I tried to set up a feed called Rational Politics, but I'm unsure about how it works, or even if it works. That will turn out to be a work in progress, assuming I can ever figure it out. My son had to come over to help me get set up just to find the button to write a post. He intuitively understood immediately how to navigate Bluesky. But to me social media is strange and counterintuitive.
Pragmatic politics focused on the public interest for those uncomfortable with America's two-party system and its way of doing politics. Considering the interface of politics with psychology, cognitive science, social behavior, morality and history.
Etiquette
Sunday, November 17, 2024
Update: The Bluesky experiment is underway
I tried to set up a feed called Rational Politics, but I'm unsure about how it works, or even if it works. That will turn out to be a work in progress, assuming I can ever figure it out. My son had to come over to help me get set up just to find the button to write a post. He intuitively understood immediately how to navigate Bluesky. But to me social media is strange and counterintuitive.
Well well, I ain't alone in the woods...........
I have said similar myself, but leave it to John Fetterman to say it better..............
Sen. John Fetterman says Democrats can't get 'freaked out' over every move Trump makes
WASHINGTON - Pennsylvania Democratic Sen. John Fetterman warned his fellow party members in an interview that they can’t get “freaked out” over every move that President-elect Donald Trump makes.
His remarks in the interview came after Trump tapped former Rep. Matt Gaetz, R-Fla., as attorney general, prompting backlash and skepticism from Democrats and some Republicans. Gaetz was under investigation by the House Ethics Committee for sexual misconduct. After his resignation from Congress earlier this week, Democrats and Republicans have sparred over whether the committee should release its report on him.
“If you’re already exhausted, freaking out, and it’s not even Thanksgiving, then you really ought to pace yourselves,” Fetterman told NBC News on Friday. “Because he hasn’t even been inaugurated yet.”
“So you really have to chill out, and you’re going to have to be more discerning or discriminate on what’s going to freak you out or what’s just trolling. Because it’s not the weather, it’s the climate now for the next four years,” he added.
Fetterman stands apart from many of his more progressive Democratic colleagues as a strong supporter of Israel and tougher border restrictions. He has clashed with progressive members including Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez.
In the interview, Fetterman said that Democrats scolding Republicans “louder” isn’t going to be a winning strategy under a Trump administration.
“It’s like he’s the guy with the laser pointer, and we’re going to be the cat chasing around here or there. ‘He did that. Can you believe (it)? I can’t believe he appointed so and so.’ And like, I’m not going to be that. I’m not that guy. I’m not that Democrat. Because we knew that’s what’s going to happen,” he said.
“And, like, Gaetz was the ultimate troll. That’s got to be candy for him to have and watch everybody get triggered. I’ve said this before, it’s like, clutch those pearls harder and scold louder, that’s not going to win. And that’s been demonstrated in this cycle,” he said.
It’s like he’s the guy with the laser pointer, and we’re going to be the cat chasing around here or there.
I get where Fetterman is coming from. Think the Dems might listen?
Saturday, November 16, 2024
Injustice: The future of American "justice"
Search All Pardons and Commutations
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Rational politics: A Mission Statement
Rational politics. There is a vision of democracy that is public interest-centered, honest, and reasonably transparent. That brand of politics can be less ideological and less dominated by special interests. It can be more rational, evidence-based, transparent and inclusive than what the two main parties and third parties offer. Public-interest-centered democracy can reasonably accommodate both the public interest and special interest needs by balancing conflicting goals. A search for reasonable compromise policies is possible and necessary. Public opinion has to have reasonable influence and power relative to America's current political situation. This vision of democracy has to stand in steadfast opposition to the opacity, special interest power, corruption, ideological fantasies and self-dealing that permeates the main parties. Special interests include the Democratic and Republican parties themselves.
Post election analyses: A second narrative about what just happened
“Thank you, my friends. Thank you. Thank you. We have lost. We have lost, and this is the last day of my political career, so I will say what must be said. We are standing at the edge of the abyss. Our political system, our society, our country itself are in greater danger than at any time in the last century and a half. The president-elect has made his intentions clear, and it would be immoral to pretend otherwise. We must band together right now to defend the laws, the institutions, and the ideals on which our country is based.”
That, or something like that, is what Hillary Clinton should have said on Wednesday [in her concession speech to Trump].
For those bewildered by why so many Americans apparently voted against the values of liberal democracy, Balint Magyar has a useful formulation. “Liberal democracy,” he says, “offers moral constraints without problem-solving” — a lot of rules, not a lot of change — while “populism offers problem-solving without moral constraints.” Magyar, a scholar of autocracy, isn’t interested in calling Donald Trump a fascist. He sees the president-elect’s appeal in terms of something more primal: “Trump promises that you don’t have to think about other people.”Around the world, populist autocrats have leveraged the thrilling power of that promise to transform their countries into vehicles for their own singular will. Vladimir Putin and Viktor Orban vowed to restore a simpler, more orderly past, in which men were men and in charge. What they delivered was permission to abandon societal inhibitions, to amplify the grievances of one’s own group and heap hate on assorted others, particularly on groups that cannot speak up for themselves. Magyar calls this “morally unconstrained collective egoism.”Trump’s first term, and his actions in the four years since, tracked the early record of Putin and Orban in important ways. Looking closely at their trajectories, through the lens of Magyar’s theories, gives a chillingly clear sense of where Trump’s second term may lead.
