Update: The Georgia state RICO lawsuit against DJT

Two judges on a Georgia state appeals court panel of three, has tossed Fani Willis off the prosecution for DJT for his crimes in GA. The two argued that Willis was disqualified to prosecute DJT due to an appearance of a conflict of interest, not any actual conflict of interest. The two judges had to make up new law to boot her off. No law or prior GA court decision has ever done this. The actual law requires proof of an actual appearance of interest.

I take this decision as evidence of MAGA rot spreading to and poisoning state courts, like it is doing to federal courts. What is interesting is that when MAGA politicians, judges and other elites are in situations of actual conflicts of interest, it is treated as a Democrat lie or something too trivial to pay any attention to. DJT routinely operates with huge actual conflicts of interest and it doesn't even slightly faze MAGA. MAGA eats conflicts for breakfast and forgets about it by lunch.

Willis has appealed to the GA supreme court. I do not know if MAGA has rotted that court. If so, she is gone and DJT once again likely will get off the hook for his crimes. If not, the outcome is still unpredictable. 

Law & Crime writes:

The decision by the Georgia Court of Appeals on Thursday morning to scrap Fulton County District Attorney Fani Willis and her office from the state’s felony prosecution of Donald Trump came with a strong rebuke from one of the court’s three appellate judges, who dissented on account of being “particularly troubled” with the circumstances surrounding the move.

“We have no authority to reverse the trial court’s denial of a motion to disqualify,” wrote Judge Benjamin Land in his dissent. “None.”

The dissent by judge Benjamin Land in the 32 page decision (1) lays out the difference between an appeals court and a trial court, and (2) explains why it is very bad to just make up laws as you go, as MAGA judges sometimes do, especially Republican judges on the US supreme court. 

Judge Lands's dissent in the Georgia Appeals Court argues:

Because the law does not support the result reached by the majority, I respectfully dissent. I am particularly troubled by the fact that the majority has taken what has long been a discretionary decision for the trial court to make and converted it to something else entirely. If this Court was the trier of fact and had the discretion to choose a remedy based on our own observations, assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, and weighing of the evidence, then perhaps we would be justified in reaching the result declared by the majority. But we are not trial judges, and we lack that authority. Given the unique role of the trial court and the fact that it is the court which has broad discretion to impose a remedy that fits the situation as it finds it to be, we should resist the temptation to interfere with that discretion, including its chosen remedy, just because we happen to see things differently. Doing otherwise violates well-established precedent, threatens the discretion given to trial courts, and blurs the distinction between our respective courts.

Our role as appellate judges is critically important, but it often requires restraint. We are here to ensure the law has been applied correctly and to correct harmful legal errors when we see them. It is not our job to second-guess trial judges or to substitute our judgment for theirs. We do not find the facts but instead defer to the trial court’s factual findings where there is any evidence to support them. “We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion to disqualify a prosecutor for abuse of discretion. Such an exercise of discretion is based on the trial court’s findings of fact which we must sustain if there is any evidence to support them.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Neuman v. State, 311 Ga. 83, 88 (3) (856 SE2d 289) (2021).

Here, the trial court expressly found that appellants failed to show that the district attorney had an actual conflict of interest, failed to show that she received any material financial benefit as a result of her relationship with Nathan Wade, failed to show that she had a personal stake in the conviction of any defendant, failed to show that her relationship with Wade involved any actual impropriety on her part, and failed to show that their relationship, including their financial arrangements, had any actual impact on the case. Because there was some evidence presented to the trial court that supported these findings, we are bound to accept them. Neuman, 311 Ga. at 88 (3). The majority does not dispute these findings. Rather, it holds, with the citation of no supporting authority and apparently for the first time in the history of our state, that the mere existence of an appearance of impropriety, in and of itself, is sufficient to reverse the trial court’s refusal to disqualify the district attorney and her entire office. As shown below, the law does not support this outcome; rather, it compels precisely the opposite.

Where, as here, a prosecutor has no actual conflict of interest and the trial court, based on the evidence presented to it, rejects the allegations of actual impropriety, we have no authority to reverse the trial court’s denial of a motion to disqualify. None. Even where there is an appearance of impropriety. Our binding precedent and the doctrine of stare decisis require our restraint and do not permit us to impose a different remedy than the one chosen by the trial court simply because we might see the matter differently and might have chosen to impose another remedy had we been the trial judge. (emphasis added)