are in part two of her three-part book. Part one is Antisemitism, and part three is Totalitarianism. Chapter six is entitled Race Thinking Before Racism, and chapter seven is Race and Bureaucracy. These two chapters describe Arendt’s unique interpretation of the key historical precedents that formed global imperialism from 1887 to 1917 and later political events in Europe that led to the indescribably brutal and dehumanizing totalitarianism that Hitler and Stalin perfected a few decades later.

Chapter Six: Race-Thinking Before Racism: The period of imperialism with its central moral value of endless expansion and accumulation of wealth ran from 1884 until 1914 and the beginning of WWI. Chapter 6 chronicles the rise of race thinking that preceded this period and led to the true racism that was one of the necessary ingredients of imperialism. Race-thinking emerged in the 1700s and developed in the 1800s. It opened the door to romanticized perceptions of non-white races and their cultures. At the time, there was a widespread belief in Europe that all people were equal and that moral value stood in the way of the development of both imperialism and totalitarianism.

Arendt describes race-thinking in France, England, Germany and Prussia as arising for different reasons in response to differing political, geographic and economic conditions. In England, race-thinking developed to help maintain foreign possessions by fostering “unity among people who lived in far-flung colonies beyond seas, separated from the mother country by thousands of miles.” Specifically, the English relied on race-thinking to discourage intermarriage to protect the English lineage. Darwin’s 1859 Origins of the Species bolstered the English vision by including a scientific basis for the competition of the fittest, with the fittest being racially pure English. “Darwinism met with such overwhelming success because it provided, on the basis of inheritance, the ideological weapons for race as well as class rule and could be used for, as well as against, race discrimination. Politically speaking, Darwinism as such was neutral”, but it was used nonetheless to justify all manner of beliefs, including pacifism, cosmopolitanism and imperialism.

In France, the nobility was drawn to the idea that the French aristocracy was of Germanic descent and that theory was used as an instrument to foment internal political discord. The nobility was fighting to maintain power in the face of political change. French race-thinking was influenced by a work of overt racism by the aristocrat Joseph Arthur, Comte de Gobineau in his 1853 work, Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races. Gobineau, whose work became prominent later in the 1800s, wrote that “the fall of civilizations is due to a degeneration of race and that the decay of race is due to the mixture of blood.” Arendt paints a curious picture of Gobineau: “Nobody before Gobineau thought of finding one single reason, one single force according to which civilization always and everywhere rises and falls. . . . He was only a curious mixture of frustrated nobleman and modern intellectual who almost by accident invented racism.” But in France, Gobineau’s idea had to compete with the contradictory French ideal of equality of all.

By contrast, race-thinking in Prussia developed not by the aristocracy for self-defense, but “as a weapon of certain nationalists who wanted the union of all German-speaking peoples and therefore insisted on a common origin.” Similarly, race-thinking in Germany arose and was employed to foster nationalist thinking and national emancipation “in an effort to unite the people against foreign domination.” The foreign domination that stimulated that idea was Napoleon’s defeat of the Prussian army.

Thus, race-thinking in France was a weapon to foster civil war, in England a tool for colonial rule, while in Prussia and Germany, it was a tool to build nationalist sentiment, but ultimately it turned out to be a weapon to foment war among nations. Clearly, the origins of race-thinking reflected the circumstances and progression in thinking of the times and it led to varying outcomes in the 20th century.

The Surviving Ideologies: Before “the fateful days of the ‘scramble for Africa,’” Arendt describes race-thinking as part of liberalism, and just one of many ideas competing for public acceptance. Regarding ideology, Arendt asserts that “an ideology differs from a simple opinion in that it claims to possess either the key to history, or the solution to ‘all the riddles of the universe’, or to the intimate knowledge of the hidden universal laws which are supposed to rule nature and man.” She goes on:

Few ideologies have won enough prominence to survive the hard competitive struggle of persuasion, and only two have come out on top and essentially defeated all others: the ideology that interprets history as an economic struggle of classes, and the other that interprets history as a natural fight of races. . . . . free public opinion has adopted them to such an extent that not only intellectuals but great masses of people will no longer accept a presentation of past or present facts that is not in agreement with either of these views. . . . . Every full-fledged ideology has been created and continued and improved as a political weapon and not as a theoretical doctrine.

