The Pragmatic Rationalism Ideology: A 12-Point Explanation

The following is an explanation of and rationale for pragmatic rationalism in 12 points.

1. Empirical cognitive and social science data are clear that when dealing with politics, the human mind has a strong tendency to distort both reality (facts) that we perceive and how we think about the facts we think we see. This is a normal part of being human. Most of the distortion is unconscious and thus it’s something that’s hard to be self-aware about. Nonetheless, some people can and do reduce distortions in facts and reason by adopting a self-aware, open mind set that allows some reduction in the distortions.

2. In general, the main purposes of politics is to solve problems, build a peaceful civil society, foster social and technical progress and the rule of law, and conduct relations with foreign nations. The main product of politics is policy. Governments, with or without input from affected interests, typically formulate and implement policy according to controlling legal or governmental structures, e.g., the US Constitution for America.

3. In reality, political policies are based on perceptions of reality and facts and the reasoning we apply to what we think we see, all of which are invariably claimed to be used to guide and formulate policy that best serves the public interest (common good or general welfare). Therefore, those three things are three key raw materials that political policy is built on. Other factors may affect the final product, e.g., bribes to politicians, undue special interest influence or a politician’s self-interested or pandering vote, but those are optional ingredients.

4. There is no logical reason to believe that political policies based on perceptions of reality or facts and reasoning or thinking about perceived facts that are distorted to some degree by normal human cognitive processes would be more effective in serving the public interest than policies that are based on perceived facts and reasoning that is somewhat less distorted. The more a policy is shaped based on less biased reality and less biased reason, the higher the chance that the policy would work better than a policy based on more distorted reality and reason.

5. One powerful source of fact and reason distortion is personal belief in a political, economic, religious or philosophical ideology (or set of morals or principles). That constitutes a distorting lens that frames personal thinking about politics. Capitalism, socialism, liberalism, conservatism, libertarianism, anarchy, Christianity and fascism are examples of prevalent ideologies that can distort both facts and reason. For whatever reasons, most people need one or more ideological lenses through which they view matters related to politics.

6. Strong belief in an ideology often gives rise to conformation bias, or the more powerful fact and common reason, motivated reasoning. An example of motivated reasoning’s distortion power is described here.

7. If one accepts that it’s true that (1) existing political ideologies tend to unconsciously distort fact and reasoning for essentially all people, and (2) political policy that’s better grounded in less biased perceptions of fact and less biased reasoning would be generally better for serving the public interest, then it’s reasonable to think that existing ideologies will probably continue to have about the same negative effects on policy they now exert, e.g., ineffective and/or inefficient politics.

8. If one wants to improve politics by reducing ideologically-inspired policy drag, that raises the question of whether any ideology could possibly partially reduce fact and reason distortion in politics. Are humans doomed to work with the fact and reason distorting intellectual frameworks or ideologies that have always dominated politics?

9. At least in theory, the answer is no. Humans may not necessarily be constrained by as much irrationality as has been the case. One possible less reality and reason distorting alternative could be an anti-bias ideology based on what social and cognitive science now know about how the human mind and social influences work in politics. There is no legal, economic, or political authority or constraint that precludes viewing politics through an ideology that is intended to be a less biasing lens. Having such a viewpoint is legal and rational.

10. One possible anti-biasing ideology could be based on the three core morals or ideological principles that are aimed directly at the three core, necessary ingredients described in point 3 above. Those three ingredients are present in essentially all political policies. Therefore, a pragmatic, problem-solving focused political 3-morals ideology could be one that is (i) dedicated to fidelity to finding less biased facts, (ii) dedicated to allowing less bias in the reason that’s applied to the perceived facts, and (iii) focused on service to the public interest.

11. None of that argues that such a pragmatic, science-based ideology would ever be accepted by a significant plurality or a majority in any country now or ever. Given human cognitive biology, any anti-bias pragmatism concept is likely to be threatening and psychologically uncomfortable for most people (>95 ?). Science-based pragmatism and its moral values may never be an acceptable ideology for more than just a few people (~5% ?). This is also not an argument that such a pragmatic mindset could ever come to dominate most policy makers’ or politicians’ personal ideological beliefs.

12. This also is not an argument that if such pragmatism were to be adopted and seriously tried that it would work well enough to make a detectable difference for the better in political policies and outcomes. However, this is an argument that there just might be a better ideology relative to all prior ideologies. The only way to know if science-based pragmatic pragmatism could work is to seriously try it. That is a testable hypothesis.