Magyar is Hungarian, and has extensively studied the autocracy of Orban. Like Trump, Orban had been cast out of office (in 2002, in a vote his supporters said had been fraudulent); he didn’t regain power until eight years later. In the interim, he consolidated his movement, positioning himself and his party as the only true representatives of the Hungarian people. It followed that the sitting government was illegitimate and that anyone who supported it was not part of the nation. When Orban was re-elected, he carried out what Magyar calls an “autocratic breakthrough,” changing laws and practices so that he could not be dislodged again. It helped that he had a supermajority in parliament. Trump, similarly, spent four years attacking the Biden administration, and the vote that brought it to the White House, as fraudulent, and positioning himself as the only true voice of the people. He is also returning with a power trifecta — the presidency and both houses of Congress. He too can quickly reshape American government in his image.Trump and his supporters have shown tremendous hostility to civic institutions — the judiciary, the media, universities, many nonprofits, some religious groups — that seek to define and enforce our obligations to one another. Autocrats such as Orban and Putin reject that deliberative process, claiming for themselves the exclusive right to define those obligations. If those two leaders, and Trump’s own first term, are any indication, he will likely begin by getting rid of experts, regulators and other civil servants he sees as superfluous, eliminating jobs that he thinks simply shouldn’t exist. Expect asylum officers to be high on that list.A major target outside of government will be universities. In Hungary, the Central European University, a pioneering research and educational institution (and Magyar’s academic home), was forced into exile. To understand what can happen to public universities in the United States, look at Florida, where the administration of Gov. Ron DeSantis has effectively turned the state university system into a highly policed arm of his government.Civil society groups — especially those that serve or advocate for immigrants, formerly incarcerated people, L.G.B.T.Q. people, women and vulnerable groups — will be attacked. Then they may come for the unions.
In an Opinion article in The Washington Post, the publisher of The Times, A.G. Sulzberger, laid out some probable scenarios for a Trump administration’s war on the media. I would add that, like Orban — and like the first Trump administration — this president will reward loyal media with privileged access and will attack critical media by targeting its owners’ other businesses. That is a particularly effective tactic, one that we may have seen at work even before Trump was re-elected, when the billionaire owners of The Los Angeles Times and The Washington Post decided to nix their publications’ presidential endorsements. (Explaining their decision, the owners cited reasons not related to deference to Trump.)
Friday, November 15, 2024
Post election analyses: One narrative about what just happened
[In 2019] I met with a [Hong Kong pro-democracy] government official preparing to resign and told him I was writing a book about the rise of authoritarian nationalism. “The nationalism in the U.S. and Europe is somewhat different,” he told me. “Yours started with the financial crisis in 2008. That’s when liberalism started to lose its appeal, when people saw this wasn’t working. The narrative of liberalism and democracy collapsed. This spilled over into China, too. This is when China started to think — should we really follow a Western model?” We were sitting in a hotel lounge, the invisible forces he described surrounding us: capitalism, but not democracy; cultural elites cloistered away from the working class. “The nationalist movements in East and West were both a response to the collapse of the Western model,” he added.
Everything I’d experienced told me he was right. Eight years serving in the Obama White House after the financial crisis felt like swimming upstream, against the currents of global politics. A radicalized Republican Party rejected liberal democracy at home, mirroring far-right leaders like Prime Minister Viktor Orban of Hungary who spoke about installing “illiberal democracy” (a polite term for “blood and soil” nationalism) across Europe. In Russia, Vladimir Putin set out to undermine — if not dismantle — the liberal order helmed by the United States. In China, Xi Jinping began to shift Beijing’s strategy from rising within that order to building a separate one, drained of democratic values.In the West, neoliberalism — that blend of free trade, deregulation and deference to financial markets — hollowed out communities while enriching a global oligarchy. Meanwhile, a homogenized and often crass popular culture eroded traditional national and religious identities. After 9/11, the war on terror was embraced by autocrats such as Mr. Putin, who used it as a frame to justify power grabs while forever wars fueled mass migration. The financial crisis came through like a hurricane, wrecking the lives of people already struggling to get by while the rich profited on the back end. Then social media’s explosion offered a vehicle to spread grievance and conspiracy theories, allowing populist leaders to radicalize their followers with the precision of an algorithm.
The playbook for transforming a democracy into a soft autocracy was clear: Win power with a populist message against elites. Redraw parliamentary districts. Change voting laws. Harass civil society. Pack courts with judges willing to support power grabs. Enrich cronies through corruption. Buy up newspapers and television stations and turn them into right-wing propaganda. Use social media to energize supporters. Wrap it up in an Us versus Them message: Us, the “real” Russians or Hungarians or Americans, against a rotating cast of Them: the migrants, the Muslims, the liberals, the gays, George Soros and on and on.
Yet now Mr. Trump has decisively won back the presidency. I would never claim to have all the answers about what went wrong, but I do worry that Democrats walked into the trap of defending the very institutions — the “establishment” — that most Americans distrust. As a party interested in competent technocracy, we lost touch with the anger people feel at government.
Yes, this is unfair: Republican policies from Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush did far more than Democrats to create this mess. But Mr. Trump’s crusade against the past elites of his own party — from the Bush family to Mitch McConnell — credentialed him with a public hungry for accountability, while the Harris campaign’s embrace of Dick Cheney conveyed the opposite message.
Donald Trump has won the presidency, but I don’t believe he will deliver on his promises. Like other self-interested autocrats, his remedies are designed to exploit problems instead of solving them, and he’s surrounded by oligarchs who want to loot the system instead of reforming it.
Out of the wreckage of this election, Democrats must reject the impulse to simply be a resistance that condemns whatever outrageous thing Mr. Trump says. While confronting Mr. Trump when we must, we must also focus on ourselves — what we stand for, and how we tell our story. That means acknowledging — as my Hong Kong interlocutor said — that “the narrative of liberalism and democracy collapsed.” Instead of defending a system that has been rejected, we need to articulate an alternative vision for what kind of democracy comes next.