Arendt appears to take a rather dim view of political ideologies in general. That raises the question of what ideology, if any, hers might have been. Nothing in this chapter or the next gives any clear indication.
Chapter six concludes with this: “Imperialism would have necessitated the invention of racism as the only possible ‘explanation’ and excuse for its deeds, even if no race-thinking ever has existed in the civilized world. Since, however, race-thinking did exist, it proved to be a powerful help to racism.” In sum, Arendt sees race-thinking as a doctrine with the appearance of national respectability and tradition that led to racism and “its utter incompatibility with all Western political and moral standards of the past, even before it was allowed to destroy the comity of European nations.”

Chapter seven, Race and Bureaucracy: This chapter focuses on the two key ingredients of colonial imperialism, full-blown racism and the development of a cold, aloof bureaucracy that operated, as much as possible, in strict secrecy with absolutely no governing law, treaty, control or moral constraint from the motherland or any other authority or source, e.g., the Bible. Colonial imperialism was, if nothing else, ruthless, cruel, uncaring and utterly focused on wealth accumulation and expansion. Deaths of millions along the way was mere collateral damage of no consequence whatever.

Two new devices for political organization and rule over foreign people were discovered during the first decades of imperialism. One was race as a principle of the body politic, and the other bureaucracy as a principle of foreign domination. Without race as a substitute for the nation, the scramble for Africa and the investment fever might well have remained the purposeless ‘dance of death and trade’ (Joseph Conrad) of all gold rushes. Without bureaucracy as a substitute for government, the British possession of India might well have been left to the recklessness of ‘the breakers of law in India’ (Burke) without changing the political climate of an entire era. Both discoveries were actually made on the Dark Continent.

Arendt assessed the European moral and political climate that lead to abandonment of traditional values:

In its [gold’s] uselessness in industrial production it bears an ironical resemblance to the superfluous money to the digging of gold and to the superfluous men who did the digging. To the imperialist’s pretense of having discovered a permanent savior for a decadent society and antiquated political organization, it added its own pretense of apparently eternal stability and independence of all functional determinants. It was significant that a society about to part with all traditional absolute values began to look for an absolute value in the world of economics where, indeed, such a thing does not and cannot exist, since everything is functional by definition.

Regarding the superfluous men who joined the imperialist colonial enterprise, ‘the Bohemians of the four continents’, they were “all game for anything from pitch and toss to willful murder”:

Thus, they brought with them, or they learned quickly, the code of manners which befitted the coming type of murderer to whom the only unforgiveable sin is to lose his temper. . . . . The world of native savages was a perfect place for men who had escaped the reality of civilization. . . . . They [native Africans] were, as it were, “natural” human beings who lacked the specifically human character, the specifically human reality, so that when European men massacred them they somehow were not aware that they had committed murder.

For South Africa, settlement by the Dutch Boers, was followed by a few Jewish international financiers who made early financing possible for European wealth. That was followed by development of full-fledged imperialism under Cecil Rhodes, whose first order of business was to displace the Jewish financiers and ultimately the Boers themselves. Social conditions were awful. The racist Boers, basing authority on their own foundational racial origin myth, enslaved natives and hated the Jewish financiers. The Boers reacted instinctively with virulent anti-Semitism. The Boers understood and hated the fact that Jews had a better claim to pre-ordained “chosenness” than themselves. Also, they sensed that Jewish financiers were the harbingers of something very bad for themselves, namely a possibility that the temporary imperialist gold and diamond rush would eventually morph into a “much broader and more permanent business,” which it did.

However, it was the imperialists, not the Jews who completely displaced the Boers. And, it was the Boers themselves who willingly walked away from their own stakes in the gold and diamond rush. In essence, the Boers had gone native and simply abandoned their stolen land and moved farther inland and upland as imperialist civilization, if one can call it that, began to encroach. The Boers remained anti-Semitic even after the imperialists displaced them and took for themselves the Boer share of the wealth.

In developing the imperialist character, racism was discovered and developed in South Africa, while ruthless bureaucracy was discovered and developed in Egypt, India and Algeria. Decades later, the African experience, especially the saga of the Boers, cured the Nazis “of the illusion that the historical process is necessarily ‘progressive’.” In essence, the Boers had completely walked away from European civilization and norms.