B&B orig: 10/27/16

Pragmatic politics: The secular morality of reason

One of the aspects of the pragmatic, anti-bias political ideology promulgated here is its focus on morals as a way to promote reason while reducing emotion and unconscious bias. It’s been argued here that politics is often or usually more based on belief and emotion than fact and logic.

By positing fidelity to less distorted truth or facts and fidelity to less biased common sense as two of three key morals in pragmatic politics, reason or conscious thought explicitly becomes a moral issue.

One criticism of the three morals anti-bias ideology is that there’s not sufficient proof that it can actually make any difference in real world politics at the level of whole societies or nations. That’s mostly true. However, circumstantial evidence suggests otherwise. Nonetheless, as cognitive and social science continues to accumulate information about how the human mind deals with politics, evidence is pointing to a solid biological rationale for considering less biased reason to be a universal human moral.

Evidence of reason as a moral issue: A recently published peer-reviewed paper by Tomas Ståhl and colleagues at the University of Illinois at Chicago and the University of Exeter suggests that some people see reason and evidence as a secular moral issue. Those people tend to consider the rationality of another's beliefs as evidence of their morality or lack thereof.

According to the paper’s summary, “In the present article we demonstrate stable individual differences in the extent to which a reliance on logic and evidence in the formation and evaluation of beliefs is perceived as a moral virtue, and a reliance on less rational processes is perceived as a vice. We refer to this individual difference variable as moralized rationality. . . . Results show that the Moralized Rationality Scale (MRS) is internally consistent, and captures something distinct from the personal importance people attach to being rational (Studies 1–3). Furthermore, the MRS has high test-retest reliability (Study 4), is conceptually distinct from frequently used measures of individual differences in moral values, and it is negatively related to common beliefs that are not supported by scientific evidence (Study 5).” Ståhl T, Zaal MP, Skitka LJ (2016) Moralized Rationality: Relying on Logic and Evidence in the Formation and Evaluation of Belief Can Be Seen as a Moral Issue. PLoS ONE 11(11): e0166332.doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0166332

 Given the intolerant, moral nature of politics (described here before), it’s perhaps not surprising that people who moralize rationality tend to harshly judge others they see as less rational because less rational is perceived to be less moral. Like believers in standard political ideological frameworks, e.g.,liberalism or conservatism, that has consequences for “moral rationalist” behavior.

According to Ståhl’s paper, “People who moralize rationality should not only respond more strongly to irrational (vs. rational) acts, but also towards the actors themselves. . . . . a central finding in the moral psychology literature is that differences in moral values and attitudes lead to intolerance. For example, the more morally convicted people are on a particular issue (i.e., the more their stance is grounded in their fundamental beliefs about what is right or wrong), the more they prefer to distance themselves socially from those who are attitudinally dissimilar.”

ScienceDaily commented on the paper: moral rationalists see less rational individuals as “less moral; prefer to distance themselves from them; and under some circumstances, even prefer them to be punished for their irrational behavior . . . . By contrast, individuals who moralized rationality judged others who were perceived as rational as more moral and worthy of praise. . . . While morality is commonly linked to religiosity and a belief in God, the current research identifies a secular moral value and how it may affect individuals' interpersonal relations and societal engagement.”

ScienceDaily also noted that “in the wake of a presidential election that often kept fact-checkers busy, Ståhl (the paper’s lead researcher) says the findings would suggest a possible avenue to more productive political discourse that would encourage a culture in which it is viewed as a virtue to evaluate beliefs based on logical reasoning and the available evidence. . . . . ‘In such a climate, politicians would get credit for engaging in a rational intellectually honest argument . . . . They would also think twice before making unfounded claims, because it would be perceived as immoral.’”

Obviously, that won't happen as long as most people retain their beliefs in less rational, pro-bias ideological frameworks such as liberalism or conservatism.

The cognitive and social science-based, anti-bias morals: The pragmatic, science-based ideology advocated here at B&B clearly is a form of a moral rationalist ideology. Ståhl’s data makes it plain that respect for rationality, i.e., less biased common sense or conscious thinking, is elevated to the level of a core political principle or moral belief as the anti-bias ideology advocated here explicitly does. What is new is that this research provides direct evidence that some people do in fact treat being rational as an core personal moral. Ståhl’s paper provides evidence that a pragmatic, anti-bias ideological framework with it’s three core morals* (i) could in fact define people’s mind set toward politics, and (ii) affect their beliefs and political behavior.

* The three core anti-bias morals are (1) fidelity to less biased or distorted reality and facts, (2) fidelity to less biased or distorted common sense, both of which are focused on (3) fidelity to service to the public interest, defined for example as described here before.

Questions: Is the finding of respect for rational thinking about political issues a credible basis for a secular political principle or moral? If not, why? Is there no such thing as a “secular moral” because morals can only come from religious belief or a supernatural source? If there’s no such thing as a secular moral, then what explains the data that Ståhl and his colleagues generated?

B&B orig: 11/23/16

Impeachable Offenses Described

Alexander Hamilton

The second paragraph of Federalist 65 contains Alexander Hamilton’s description of impeachable offenses:

A well-constituted court for the trial of impeachments is an object not more to be desired than difficult to be obtained in a government wholly elective. The subjects of its jurisdiction are those offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself. The prosecution of them, for this reason, will seldom fail to agitate the passions of the whole community, and to divide it into parties more or less friendly or inimical to the accused. In many cases it will connect itself with the pre-existing factions, and will enlist all their animosities, partialities, influence, and interest on one side or on the other; and in such cases there will always be the greatest danger that the decision will be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties, than by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt.

Hamilton was amazingly accurate. Simply discussing impeachment agitates the passions of the whole community and divides it into parties more or less friendly or inimical to the accused. That is an understatement.

But the main point is this: Impeachable actions are “offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the abuse or violation of the public trust. They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself.”

Has President Trump committed any impeachable offense? If agitated passions of the whole community and division into parties more or less friendly or inimical to the accused are competent evidence, then yes, Trump may have committed an impeachable Offense(es). But that is not enough.

But, there is direct evidence in the public record that Trump and his associates did abuse or violate the public trust. Trump himself publicly asked the Russians to hack the DNC, and they did that immediately after Trump's request. Meetings between Russians and members of the Trump campaign to collect dirt on Clinton's campaign, was falsely denied as a meeting for another reason. Collectively, all of the actions, lies, indictments for lying about Russia and successful prosecutions for lying about Russia clearly show a abuse or violation of the public trust.

Political lying betrays and thus abuses and violates public trust. There is no way to deny that fact.

The logical, non-partisan conclusion is obvious: Impeach Trump. The partisan conclusion will fall along partisan lines.

Is that logic sound or flawed, e.g., too biased or too partisan to be defensible?

B&B orig: 3/27/19

Pragmatic Rationalism: an Anti-Ideology Ideology

Source: Vox, with info sources cited therein

Anocracies are loosely defined as part democracy and part dictatorship, or as a regime that mixes democratic with autocratic features

CONTEXT: From time to time, I try to explain my human biology-based ideology. What led to that mindset was a number of things. One was an increasing awareness of how corrupt, inept and self-serving the two-party system is. Another was the rise of deep public discontent with and distrust in American political institutions, politics, politicians and real and fake experts. Another was a possibly not completely correct understanding that all forms of government, capitalism, socialism, communism, fascism, dictatorship, theocracy, almost all of which were kleptocratic, and whatever else humans have ever tried usually led to bad to awful outcomes for most average people, or, in view of endless wars, poverty, tyranny and human misery, at least that’s how it seemed.[1] Also in the mix was the fact that human technology and activity could easily lead to destruction of civilization and maybe even species self-annihilation. If civilization collapses, billions will die.

Finally, there was a decline in respect for truth, facts and defensible, reasonable logic, something that was surprisingly motivating in looking for an appealing alternative political mindset. The disrespect had been growing for decades, but now with the rise of Trump-style populism, it is full-blown, powerful and highly corrosive to civil society.

Obviously, all of that is personal opinion and some or much of it could be at odds with objective truth. Different people will see the situation differently. The data shown in the charts suggest that things have been getting better despite all the discontent, distrust, complaining and finger pointing. Maybe too many people’s expectations, e.g., me, are out of line with what the human species can do. Maybe they’re not.

Setting that good news stuff aside, what seemed to be universal failure of all tested political ideologies, forms of government and economic systems, it was to be reasonable to look elsewhere for potential answers. It took only a brief exposure, ~30 minutes, to a book on the biology of politics, George Lakoff’s 1996 book Moral Politics: What Conservatives Know That Liberals Don't, to switch the light bulb on. It’s all about the biology, stupid -- ideology, religion and systems of government are beside the point. People are going to be people. Period. That lesson came fast and easy. What came after was slow and hard.