Arendt describes Rudyard Kipling as the author of the foundation legend for the British Empire. The myth was that being surrounded by the sea, superior navigation allowed water, wind and sun to be transformed and harnessed for the empire. Navigation made “the Englishman master of the world.” Kipling’s myth also presented “the British as the only politically mature people, caring for law and burdened with the welfare of the world, in the midst of barbarian tribes who neither care or know what keeps the world together.” Apparently, Kipling was unaware of the rest of Europe, at the very least. Or, he just ignored it. Kipling’s great myth help to draw some of the best and worst of English society into believing and participating in the great cause.

The fact that the “white man’s burden” is either hypocrisy or racism has not prevented a few of the best Englishmen from shouldering the burden in earnest and making themselves the tragic and quixotic fools of imperialism. . . . . Only those who had never been able to outgrow their boyhood ideals and therefore had enlisted in the colonial services were fit for the task. . . . . Strange and curious lands attracted the best of England’s youth since the end of the 19th century, deprived her society of the most honest and the most dangerous elements, and guaranteed, . . . . petrification of boyhood noblesse which preserved and infantilized Western moral standards.

The first imperialist administrator was Lord Cromer, who took the position of British Consul General in Egypt (1883-1907) and served, among other things, for the British race. Cromer was far sighted. He could have ruled India, or taken a high-level position in the British government, but instead he chose the then-obscure Egypt. He correctly foresaw that Egypt was a necessary means for the continued control of India, the crown jewel of the Empire. Cromer developed and perfected the imperialist bureaucracy. At the same time, Cecil Rhodes was developing and perfecting imperialist racism in South Africa. The two necessary ingredients of imperialism had their champions.

At first Cromer had qualms about imperialist ‘hybrid government’ based on (i) individual bureaucrats working in as much secrecy as possible and controlling governance with no controlling law or treaty, and (ii) racism. Cromer was correct to see the only way to fix the inherent instability of imperialism was to either conquer and occupy a land or to leave it entirely. Later, Cromer accepted and began to justify a form of government without any precedent or even a name. Cromer just referred to it as the “hybrid form of government.” Cromer came to conclude that talented bureaucrats with talented staff and working without law or constraints was what the times and circumstances called for. The bureaucrat’s greatest passion would be for secrecy. Secrecy had the effect of not arousing much in the way of national aspiration in the lands the bureaucrats governed.

In South Africa, Cecil Rhodes, despite his personal megalomania, came to the same conclusion as Cromer. Rhodes hated publicity and raged when his name popped up in public from time to time. Regarding secrecy, Arendt comments: “Every growth of democracy or even the simple functioning of existing institutions can only be a danger, for it is impossible for a people to govern a people – the people of India by the people of England.” The drive for secrecy was necessitated by the idea of expansion, which envisioned an endless process (ending in self-destruction and starting anew), not a process of conquering one country at a time.

Regarding the essentially unlimited power of the bureaucrat, Arendt writes:

Then, as Rhodes was insane enough to say, he could indeed “do nothing wrong, what he did became right. It was his duty to do what he wanted. He felt himself a God – nothing less.”

Cromer, was more circumspect on this point, but was essentially in accord with the egomaniac Rhodes in calling the bureaucrats “instruments of incomparable value in the execution of a policy called Imperialism.” In this world, success was evidence lawfulness, and failure was someone else’s fault: “They were monsters of conceit in their success and monsters of modesty in their failure.” In essence, law and human rights were simply incompatible with imperialism.

Arendt concludes chapter seven with these observations on the later, less brutal, British imperialism, which paved the way to the loss of empire:

The happy fact is that although British imperialist rule sank to some level of vulgarity, cruelty played a lesser role between the two World Wars than ever before and a minimum of human rights was always safeguarded. It is this moderation in the midst of plain insanity that paved the way for what Churchill has called “the liquidation of His Majesty’s Empire” and that eventually may turn out to mean the transformation of the English nation into a Commonwealth of English peoples.

Insistence on human rights was from the ‘English Departments’ in London that colonial bureaucrats hated: “The ‘prayer’ which Cromer addressed to Lord Salisbury during his administration of Egypt in 1896, ‘save me from the English Departments’, was repeated over and over again, until in the twenties of this century the nation and everything it stood for were openly blamed by the extreme imperialist party for the threatened loss of India.”