THE IDEOLOGY: The science is in and the debate is over: If serving the public interest or common good is the goal, politics is more incoherent and irrational than needed. Arguably, it is more incoherent and irrational than not.[2]

Bad leaders usually share a few traits that are deeply ingrained in human biology. They (i) disrespect or completely ignore truth and facts, (ii) don't care if they apply completely bogus logic or reason to whatever truth and facts they are claiming, and (iii) cite their facts, logic, ideology and morals as the basis for the best outcomes for the people, but (iv) usually (> 95% of the time ?) generate results that greatly benefit them, their family, friends, supporters and/or ideology, while doing little or nothing for, or actually harming, the public interest. Sooner or later, it always seems to turn out about like that. The last century may have some contrary lessons, but listening to everyone complain today, one wouldn't think that.

If one accepts the fact (not opinion) that human biology is by far the dominant force in politics and the opinion that the public interest usually gets the shaft while elites frolic in semi-utopia, then what can one do for politics? Over time, this ideology slowly came into focus:

Ignore political ideologies to the extent possible and to the extent possible hold as the highest moral political values (i) fidelity to objective truth, (ii) fidelity to reason that is as unbiased or logically defensible as possible, and (iii) use that to inform and shape policy and laws in service to the public interest based on a competition of ideas.

The public interest is a complicated, contested concept. It will probably be debated forever. However, putting that aside, one definition of service to the public interest can be described like this: It means governance based on identifying a rational, optimum balance between serving public, individual and commercial interests based on an objective, fact- and logic-based analysis of competing policy choices, while (1) being reasonably transparent and responsive to public opinion, (2) protecting and growing the American economy, (3) fostering individual economic and personal growth opportunity, (4) defending personal freedoms and the American standard of living, (5) protecting national security and the environment, (6) increasing transparency, competition and efficiency in commerce when possible, and (7) fostering global peace, stability and prosperity whenever reasonably possible, all of which is constrained by (i) honest, reality-based fiscal sustainability that limits the scope and size of government and regulation to no more than what is needed and (ii) genuine respect for the U.S. constitution and the rule of law with a particular concern for limiting unwarranted legal complexity and ambiguity to limit opportunities to subvert the constitution and the law.

Obviously, some of that will be instantly criticized, e.g., protecting and growing the American economy is unsustainable and completely at odds with protecting the environment. That's right, there are internal contradictions and the way that conception of service to the public interest deals with conflicting goals is to focus on “identifying a rational, optimum balance” among competing interests.

The point is to build a mindset that relentlessly looks for merit and tangible results for the public interest. Weak argument such as, “What’s good for GM is good for America” isn't persuasive. What’s good for the public interest is good for America. Notice the mindset change from the specific to the broad.

The point of the ideology is to make it a little harder to do politics based on opacity, lies and fake logic. Opacity, lies and fake logic are invariably used by special interests, bad leaders, e.g., Donald Trump, and ideologues to win arguments. The point is to make politics perform the best it can within the limits of human biology.

Will it work? Not at present. Maybe never. At the moment, American politics is turning toward more lies, fake logic and opacity, not less. Maybe this read is wrong, but the American public has lost patience and is succumbing to fear and other reason-killing emotions. There is some evidence that at least some humans can be noticeably more rational about politics. But whether that mindset can ever gain mainstream acceptance is an open question. In view of human history and biology, it seems highly unlikely.

Footnotes:
1. There is data showing that for many poor people in the US and probably most other countries, the last 100 years or so have been the best time in human history to be poor in terms of access to basic necessities such as food, public education, clean water, sanitation and health care. If that data is basically correct, things could be a whole lot worse than they are now.

2. This is how some scientists see politics: “. . . . the typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the political field. He argues and analyzes in a way which he would readily recognize as infantile within the sphere of his real interests. . . . cherished ideas and judgments we bring to politics are stereotypes and simplifications with little room for adjustment as the facts change. . . . . the real environment is altogether too big, too complex, and too fleeting for direct acquaintance. We are not equipped to deal with so much subtlety, so much variety, so many permutations and combinations. Although we have to act in that environment, we have to reconstruct it on a simpler model before we can manage it.”