Apparently, British imperialists took their ideology very seriously.

B&B orig: 1/15/19

Chapter Review: Decline of the Nation State; End of the Rights of Man

Refugees entering Europe

Chapter nine of Hannah Arendt’s 1951 book, The Origins of Totalitarianism, is the last chapter in part two of the book, Imperialism. Here, Arendt describes the breakdown of the European Nation-State and the rise of the Nation in the period between the two World Wars. The Nation-State had been the guarantor of basic human rights for stateless people, refugees and small numbers of asylum seekers. After the demise of the Nation-State, only the right to asylum survived to some extent and even that was under attack by the Nation. Asylum was never established to protect large numbers of people. Masses of people who were being persecuted in their own countries and tried to flee to another country were simply designated as “stateless”. Stateless status left those people outside all legal structures that could serve to guarantee basic rights, including the right to be alive. No nation wanted stateless people, so unlike all prior history there was no place anywhere for masses of displaced people to go to resettle.

Later, the Nazis under Hitler used this situation to strip all citizenship status from hated populations such as German Jews, converting them into stateless people. Since such people had no human rights whatever, there was no law to prevent putting stateless people in interment camps and then murdering all of them. The breakdown of the Nation-State into the Nation helped pave the way for Hitler and the unspeakable savagery he unleashed.

Arendt writes:

Civil wars which ushered in and spread over the twenty years of uneasy peace were not only bloodier and more cruel than all their predecessors; they were followed by migrations of groups who, unlike their happier predecessors in the religious wars, were welcomed nowhere and could be assimilated nowhere. Once they had left their homeland they remained homeless, once they left their state they became stateless, the scum of the Earth. . . . . Every event had the finality of a last judgment, a judgment that was passed neither by God nor the devil, but looked rather like the expression of some irredeemably stupid fatality. . . . . Hatred, certainly not lacking in the pre-war world began to play a central role in public affairs everywhere . . . . . This atmosphere of disintegration, though characteristic of the whole of Europe between the two wars, was more visible in the defeated than the victorious countries, and it developed fully in the states newly established after the liquidation of the Dual Monarchy and the Czarist Empire. . . . . The very phrase “human rights” became for all concerned – victims, prosecutors, and onlookers alike – the evidence of hopeless idealism or fumbling feeble-minded hypocrisy.

The fall of the Nation-State: Arendt asserts that the Peace Treaties in the wake of WWI failed because the framers of the peace did not understand that conditions for the Nation-State, a homogenous population and firm rootedness to the soil. Those were the social conditions necessary for a Nation-State. One contemporary observer, Kurt Tramples, commented that it was preposterous to think that the Peace Treaties could lead to the rise of a Nation-State: “One glance at the demographic map of Europe should be sufficient to show that the nation-state principle cannot be introduced into Eastern Europe.” It was obvious even then that various ethnic groups would never see one another as equals and when lumped into a single state, they would work to undermine each other. The Treaties were nothing more than an idealistic illusion that arbitrarily “handed out rule to some and servitude to others.”

The political upshot was rather simple: In the transition from Nation-State to Nation, public and government sympathies moved from virtuous rule with equality of all people, including minorities, to protection of the nation, with its despotic and arbitrary form of governance. The new governments in Eastern Europe were opposed in principle by minorities comprising about 25-50% of their populations. On seeing this play out, defenders of the Treaties changed their rationale. Now, the Treaties “had been conceived merely as a painless and humane method of assimilation, an interpretation which naturally enraged the minorities.” Arendt argues this was cynical: “The representatives of the great nations knew only too well that minorities within nation-states must sooner or later be either assimilated or liquidated.” The problem was that assimilation was not effective and it was clear to everyone.

Consciously or not, the Peace Treaties made it plain that only nationals could be full-blown citizens with the full protection of legal institutions and the rule of law. Stripping minorities of their nationality status to render them stateless scum was a preferred tactic. Maybe today that would be called racial or ethnic cleansing. In the rise of stateless masses, Arendt saw that “the transformation of the state from an instrument of the law into an instrument of the nation had been completed; the nation had conquered the state, the national interest had priority over law long before Hitler could pronounce ‘right is what is good for the German people.’”