B&B orig: 5/29/18

Antecedents to Pragmatic Politics: Karl Popper

Popper commenting on confirmation bias in politics and life generally

In one recent essay in a series on the origins of modern liberalism, The Exiles Fight Back, the Economist describes the reaction of three Viennese intellectuals in responding to the tyranny and terror that both centralized power, e.g., fascism, and collectivism, e.g., socialism, lead to in the years leading up to and after World War 2. The three, Frederich Hayek, Joseph Schumpeter and Karl Popper, were reacting to extremist political ideologies and, in their own ways, criticizing the dangers of centralized power: “Each was troubled by the Anglo-Saxon countries’ complacency that totalitarianism could never happen to them. Yet warning signs abounded. The Depression in the 1930s had made government intervention seem desirable to most economists. Now the Soviet Union was a wartime ally, and criticism of its terror-based regime was frowned upon. Perhaps most worryingly, in Britain and America war had brought centralised authority and a single collective purpose: victory. Who could be sure that this command-and-control machine would be switched off?”

According to the Economist essay, the three men did not cooperate, but instead a division of thinking arose spontaneously: “Popper sought to blow up the intellectual foundations of totalitarianism and explain how to think freely. Hayek set out to demonstrate that, to be safe, economic and political power must be diffuse. Schumpeter provided a new metaphor for describing the energy of a market economy: creative destruction.”

Popper’s war effort: Popper's 1945 book, The Open Society and Its Enemies, begins with an attack on historicism, which the Economist describes as “grand theories dressed up as laws of history, which make sweeping prophecies about the world and sideline individual volition.” That may be a definition that at least some people would dispute.

The Economist comments on Popper’s thinking: “Hegel’s metaphysics and his insistence that the state has its own spirit are dismissed as ‘mystifying cant’. Popper gives a sympathetic hearing to Marx’s critique of capitalism, but views his predictions as little better than a tribal religion.

In 1934 Popper had written about the scientific method, in which hypotheses are advanced and scientists seek to falsify them. Any hypothesis left standing is a kind of knowledge. This conditional, modest concept of truth recurs in ‘The Open Society’. ‘We must break with the habit of deference to great men,’ Popper argues. A healthy society means a competition for ideas, not central direction, and critical thinking that considers the facts, not who is presenting them. Contrary to Marx’s claim, democratic politics was not a pointless charade. But Popper thought that change was only possible through experimentation and piecemeal policy, not utopian dreams and large-scale schemes executed by an omniscient elite.

Taken together, in the 1940s Hayek, Popper and Schumpeter offered a muscular attack on collectivism, totalitarianism and historicism, and a restatement of the virtues of liberal democracy and markets. Capitalism is not an engine for warmongering exploitation (as Marxists believed), nor a static oligarchy, nor a high road to crisis. Accompanied by the rule of law and democracy, it is the best way for individuals to retain their liberty.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s vindicated Popper’s searing attack on the stupidity of grand historical schemes.”

Since this is about political theory, criticisms are to be expected: “The three Austrians are vulnerable to common criticisms. The concentration of their intellectual firepower on left-wing ideologies (rather than Nazism) can seem lopsided. Schumpeter had been complacent about the rise of Nazism; but for Popper and Hayek, the devastation unleashed by fascism was self-evident. Both argued that Marxism and fascism had common roots: the belief in a collective destiny; the conviction that the economy should be marshalled to a common goal and that a self-selected elite should give the orders.

Another criticism is that they put too little emphasis on taming the savagery of the market, particularly given the misery of unemployment in the 1930s.”

In addition to political and philosophical criticisms, advancing science arguably has brought some of the logic basis for Popper’s thinking into question. For example, one analyst argued that Popper’s thinking rested on assumptions such as (1) no precise predictions are possible in the social sciences, and (2) no short term predictions are possible in the social sciences. Depending on how one defines a ‘precise’ or ‘short term’ prediction in the social sciences, Popper appears to be wrong about both of those beliefs. Both kinds of predictions are have been documented.

Also different is new technology, which appears to be undermining Popper’s 1940s point of view that knowledge was contingent and dispersed: “A free, decentralised society allocated resources better than planners, who could only guess at the knowledge dispersed among millions of individuals. Today, by contrast, the most efficient system may be a centralised one. Big data could allow tech firms and governments to “see” the entire economy and co-ordinate it far more efficiently than Soviet bureaucrats ever could.

Schumpeter thought monopolies were temporary castles that were blown away by new competitors. Today’s digital elites seem entrenched. Popper and Hayek might be fighting for a decentralisation of the internet, so that individuals owned their own data and identities. Unless power is dispersed, they would have pointed out, it is always dangerous.”

If digital elites are entrenched and fairly resistant to creative destruction, then it would seem that regulation is one way to deal with the danger inherent in accumulated power. Today, some see giants such as Google, Facebook, Twitter and Microsoft as being in, or having made, a transition from benign to malicious. Part of the logic is simple. There is so damn much money to be made. One problem with jumps right out: To some extent, all that damn money has bought government so intelligent regulation is off the table. The other problem, which exacerbates the first, is sweeping anti-government, pro-business political ideology that currently dominates American politics. Together, the two problems are positively toxic. An intelligent balance cannot be struck.

Popper & Pragmatism: The Economist comments: “Popper was deeply concerned about workers’ conditions; in ‘The Open Society’ he lists approvingly the labour regulations put in place since Marx wrote about children toiling in factories. He thought pragmatic policies could gradually improve the lot of all.” That accords with Popper’s belief in experimentation and piecemeal policy.[1] That mindset is also compatible with the brand of politics advocated here, a pragmatic, biology-based, anti-bias ideology.

Footnote:
1. In his 1998 book (pages 394-395), The User Illusion, Tor Norretrander argues that information theory (the complexity of social forces) shows that free markets are a more efficient way forward to social progress than planned economies. The argument is that free markets are more efficient at allowing successes to succeed and failures to fail: “The collapse of communism is a manifestation of the low bandwidth of the social domain, the low capacity of language compared to the actual wealth of information in our needs. Feedback from society to planners cannot take place efficiently enough over the conscious linguistic bandwidth. Supply and demand are better at returning this information. This is ironic, for the whole idea of socialism is that barter and the market economy discard too much information.”

Norretranders may or may not be right about what the ‘whole idea of socialism’ is. Nonetheless, his point about information content in social reactions to offers of various goods and service in the economy compared to what elites and central planners would provide seems self-evident on the basis of unbiased common sense (logic). That argument seems about as powerful as any that a planned economy will not be as efficient in the long run as a free market economy. As always, the trick is for free market economies is how to regulate to balance unfettered capitalism’s tendency toward corruption, brutality and misery without crippling it. Unfortunately, balancing is not generally compatible with political, economic, religious or philosophical ideologies that do not look to trial and error pragmatism as a core value.

B&B orig: 8/31/18

Chapter Review: Plato, Aristotle and the Origins of Political Psychology

Plato

In his 2103 book, Political Psychology: Neuroscience, Genetics and Politics, political science professor George Marcus describes the origin of the Western intellectual framework that shapes and constrains how social sciences approach the science of politics. That framework both reveals and hides questions for research. For the most part, Marcus conveys a cautionary tale about the modern mindset and its conceptions of time, reason and emotion.

He is trying to teach self-awareness and some humility in the face of the subtle power of the modern intellectual framework. It is a lens or mindset that can distort reality and understanding. Nonetheless, we view politics through that modern Western lens even though it sometimes misleads us. The trick for the open-minded is to be self-aware and on guard. The following is based on chapter 3, A Short History of a Long Tradition.

The short history and its lessons were written for students of political psychology and related disciplines such as sociology. However, the core facts and ideas are helpful, maybe necessary, for people who want to be informed, rational citizens operating on the basis of objective evidence to the extent that influencer is available to the public. Even though social sciences knowledge and reality is constrained by empirical data and error-correction by peer-review, there is a powerful, subtle agenda that operates mostly unconsciously.

The Enlightenment Agenda: That modern agenda is grounded in the 17th and 18th century intellectual ferment in the Europe and the US. The ferment is called The Enlightenment and it constitutes a powerful social science agenda. Marcus points out that an agenda identifies ideas that are seen as important and what one would expect to find based on those ideas or assumptions. Regarding The Enlightenment, he comments: “Those ideas, and the agenda that they defined, have become so widely shared and so deeply embedded that they have become largely invisible with few to challenge its assumptions. And, as Plato argued, shared beliefs are not only likely to become invisible, when a rare iconoclast raises a challenge to accepted wisdoms, the response is hardly a welcome one.” Plato in his classic work, The Republic, in defense of philosopher kings and enlightened aristocrats as the best form of government, writes that the iconoclast will be killed. That is definitely not a welcome response.

Marcus points out that the human mind both hides and protects the unity we think we see. That Enlightenment unity gives the world coherence and meaning, even in situations where there is no rational basis for coherence. Regarding how the mind operates and self-deceives, Marcus comments: “As we shall see, Plato anticipated this research by more than two millennia. . . . . Rather, we all evince this same protective shield. The goal of the sections that follow is to make the invisible visible. This chapter is intended to ruffle some feathers: yours in particular.” One can only wonder what it is like to take professor Marcus’ political psychology class.

Also, one can only wonder how it was that Plato, by simple observation alone in his lifetime (c.428-347 B.C.), observed and correctly interpreted the fundamentally self-deceiving basis by which the mind operates when dealing with politics. That must have been some mind.