Fleeing to Slovenia

The fall of the Rights of Man: The Peace Treaties after WWI were argued to have been founded on the Rights of Man, which suffered from problems that no one knew how to define or how to defend whatever those rights are conceived to be. Arendt writes of the consequences:

The Rights of Man, supposedly inalienable, proved to be unenforceable . . . . The first loss which the rightless suffered was the loss of their homes, and this meant the loss of the entire social texture into which they were born . . . . . What is unprecedented is not the loss of a home but the impossibility of finding a new one. . . . . The second loss . . . . . was the loss of government protection, and this did not imply just the loss of legal status in their own, but in all countries. . . . . One of the surprising aspects of our experience with stateless people who benefit legally from committing a crime has been the fact that it seems to be easier to deprive a completely innocent person of legality than someone who has committed an offense.

In other words, a stateless person had more legal protection as a convicted criminal than as an innocent. For example, if an applicable law prohibited arbitrary beating of prisoners by the police or guards, that constituted more protection than what statelessness provided. Once a stateless person became a convicted criminal, they had their rights as a criminal. This helps put in context what statelessness actually meant for millions of people in this bizarre status of legal non-existence.

Arendt touches on attempts to define the Rights of Man. In America it boiled down to the rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, the meaning of which is still contested today and always will be. In France they were conceived to be equality before the law, liberty, protection of property, and national sovereignty. That is also ambiguous, or in the case of an absolute right to property, unworkable in modern civilization.

The Rights of Man was conceived as inalienable human rights flowing from natural law or nature and not from any God, government or tyrant. Some observers, e.g., Edmund Burke (1729-1797), saw danger in that conception of rights and man, and argued against it. Arendt writes:

. . . . stateless people could see without Burke’s arguments that the abstract nakedness of being nothing but human was their greatest danger. Because of it they were regarded as savages, and afraid they might end by being considered beasts, they insisted on their nationality as their only remaining and recognized tie with humanity. Their distrust of natural [Rights of Man], their preference for national, rights comes precisely from their realization that natural rights are granted even to savages. Burke had already feared that natural “inalienable” rights would confirm only the ‘right of the naked savage,’ and therefore reduce civilized nations to the status of savagery. . . . . It seems that a man who is nothing but a man has lost the very qualities which make it possible for other people to treat him as a fellow-man. This is one of the reasons why it is far more difficult to destroy the legal personality of a criminal . . . . . than of a man who has been disallowed all common human responsibilities.

The human condition: Arendt points to the ancient origins of this line of thinking and her conclusions as to its modern meaning:

Since the Greeks, we have known that highly political life breeds a deep-rooted suspicion of this private sphere, a deep resentment against the disturbing miracle contained in the fact that each of us is made as he is – single, unique, unchangeable. This whole sphere of the merely given, relegated to private life in civilized society, is a permanent threat to the public sphere, because the public sphere is consistently based on the law of equality as the private sphere is based on the law of universal difference and differentiation. . . . . We are not born equal; we become equal as members of a group on the strength of our decision to guarantee ourselves mutually equal rights. 
. . . . . The reason why highly developed communities, such as ancient city-states or modern nation-states, so often insist on ethnic homogeneity is that they hope to eliminate as far as possible those always present differences and differentiations which by themselves arouse dumb hatred, mistrust and discrimination because they indicate all too clearly those spheres where men cannot act and change at will, i.e., the limitations of human artifice. (emphasis added)

Arendt ends chapter nine with this warning:

Deadly danger to any civilization is no longer likely to come from without. Nature has been mastered and no barbarians threaten to destroy what they cannot understand, as the Mongolians threatened Europe for centuries. Even the emergence of totalitarian governments is a phenomenon from within, not outside our civilization. The danger is that a global interrelated civilization may produce barbarians from its own midst by forcing millions of people into conditions which, despite all appearances, are the conditions of savages.

Here, Arendt can be forgiven for ignoring asteroid collisions, supervolcano eruptions and the causes of mass extinctions as sources of a slide from civilization to savagery. A question Arendt raises asks if America today has a barbarian leader that arose from our own midst. One can plausibly argue that point. One can also look at nations like China, North Korea and Russia and ask if barbarians aren’t already in control there.

B&B orig: 1/21/19