Aristotle

Two Western Conceptions of Time: Pre-Enlightenment & Enlightenment: Professor Marcus’ short history described two different Western conceptions of time. He argues that understanding the two different conceptions of time are necessary to understanding politics. Existing evidence shows that most people are inconsistent about which conception of time they apply in their thinking, and instead “most of us adhere haphazardly to one or the other as circumstances warrant.” The pre-Enlightenment mind conceived of time as operating in cycles. In that mindset, political regimes started, grew, matured and then lost vitality and withered. It was an endless cycle. The parallels to spring, summer, fall and winter are obvious. The modern or Enlightenment conception of time see it as a one-way arrow, always moving forward with increasing knowledge and social progress.

The philosopher Hannah Arendt is credited with pointing out that the distinction between the premodern and the modern conceptions of time constituted a radical mindset change. In the premodern mind, political regime change was seen as a ‘revolution’, which reflected the view of time as cyclical. Both mindsets have major implications for how the world is perceived and understood. In the case of the premodern mindset: “We search for the recurring patterns that provide us with confidence that our past foretells our future.” In other words, the cycle of time defines our fate. In turn, that leads many people to a belief that it is best not to go against our fate or destiny because that can lead to disaster. At this point, Marcus argues: “Time as cyclical, especially when married to the idea of fate and destiny, is inherently conservative, protective of the established social order, established political authority, and dominant traditions.” That thought leads to this important point:

“In addition, with time as cyclical, the debate between advocates of democracy, such as Aristotle, and those who advocated aristocratic rule, such as Plato, is stable. Nothing new will alter that debate as human nature is fixed and our natures either suit us for democracy, as some have it, or for aristocracy as others have it.”

Marcus then points out that with the premodern view of time as cyclic, the role of political psychology is limited because what government and politics can do, at most, is ease the passage of time for people. Trying to challenge the limits that cyclical time imposes is pointless folly. From that point of view, an important political psychology goal would be to develop knowledge of what leads to virtue and what leads to corruption. Obviously, that is an important goal for adherents of the modern linear, or probably any other, view of time. At least, that is how it appears to this observer.

By contrast with the premodern continual vision of self-renewing cycles of time, the modern or Enlightenment thinkers “reconceived time as an engine that, as a train on tracks, drives along a line from past to future. Time as progress replaced time as cyclical repetition. . . . . The modern conception of time understands time as a linear progression from an older and archaic way of life to a new, younger, and more progressive way of life.” Here, life is seen to progress from early, immature stages of political belief and behavior to later, more refined stages. The later stages are better able to adapt to changing forces such as social, economic and environmental changes.

For example, Karl Marx saw politics as an inevitable progression of class conflict from feudalism to mercantilism to capitalism, to socialism and finally to communism. In a way, time is seen as an arrow. For Marx, the engine of progress is class struggle. For Immanuel Kant, the engine is war. For Alexis de Tocqueville, based on his direct observations of, and thinking about, the new US democracy in 1831 and thereafter, the engine of progress is democracy: “Hence, democracy becomes the institutional regime most likely to accelerate progress because a democratic regime enables more people to engage in private and public deliberation on the means by which their sundry preferences can be justified and realized.”

Pre-Modern vs Modern Visions of the Role of Emotion and Reason: Disagreements on the nature and political importance of emotion and reason date at least back to Plato and Aristotle. Plato’s view led him to the conclusion that the masses are too influenced by emotion and thus enlightened and trained aristocrats and/or an enlightened philosopher king constituted the best form of government. Plato argued that knowledge alone should be the basis for governance, and as mentioned above, people will kill in defense of the false beliefs, myths and illusions that most people live by. He saw that as placing beliefs over truth: “Plato argued that to give the public a role in public affairs would introduce assertive opinion, what today political psychologists would call ‘motivated reasoning’. Hence, it is no surprise that Plato predicted that when truth confronts belief, the result would be the killing of truth-sayers.”

By contrast, Aristotle advocated for democracy based on the collective wisdom of the crowd as a source of intellectual and situational diversity. Aristotle believed rule by many was a better basis for governance than intellectual and situational diversity of one or a few rulers. In his view, collective public wisdom was superior to the wisdom of the one or the few. He saw governance as best based on a combination of objective knowledge and subjective goals of the people. Aristotle correctly understood that emotions and passions cannot be ignored in political thinking.

Marcus points out that Plato’s teacher, Socrates, was put to death by a democratically elected Athenian jury precisely for the crime of challenging sacred Athenian beliefs. Could that have influenced Plato to some extent? It is also interesting to note that Aristotle was an Athenian where political leaders were elected. Plato was citizen of Sparta, which was governed by kings.

Marcus commented on reason and emotion: “The interest in reason and emotion arose because it addressed the foremost question that has long engaged us: Where can we find the knowledge so that whichever regime we adopt it will be virtuous?” That arguably is the central question of our time. For example, why is the obvious corruption of President Trump seemingly acceptable to so many of his supporters and populists in general?

Emotion was generally viewed by all observers as an impediment to rational, good government and thus something that people should and can set aside. Modern cognitive science and neuroscience has shown it is impossible to separate emotion from politics. Emotion is biologically unavoidable. And, it can be very helpful. What needs to be kept in mind is that emotion can mislead and sow deep civil divisions, misery and war. When that happens, self-awareness is necessary for conscious reason to temper irrational, destructive emotions. Marcus argued that emotions are not rational.

The Three Key Influencers: Reason, Emotion & Interest: In view of the possibility, if not inevitability, of emotion in politics, philosophers have long struggled with how to deal with that reality. Enlightenment thinkers came up with the concept of interest, meaning self-interest and the public interest, to account for differences between conscious reason and emotion, which exerts effects in mostly unconscious ways. Pre-Enlightenment thinking held that reason and emotion were the main influencers. Enlightenment thinking held that reason, emotion and interest were the driving influencers. Current research has shown that interest is a powerful unconscious influence on perceptions of political reality and thinking or reasoning about it.

Therein lies a major issue: “Because interests do not reside in the self-aware mental region, we may not know what our ‘interests’ are.” That can lead to false beliefs about what objectively a person’s or the public’s interests are. The power of interest arises from a combination of unconscious calculating emotion and conscious reason heavily influenced by the emotion. The evidence that interest exerts major influences on both perception and reason is solid and not debated among experts. Evidence that people are significantly unaware of their own and the public interests is strong, maybe close to the point of being settled science.

Conservatism vs Liberalism: Marcus points out that most social scientists self-identify as liberals. One study found more than 95% of social scientists are liberals.[1] Therein lies a problem for the social sciences. Shared liberal values become invisible. That can obscure the conservative point of view and its values. Marcus cautions: “Perhaps the answer is that in any given case, our species is better off for having both orientations distributed among us than having just one modal position.” He argues that there are potential dangers and rewards in taking either a liberal or a conservative path. He also criticizes the Enlightenment view that has unduly downplayed emotions, thereby skewing visions of reality. He sees progress as both an empirical tale and a moral story.

The Human Condition: Marcus gives a sobering assessment. Progress has not been a straight line. Politics has not gone according to the Enlightenment plan. Accumulating evidence continues to show that reason and rationality is not displacing the role of emotion. Interest helps explain some aspects, but emotion continues to be a powerful influencer. The issue is coming to terms with what it is to be human. In reference to economics, sociology and social psychology there is an ongoing problem: “Blindness to the constraints induced by progressive convictions is not limited to political psychology. . . . . The problem of explanation without a clear recognition and understanding of the normative foundations of political psychology [] will limit the value of our research to show us what is and what is not plausible, let alone possible.”

Clearly, the evidence-based anti-bias ideology advocated here at B&B crashes directly into this concern about the nature and limits of the human mind acting alone and in groups, tribes and societies. How much more and what more, if anything, are possible in terms of evidence- and reason-based politics? The answers are unknowable. So far, no major ideology and social institution predicated on elevating the role reason to some non-trivial extent has had a fair test on a large, nation-size scale. Given that, the immense power of social institutions as sociologist Peter Berger described in his 1963 book, Invitation to Sociology, has never been tested in human history.

The situation is not all bleak. Marcus point out that neuroscience is rapidly changing our view of time, reason, emotion and knowledge, all of which can point to new possibilities. Therein lies the best hope for new understandings in how to try to deal with the problems that political psychology has been struggling with at least since Plato and Aristotle engaged in their sparring match over two thousand years ago.

Footnote:
1. One observer pointed out that maybe conservatives avoid the social sciences because much of what has been found contradicts conservatism to some extent. Some research suggests that conservatives are generally more uncomfortable with cognitive dissonance associated with ambiguity and contradictions than most liberals tend to be. In other words, social science just might be too psychologically uncomfortable for most conservative minds to find much appeal in that branch of the sciences.

B&B orig: 11/22/18